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Complex global challenges such as climate change and the 2008 financial crisis have 
pushed firms to adopt more socially responsible strategies. Yet many still display socially 
irresponsible behavior, and the demonstrable effect on firm performance and strategic growth has 
been scarcely researched. Consequently, this thesis aims to address the following overarching 
research question: does corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR) adversely affect performance and 
strategic growth or can firms act with impunity? Specifically, we examined the financial and non-
financial outcomes of being socially irresponsible. Additionally, we analyzed whether corporate 
political activity (CPA) and corporate reputation moderate these relationships.  
The thesis is comprised of three core chapters. In the first chapter we applied content 
analysis to systematically review the instrumental stakeholder theory (IST) literature to first, 
determine the current state of knowledge; and second, extend the theory into the nonmarket 
domain. Following from this review, in the second core chapter we draw on IST to conduct a 
quantitative analysis to determine the impact of CSiR on both market and corporate social 
performance, and the moderating role of CPA. Our findings suggest that CSiR does not seem to 
influence market-based performance measures. Meanwhile, it does diminish corporate social 
performance—a negative effect that is intensified by the firm engaging in financial and relational 
political activity. Finally, in the third core chapter we use IST and signaling theory to explore the 
firms’ ability to announce new mergers and acquisitions (M&As) in the aftermath of a CSiR event. 
Our results show that there is a partially significant negative relationship between firm involvement 
in CSiR and the increase in M&A announcements, which becomes nonsignificant when M&As are 





moderate this relationship (consistent with the analysis in the previous chapter), corporate 
reputation exerts a positive moderating effect.  
This thesis contributes theoretically to advancing IST and signaling theory literatures 
through engaging and applying these ideas in the nonmarket strategy domain. Empirically, the 
primary contribution of this thesis is in adding to extant research on the financial and non-financial 
outcomes of CSiR by using quantitative methods. Specifically, we developed a unique CSiR 
database from LexisNexis media publications, that formed the basis of the analyses in Chapters 3 
and 4. Finally, the findings of this thesis have important implications for managers and leaders, 
who may extract valuable lessons about stakeholder management and the implications of CSiR, 
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1.1 Introduction  
Over the last three decades, as economies and companies globalized, we have witnessed 
escalating stakeholder pressure on firms to readdress their role in society (Hah and Freeman, 2014). 
Access to new international markets, where firms often take advantage of cheap labor and lax 
regulatory systems (El Ghoul, Guedhami and Kim, 2017); the exposure of serious corporate 
misconduct in the lead up to the 2008 financial crisis (Herzig and Moon, 2013); and the antecedents 
and outcomes of climate change (Reid and Toffel, 2009), are some of the issues and areas that have 
transformed not only the structures and operating practices of firms, but also how stakeholders 
view corporate action and impact. Alongside these matters is the fact that firms are becoming 
increasingly powerful in terms of influence over governments and control of important resources 
(McDonnell and Werner, 2016). Firms often bridge institutional deficiencies, particularly in 
emerging economies, assuming a de facto governmental role by assuming, or sharing, 
responsibilities for health, education, human rights, and environmental protection (Kolk and Van 
Tulder, 2010; Scherer, Palazzo and Matten, 2014).  
Firms have increasingly expanded across national borders to take advantage of new 
markets, access scarce resources, expand production and sales, and form new alliances (Enderwick, 
2018). Besides these drivers to grow internationally, there is a burgeoning trend, at local, regional 
and national government levels, to compete for corporate investment by offering lucrative 
incentives to establish production and value chain operations (Matten and Moon, 2008). For 
example, the global technology giant Amazon effectively ignited a bidding war in the United States 
between local city and state governments, in its quest to establish a second headquarters. The firm 
promised to invest significantly in the selected area in the form of job creation, while seeking 





strategy highlights the interconnections between powerful firms and government officials, even if 
this ultimately attracts significant backlash from social activists and local community groups, as 
happened in the Amazon example.   
 The increased role of firms’ in both social and political spheres is now shaping how they 
operate and devise their strategic goals beyond merely market intent. In this regard, Baron (1995) 
first introduced the concept of nonmarket strategy (NMS) to account for corporate social, political 
and legal activities that shape the competitive environment. Research in both strategic management 
and international business has now moved towards designing NMS that improves firm 
performance, often specifically focused on influencing public policy decisions and outcomes 
(Bonardi, Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2006). This in turn has prompted scholars to devote 
considerable resources to understand where nonmarket factors fit into the more traditional business 
environment. As firms increase their involvement in social and political arenas, this is affecting 
how they develop and implement core strategic decision-making processes (Hawn, in press), 
working to understand how to align their market and nonmarket strategies to achieve their corporate 
objectives (Lawton, Doh and Rajwani, 2014).  
We1 note that NMS has developed almost separately across two main strands of literature. 
Firstly, corporate social responsibility (CSR), which accounts for the policies and practices that 
firms implement concerning their social and environmental impact. And secondly, corporate 
political activity (CPA), which considers the initiatives that firms undertake to shape public policy 
and regulatory frameworks in their favor. Separately, both topics have contributed extensively to 
 
1 This thesis differs from the more traditional monograph thesis in that its chapters can be more easily formatted for 
publication purposes. Based on the structure of previous thesis (e.g. García García, R., 2014. ‘The effect of 
internationalization on the result of Spanish listed firms: 1986-2010’), guided by the same rationale, the term “we” has 





the NMS literature, yet questions remain regarding how to align both strands effectively to improve 
firm performance (den Hond, Rehbein, de Bakker and Lankveld, 2014; Lawton et al., 2014; 
Liedong, Rajwani and Mellahi, 2017; Mellahi et al., 2016).  
Despite the increased interest in NMS, there are certain limitations concerning how this 
topic has developed. Firstly, scholars in the nonmarket arena have called for the alignment of CSR 
and CPA, yet so far, little progress has been made in either conceptual or empirical studies (den 
Hond et al., 2014). Secondly, we note that both strands of the literature have developed to take a 
rather one-sided approach. In particular, focused on CSR and its financial benefits and thus 
ignoring other important factors that may develop the area, such as the alignment of CPA and CSR, 
or studying how investing in CSR does not necessarily mean a lack of involvement in irresponsible 
behavior. In some respects, we live in an age of contradictions, where corporations are viewed as 
leaders in the fight against grand societal challenges, from climate change and inequality to global 
poverty (Barnett, Henriques and Husted, 2020), but are also blamed for many of the world’s 
problems.  
As we identify growing interest in business and society to discover how CSR and CPA can 
together be a positive influence in society (e.g. Flammer, 2013; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012), the 
concept of corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR) has mostly gone undetected. The key aim of 
this research is therefore to understand the outcomes of CSiR, both in financial and non-financial 
terms. 
Originally introduced by Armstrong (1977) CSiR has been largely overlooked in 
management research. However, in recent years interest has shifted to understand what constitutes 
as irresponsible corporate behavior, why firms engage in CSiR and its potential effect on firm 





is a key factor contributing to the under-researched nature of CSiR. As interest in CSR grew in 
academia, research focused on the idea that if a firm is “doing good” it is by default “avoiding 
bad”, contributing to the lack of direct attention on CSiR as a stand-alone concept (Murphy and 
Schlegelmilch, 2013; Walker et al., 2016).   
Similar to CSR, the concept of CSiR is best described as being multifaceted and complex 
in nature, identified through a broad range of actions undertaken by firms (Riera and Iborra, 2017). 
The issue is further amplified by the lack of a consistent definition concerning what exactly 
constitutes socially irresponsible behavior. Strike et al. (2006: 852) describes this concept as “the 
set of corporate actions that negatively affects an identifiable social stakeholder’s legitimate 
claims”. Yet the notion that CSiR can be both accidental and intentional is absent here, thus blurring 
the line in terms of how CSiR can be identified to appropriate responsibility. 
Overall, the act of CSiR is commonly understood as “immoral and/or illegal corporate actions 
with negative consequences for others” (Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013: 1932). How we differentiate 
between intentional and accidental CSiR is dependent on numerous factors. Intentional CSiR is 
predominantly associated with financial misconducts like deceptive accounting practices (Harris 
and Bromiley, 2007), stock option backdating (Carberry et al., 2018; Lie 2005) and embezzlement 
(Karpoff, Lee and Martin, 2008). While accidental CSiR falls into categories reporting on issues 
such as environmental damage (Fu et al., 2019) and product recalls (Carvalho, Muralidharan and 
Bapuji, 2015). However, these distinctions can often be distorted by stakeholder perception of the 
CSiR event and can determine stakeholder’s response to these actions (Barnett, 2014). 
Intentional CSiR have previously been linked to market uncertainty (Campbell, 2007) 
where firms may try to engage in profit maximizing behavior harmful to stakeholders (Lin-Hi and 





also ensure firms incur significant costs and penalties. Moreover, the characteristics of the CSiR 
act itself can determine the level of accountability, as what exactly counts as socially irresponsible 
behavior is an evolving process. Where firms may be directly involved in CSiR acts related to 
bribery and fraud, other times, firms are also indirectly implicated in CSiR actions through 
association across their value chain (Strike et al., 2006). These actions could result in accusations 
of negligence, rather than outright misconduct. As stakeholder awareness of firm behavior 
increases, identifying irresponsible behavior can be a complex process as the concept of CSiR is 
still evolving. For instance, certain practices by firms previously deemed acceptable, are now 
considered unacceptable or even illegal due to changing laws and regulatory processes. Issues such 
as use of child labor across supply chains has received considerable attention in recent years, due 
to stakeholder pressure firms are no longer involved in these practices (Kolk and van Tulder, 2010).  
As research has only recently begun to investigate CSiR, so far, there is no consensus 
concerning whether CSiR can have a positive or negative impact on firm performance. In some 
CSR studies, scholars have reached an agreement of sorts that socially responsible firms will be 
rewarded in the marketplace (Doh, Howton, Howton and Siegel, 2010). However, research also 
suggests that despite irresponsible behavior, firms will continue to operate successfully and face 
no serious consequences for their actions. Chen, Guo, Hsiao and Chen (2018) use Apple Inc. as an 
example of this contradictory behavior, stating that despite facing accusations of child labor and 
poor working conditions across its supply chain, the firm has faced relatively little backlash and 
continues to enjoy rising profits. Indeed, as consequences such as lawsuits and diminished 
reputation are held up as potential deterrents to socially irresponsible behavior, it seems reasonable 
to ask why this behavior still occurs. Moreover, firms now face increased scrutiny from 





behavior. As firms expand across national borders and build international presence through 
dispersed global operations, this further impacts on performance and reputation.   
Despite the impact that CSiR may have on organizational outcomes, only a few exceptions 
such as Chen et al. (2018), Kim, Kim and Qian (2018), and Price and Sun (2017) have looked at 
the performance impact of social irresponsibility. For this reason, this thesis addresses the 
following research question: Does CSiR adversely affect performance and strategic growth or can 
firms act with impunity?  
Climate change, human rights, and corporate scandals are pushing firms to develop policy 
and performance outcomes that account for political, social, legal, and cultural factors. Our 
research considers these factors, and also how they are received and perceived by a firm’s 
stakeholders. It is now common practice for firms to devise socio-political strategies that consider 
a firm’s corporate social performance and corporate political activity as a means for firms to 
contribute to and sustain long-term competitive advantage (Barnett and Salomon, 2012; Baron, 
1995; Kang, Germann and Grewal, 2016; Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013). This thesis aims to address 
these various strands of NMS to gain a better understanding of how firms devise market and 
nonmarket strategy to overcome exposure to socially irresponsible behavior. By introducing 
instrumental stakeholder theory (IST) as our main theoretical lens, we aim to address how 
stakeholders have the potential to sanction or reward firms for their (ir)responsible behavior. 
1.2 Research Philosophy  
 In this section we provide a brief overview of the key methodological aspects of this thesis. 
Here we address the epistemological and ontological considerations that guided the development 





specific details on the research methods, data collection and types of analysis in each of the three 
chapters that form the main body of research for this thesis.   
 Choosing the appropriate research methods is a complex process that often changes from 
one project to another. This requires asking questions that determines the “how”, “what” and “why” 
of the research process and often reflects the researcher’s own belief system (Holden and Lynch, 
2006; Saunders, Lewis, and Thornhill, 2009). According to Burrell and Morgan (1979), scholars 
make assumptions regarding the nature of society and science, questioning if the principles and 
practices of the natural sciences apply to the social sciences (Bryman and Bell, 2011). The 
distinction between the ‘natural world’ and research concerning social phenomena like culture, 
organizations, values and beliefs spurs this debate, with researchers divided on the most appropriate 
stance to study these characteristics (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Walliman, 2011).  
Adding to this, we now operate in an era where many practical considerations are impacting 
on a researcher’s ability to access information and data, influencing methodological choices. Issues 
concerning an overload of information and potential misinformation can negatively impact 
research outcomes, making the philosophical positioning an important factor in the research 
process (Ruane, 2016). Furthermore, the practicalities of researchers gaining access to primary data 
sources is increasingly challenging. It is this aspect that has largely driven the philosophical stance 
taken in this thesis. It is important to understand that choosing the appropriate research 
methodology can provide a pathway to develop a rigorous research plan to account for any issues 





1.2.1 Epistemology and ontology  
  Before designing a research strategy, it is important to identify a researcher’s philosophical 
positioning. Epistemology is referred to as what is acceptable knowledge in a research discipline 
or field of study (Bryman and Bell, 2011; Saunders et al., 2009). According to Creswell (2003), 
when considering this approach, research in social science has traditionally taken two philosophical 
paradigms; namely, positivist (associated with a quantitative approach), and social constructionist 
(associated with a qualitative approach). Scholars carrying out a study should think about the 
research paradigm that best suits their needs. The term paradigm has different meanings depending 
on the person’s own beliefs and assumptions (Hussey and Hussey, 1997). Selecting the most 
appropriate approach and understanding the underlying philosophical issues can be useful in terms 
of clarifying the research design (i.e. data gathering, measurement, and analysis), therefore 
providing the researcher with a clear path to recognize the designs that will and will not work, 
while also helping them to adapt to constraints stemming from different subjects or knowledge 
structures (Easterby-Smith, Thorpe, and Jackson, 2008).  
While many debates surrounding epistemological and ontological considerations generally 
focus on the two main paradigms of positivism and constructivism, in recent years we note a 
growing interest in a third paradigm labeled pragmatism. Though this is generally applied to 
researchers undertaking a mixed methods approach, we agree with sentiments expressed by 
O’Leary (2013) and Saunders et al. (2009), who argued against taking traditional approaches to 
research methods and strongly encouraged academics to focus on the research question itself, 
taking the approach that best answers said research question. We recognize the different 
philosophical positions that researchers take and agree that one is not necessarily better than 





constructivism should not be an either/or ultimatum and the practicalities and challenges of the 
research process should be considered.  
We propose that taking on the paradigm of pragmatism is ideally suited to the business and 
society research domain, specifically research addressing the controversial concept of CSiR. In this 
case, taking a social constructivist position would be met with significant challenges regarding 
access to primary data. Indeed, in the initial stages of the thesis we developed an inductive 
qualitative study targeting the aerospace industry, whose strong involvement in nonmarket 
activities made it particularly appropriate to carry out our analysis. We encountered serious 
challenges throughout this process, as most senior executives were reluctant or unable to discuss 
their nonmarket strategies in detail with ‘outside researchers’. We found that firms were conflicted 
or constrained by the separate strands of nonmarket research. Where we had interest in discussing 
a firm’s socially responsible activities, dialogue about their political activity was strongly 
discouraged. This effectively ruled out taking a social constructivist approach.   
Applying the pragmatic paradigm to our research, in chapters 3 and 4 we undertake a 
quantitative approach to our research methods and design a research strategy whereby CSiR 
characteristics are viewed as observable phenomena that can be measured to explain and predict 
actions in society by researchers searching for casual relationships (Burrell and Morgan, 1979).  
We justify our epistemological approach by again pointing to the nature of our research 
topics. We designed our methodological approach based on evidence that is publicly available 
through the various databases we have used. Our topic of CSiR is rather subjective, where one may 
view an incident as morally or legally wrong, depending on the personal views of the researcher or 
the jurisdiction of the incident. We aimed to avoid any personal bias by collecting and coding a 





keywords covering a broad range of events. Added to this, we did not restrict either the 
geographical boundaries where the incidents had taken place or the media publications in which 
they had been published—ranging from high-impact outlets in terms of reach like CNN, BBC and 
the New York Times, to low impact ones such as local community newspapers and press releases.  
Due to the nature of the core research topics CSR and CPA, choosing the most appropriate 
selection of firms to create our sample played an essential role in the research process. It is 
necessary that the chosen sample is reflective of both these concepts, including firms that have a 
social and political profile. To this end, our sample comprises firms listed on Standard and Poor’s 
(S&P) 500 index, which is primarily made up of large US listed firms that have an international 
profile (Chen, Hermes and Hooghiemstra, 2020; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). S&P 500 firms 
represent a significant portion of the American economy, operating across a wide range of 
industries (Werner, 2015). Most of these firms are large multinationals that must have a market 
capitalization of $8.2 billion to meet the eligibility criteria.2 From this perspective, we note that 
larger firms are more likely to engage in political activities, expressly aimed at improving firm 
performance (Minnick and Noga, 2017). The scale of political activity that takes place in the United 
States is a contributing factor in using the S&P 500 index. For instance, in 2018 the lobbying 
activity alone totaled $3.4 billion in the country.3 Additionally, these firms all have economic, 
social and governance ratings (ESG) evidenced by their social responsibility involvement. 
Furthermore, due to the data availability of these firms on databases and publicly accessible 
platforms, the sample of firms used in the US context is wholly appropriate for the topics 
 
2 https://www.spglobal.com/spdji/en/documents/additional-material/sp-500-brochure.pdf  (Last accessed November 
10, 2020). 






researched in this thesis. As previously mentioned, we elaborate on the description of the methods 
used to perform our analyses in subsequent chapters.   
1.2.2 Research approach 
 Our research strategy is guided by the aim and objective of answering the following 
question: Does CSiR adversely affect performance and strategic growth or can firms act with 
impunity? Taking a pragmatic approach to our research and in light of the CSiR concept, the aim 
of this research is to discover: 
1. What is the current state of knowledge concerning IST and how we can extend this theory 
into the nonmarket domain? 
2. What is the impact of socially irresponsible behavior on a firm’s financial and non-financial 
performance? 
3. How will socially irresponsible behavior affect a firm’s core strategic decision processes, 
particularly external growth strategies?  
4. How do CPA and corporate reputation moderate the above relationships? 
To answer these questions, we start by conducting a content analysis of the IST literature 
in Chapter 2. This method has grown in popularity and is used to critically assess literature from 
multiple sources (Duriau, Reger and Pfarrer, 2007). Our aim here is to map the trajectory of this 
theory since its introduction by Donaldson and Preston (1995) and assess its theoretical and 
empirical development. The process of content analysis allows us to identify specific themes to 
highlight the research trajectory and provide a pathway to future research.  
Our research then takes a purely quantitative approach in Chapters 3 and 4. We have created 





to improve performance. Our methodological approach aligns with previous research in the 
nonmarket strategy and social movement literatures (e.g. McDonnell and Werner, 2016; Price and 
Sun, 2017). Our data collection strategy set out to gather secondary archival data, collected from a 
number of sources that has been used to create our dependent, independent, moderating, and control 
variables specifically targeted to answer the hypotheses.  
We developed and tested a series of hypotheses on a panel-data sample of firms listed on 
Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 over an 11-year timeframe (2007-2017). Our original sample 
consisted of 503 companies and 5,533 firm year observations. However, we lost some observations 
due to either a lack of available data or because firms disappear by ceasing their activity or getting 
delisted during our specified timeframe. Consequently, we performed our analyses on an 
unbalanced sample of 300 firms and 2,533 observations in Chapter 3, and 304 firms and 2,592 
observations in Chapter 4 respectively.  
1.3 Intended Contribution to Research  
The research conducted in this thesis aims to make four central contributions to the NMS, 
IST and M&A literatures. First, our intention is extend IST into the nonmarket domain by drawing 
attention to the ability of stakeholders to sanction firms where irresponsible actions by firms has 
been discovered. Our second stated contribution is to the nonmarket domain, where we address a 
call from strategy and international business scholars to align the parallel strands of NMS; namely, 
CSR and CPA. The goal here is to investigate whether these two concepts can be utilized to 
improve firm performance. Our research also analyzes the differing impact of CSR and CPA tactics 
where CSiR has occurred to understand if firms can align these concepts to avoid potential 





We also make a more generic contribution to the NMS literature by analyzing CSR and 
CSiR as two separate variables. Recently, business and society scholars have taken note of the 
dominant perspective in CSR research that assumes that firms that “do good” also “avoid bad” 
(Murphy and Schlegelmilch, 2013). Our research aims to move away from this one-sided approach 
to examine both constructs separately. Taking a quantitative approach in chapters 3 and 4, our 
research differentiates “good” and “bad” firm actions to provide a better understanding of the 
different factors that can influence firm performance and growth. 
Our final contribution focuses on the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature. We extend 
nonmarket strategy and IST into this research domain to determine the potential effect of CSiR and 
stakeholder engagement on the M&A process. M&As are complex negotiations and are often 
subject to many nonmarket factors such as political, social and governance issues. However, so far, 
the M&A literature has largely overlooked this instance. Consequently, this thesis attempts to 
address this gap.  
1.4 Outline of the Thesis  
 This section provides a brief outline of the structure, content, and objectives of each chapter. 
The main body of the thesis is constructed of three chapters, each containing a detailed literature 
review, set of hypotheses, and specific research methodology aimed at answering the overarching 
question: Does CSiR adversely affect performance and strategic growth or can firms act with 
impunity? 
Chapter 2. In this chapter we use content analysis to systematically review the literature 
on IST. We note that there is a renewed interest in this strand of stakeholder theory (Bridoux and 





groups on an ethical contract basis to achieve corporate goals by building long-term stakeholder 
relationships (Jones, 1995). To gain a comprehensive understanding of this theory we reviewed the 
existing IST literature, tracing how this theory has developed since its introduction by Donaldson 
and Preston (1995). Using the process of content analysis, we identified and reviewed 109 papers 
spanning from 1995-2019, beginning with the original introduction of the theory. Building upon 
Laplume, Sonpar and Litz (2008), we identified four themes that capture the research trajectory 
that IST has followed: 1) Identification and salience; 2) Firm performance; 3) Corporate social 
responsibility (CSR); and 4) Theory debates; our research extends this, adding a fifth them 
Corporate Social Irresponsibility (CSiR).  
Recent research on stakeholder engagement and firm performance has shifted to account 
for the roles of both primary and secondary stakeholders, and how they have changed over the last 
three decades. Firms are continually seeking to improve their financial and operational capabilities, 
yet challenging external factors are influencing how they can achieve their aims. Increased 
emphasis on the societal and environmental impact of firms presents new challenges that must be 
addressed and understanding the role that stakeholders play is more crucial than ever.  
Our review reveals that much of the research applies an IST approach to find a link between 
CSR and firm performance. However, research in this vein has mostly overlooked the performance 
effects of CSiR. Moreover, we note that previous research using IST has only recently begun to 
account for a nonmarket approach. This thesis is focused on the interaction between firms and their 
stakeholders, investigating how or if they can be sanctioned for bad behavior. The seminal 
contribution of Jones (1995) identified how firms can sanction stakeholders, and much of the 
research has followed in this vein. However, our research takes a different approach. Taking an 





However, when firms are involved in CSiR, research has overlooked how these same stakeholders 
have the potential to retaliate against the firm. We empirically investigate this concept in the 
following two chapters using IST as our main theoretical approach.  
Chapter 3. Our second chapter aims to uncover the extent to which involvement in CSiR 
can impact firm performance, investigating both financial and non-financial performance 
measures. To do this, we developed and tested a series of hypotheses using random effects 
regressions on our sample of firms listed in the S&P 500 over an 11-year timeframe (2007-2017). 
We use this timeframe as it reflects a period of immense socio-political change, as corporate 
misconduct was revealed on a global scale due to the 2008 financial crash. Additionally, 2007 saw 
a rise in the use of social media platforms which increased stakeholder awareness of the ‘good’ and 
‘bad’ actions of firms. Using the unique CSiR database that we specifically developed for this 
thesis, we created our dependent variables financial performance (proxied by the firm’s Tobin’s 
q), and non-financial performance (measured using firm’s corporate social performance or CSP). 
In addition, we analyzed the moderating effects of financial and relational CPA; or lobbying 
expenditures and distance from the firm’s headquarters to Washington DC (the political capital of 
the US), respectively.  
Our results show that there is no significant relationship between CSiR and financial 
performance. However, we find evidence that CSiR will negatively impact a firm’s non-financial 
performance in the form of CSP. Adding to this, we find that firms involved in CSiR that also 
partake in financial CPA will experience further damage to their non-financial performance. 
Interestingly, this is not the case when we analyze a firm’s political connections using the 
geographic measurement of ‘distance to DC’. This measurement represents the location of our 





connections, though, we ran additional tests using an alternative measure of relational CPA (i.e. 
number of revolvers4 hired by the firm). Using this measure provided new insight into our results, 
as our tests produced support for our hypothesis that political connections also deepen the negative 
relationship between CSiR and non-financial performance.     
This chapter provides interesting contributions about the ways in which firms use 
nonmarket strategies to affect firm performance. By applying an instrumental perspective to 
stakeholder relations, we gained a deeper understanding of how these strategies, particularly those 
focused on firm political activity, can impact relationships between firms and their stakeholder 
groups with the aim to gain competitive advantage. Firms increase investment in non-financial 
performance activities to improve corporate reputation, brand loyalty, and boost employee morale 
(Basu and Palazzo, 2008; Eccles, Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014). Our research sheds light on how 
CPA can potentially undo all the gains earned by engaging in actions that may seem to improve 
performance at the expense of some of the firm’s stakeholders, leaving firms vulnerable to 
stakeholder retaliation.  
Chapter 4. In the final chapter, we investigate how firms adapt their core strategies when 
CSiR behavior occurs. The intention behind this study is to explore how firm behavior may change 
and adapt to shocks in its external environment. To do this, we turn to the M&A literature to 
investigate how firms may use this method of growth to deflect attention relating to CSiR behavior 
away from stakeholders. We focus on external growth strategies of firms and specifically M&A, 
as both literature and practice advance M&As as the preferred inorganic growth strategy (Bauer, 
Dao, Matzler and Tarba, 2017). For instance, almost 50,000 M&A transactions took place 
 
4 Government regulators, Congressional staff and members of Congress who, upon leaving these roles take up new 





worldwide in 2019.5 However, despite the popularity of M&A as a growth strategy, the chances of 
success are low, as more than 70 percent of M&As fail over time (Bauer and Matzler, 2014).  
The M&A process involves a set of complex negotiations between multiple stakeholders, 
using significant and valuable resources. Yet despite this, M&A research has overlooked social, 
environmental and political factors that impact the process. Additionally, most research in this vein 
has largely focused on shareholders, ignoring important nonmarket stakeholders. It is for this 
reason that we introduce the nonmarket element in our analysis. In this chapter, we take a different 
approach and investigate whether firms increase their M&A activity when CSiR behavior is 
uncovered. Our analysis focuses on the announcement phase of both domestic and cross-border 
M&As. Specifically, we argue that firms increase their M&A announcements to distract from 
involvement in CSiR, and that this relationship is moderated by the corporate reputation and 
political activity of the firm. 
Drawing on IST and complemented by signaling theory, we seek to understand why firms 
engage in external growth strategies like M&A in the face of serious financial and non-financial 
risk. Signaling theory is primarily linked to the reduction of information asymmetry between the 
various parties involved in specific business activities (Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel, 2011). 
Firms will want to control the message that these actions send to stakeholder groups whenever 
CSiR occurs. Signaling theory is ideally placed to do so, as increasing M&A announcements may 
signal to shareholders and other stakeholders that the firm has the necessary ability to grow despite 
the potentially negative consequences of CSiR.  
 





In this chapter we developed and tested a series of hypotheses using a Generalized 
Estimating Equation (GEE) negative binomial specification. The dependent variable in this chapter 
is the number of M&A announcements, which we built by using information collected from the 
Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. We added a second dependent 
variable from the information gathered on M&A announcements from our dataset, which measures 
the count of M&A deals announced by the acquiring firm where the target firm is located in a 
developing country. As in Chapter 3, we included CSiR as our independent variable. Furthermore, 
we entered lobbying expenditures and corporate reputation as the key moderating variables of the 
relationship between CSiR and the number of M&A announcements.  
Our results show that there is partially significant negative relationship between CSiR 
events in t-1 and the number of announced M&As, that becomes non-significant when we only 
consider those in which the target company is located in a developing country. Furthermore, we 
find evidence that engagement in financial CPA deepens the negative relationship between CSiR 
and the number of M&A announcements. Meanwhile, companies that are highly regarded in the 
markets—proxied by the firm appearing in the Fortune’s Worlds Most Admired Companies 
(WMAC) list—experience a lower reduction in the number of deals announced. This carries 
important managerial implications. Whereas stakeholders seem to consider that firms involved in 
CSiR and CPA at the same time may be “doing something shady”, they are more forgiving with 
those that have a better corporate reputation. 
1.5 Concluding Remarks 
Firms and stakeholders should be concerned about both socially responsible and 
irresponsible behaviors. While the literature has so far focused on CSR, in this thesis we turn our 





we account for the insurance-like effects of CPA and corporate reputation in the event of CSiR, or 
the lack thereof. We now move on to the next chapter, in which we review the IST literature and 
propose a future research agenda. 
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CHAPTER 2 - INSTRUMENTAL 
STAKEHOLDER THEORY: A 















 2.1 Introduction  
Stakeholder theory is based on the premise that a firm has many interested parties that can 
affect its success or failure. Freeman’s seminal work (1984) argued that taking a stakeholder 
approach to management is an effective means of dealing with a complex business environment. 
Since the publication of this influential book, a stakeholder approach to managing a firm’s complex 
environment is more important than ever due to globalization, the prevalence of information 
technology and social media, and an increased focus on corporate societal and environmental 
impact (Freeman, Harrison, Wicks, Parmar, and De Colle, 2010).  
Questions around the business-stakeholders relationship have come to dominate the 
business and society literature, with scholars often adopting a multi-disciplinary approach to 
stakeholder management, bridging sociology, strategic management, political science and 
international business (Wasieleski and Weber, 2017). Whilst this diversity provides opportunities 
for a more holistic development of stakeholder theory, it nonetheless comes at a cost.  
The key criticism is that this fragmentation of the literature results in a lack of a consistent 
definition of what stakeholder theory, or indeed what a stakeholder really is. Described as an 
‘amalgamation of eclectic ideas’ and subject to numerous interpretations across a variety of 
disciplines, this inconsistency has only added complexity to the development of stakeholder theory 
(Gilbert and Rasche, 2008; Miles, 2017). Other critics have labeled stakeholder theory as being 
vague and superficial in scope. Indeed, as scholars from business ethics, strategic management to 
finance have worked towards refining this theory, questions still dominate its application to, and 
suitability for, real-world ethical business problems (Orts and Strudler, 2009). Therefore, to 





recognize how the global business environment has changed, in comparison to the world as it was 
when Freeman’s (1984) work was produced. 
For instance, technology has rendered customers more knowledgeable and globally aware 
of a company’s social and environmental footprint. New technology and social media platforms 
allow faster access to data and almost real-time scrutiny from stakeholders. Prominent well-known 
brands are developing digital campaigns promoting their socially responsible agenda to engage 
with stakeholders. Heineken now have ‘Brewing a Better World’ interactive sustainability reports.1 
Patagonia use supply chain mapping and launched a digital campaign ‘Patagonia’s Footprint 
Chronicles’ to track and trace interaction with mill’s, factories and farms across its supply chain.2 
Adding to this, stakeholder groups outside of the firm such as powerful nongovernmental 
organizations (NGOs) are fully utilizing social media campaigns to draw attention to firm behavior. 
Greenpeace for example, have fully embraced social media into their activist agenda. The NGO 
successfully targeted Lego to end its fifty-year partnership with Shell Oil through its 
#SaveTheArctic campaign. Part of this campaign launched a YouTube video titled ‘Everything is 
NOT awesome’ viewed almost nine million times.3 The stakeholder literature needs to reflect these 
changes as firms collaborate with multiple stakeholders who have competing, and complex 
demands outside of the traditional business arena. But research has scarcely moved beyond the 
generic function of the economic and financial activities of primary stakeholders. Stakeholder 
theory and its many perspectives must now be challenged and moved beyond its focus on the 
shareholder-stakeholder debate. A broader focus on a nonmarket approach, where social and 
 
1 https://www.theheinekencompany.com/our-sustainability-story/our-strategy-and-achievements (Last accessed 
August 28, 2020). 
2  https://www.patagonia.com/our-footprint/ (Last accessed August 28, 2020) 
3 https://www.theguardian.com/environment/2014/oct/09/lego-ends-shell-partnership-following-greenpeace-





political stakeholders are accounted for, could extend stakeholder theory both empirically and 
conceptually (Dorobantu, Henisz and Nartey, 2017).  
Confusion also surrounds the interchangeability between stakeholder theory and 
stakeholder management (Freeman et al., 2010), with some authors arguing that the abundance of 
definitions and the contested nature of stakeholder theory in itself provides richness and depth to 
the literature (Crane and Ruebottom, 2011; Freeman, et al., 2010; Fassin, 2012; Miles, 2017; 
Stoney and Winstanley, 2001). Nevertheless, as advancements and contributions to stakeholder 
theory continue, there are still those who see stakeholder theory as a framework, more suitable as 
a strategic management tool. The implication is that the optimal application of this theory is to 
identify stakeholders and the claims they have on firms and prioritize these in terms of how they 
may directly affect the firm (Crane and Ruebottom, 2011; Mitchell, Agle and Wood, 1997).  
Unsurprisingly, the highly contested nature of this theory can be associated with divergence 
as to who exactly can be labelled a ‘stakeholder’. Regardless of the debate over it, the original 
definition by Freeman (1984) still stands, identifying stakeholders as “any group or individual who 
can affect, or are affected, by the strategic outcomes of the firm”. Building upon this definition, the 
literature has evolved to classify stakeholders into two different groups, commonly labelled as 
‘primary’ and ‘secondary’. This is in accordance with the level of interaction with firms, the role 
each stakeholder group plays, and their potential to impact firm performance (Freeman et al., 2010; 
Harrison, Bosse and Phillips, 2010; Orts and Strudler, 2009). Primary and secondary stakeholders 
identify under a broader scope, particularly where firms have an international presence. 
Stakeholders are more social and political in nature, and these changing characteristics are 
providing interesting research opportunities (Henisz, Dorobantu and Nartey, 2014). In this thesis 





‘nonmarket stakeholders as governments and legislators, the environment, local communities, 
media and nongovernmental organizations (Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006; Hillman and Keim, 
2001). 
 Despite these recent advancements, perhaps the most significant contribution to 
stakeholder theory came early in the literature (Donaldson and Preston, 1995). Originally rooted in 
strategic management, scholars began introducing ethical and societal elements to the theory, 
creating further tensions (Freeman, Phillips and Sisodia, 20204). To combat this fragmentated 
nature of stakeholder theory, three distinct perspectives were introduced related to how 
stakeholders and firms interact (Freeman et al., 2010). These perspectives are descriptive (detailing 
what the firm does and how it behaves), instrumental (examining the effect of stakeholders on firm 
performance), and normative (explaining how stakeholders should be treated).  
Originally introduced by Donaldson and Preston (1995), they helped focus the stakeholder 
debate and provide much needed clarification. Indeed, some authors credit this work as the first to 
attempt to systematically identify the theory’s role and methodology (Freeman et al., 2010; Jones, 
Felps, and Bigley, 2007; Wijnberg, 2000). However, despite contributing significantly to the 
stakeholder theory debate, it also accentuated the fragmentation of the topic, facilitating competing 
approaches and assumptions (Freeman et al., 2010; Scherer, 2018).  
At its most basic level, stakeholder theory specifies the moral obligation that firms have to 
their stakeholders, which encourages researchers to take this normative approach, particularly in 
the business ethics literature (Bishop, 2000; Freeman et al., 2010; Freeman and Phillips, 2002). 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) argued that the normative approach is central to stakeholder theory, 
 





relegating the descriptive and instrumental to a more subordinate role. Yet arguably stakeholder 
theory is, in essence, grounded in strategic management. Despite some scholar’s preference for the 
normative or ethical approach, it is the instrumental perspective that is of greater relevance in 
stakeholder performance debates. Value creation in the face of global environmental challenges, 
corporate negligence and misconduct, and social issues bring new challenges to firms that require 
innovative solutions. Indeed, political activity, climate change, board diversity and equitable 
working conditions are listed as the top issues concerning shareholders and firms in 2020.5  Defined 
as “a framework for examining the connections, if any, between the practice of stakeholder 
management and the achievement of various corporate goals” (Donaldson and Preston, 1995: 67), 
an instrumental strategic approach to stakeholder engagement can perhaps provide opportunities 
for industry and academia alike.  
With this in mind, and despite the normative approach being more relevant in the past, there 
is a renewed interest in instrumental stakeholder theory (IST) (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2014; 
Henisz et al., 2014), which comes at a time when firms are under increased pressure to consider 
non-primary stakeholder needs and expectations and are ever more accountable for their actions 
and impacts. Firms’ efforts to establish stakeholder trust and credibility is increasingly important 
for value creation, as they face increased competition, scarcity of resources and pressure for 
regulatory and legal compliance (Gilbert and Rasche, 2008; Marens and Wick, 1999; Pierce and 
Aguinis, 2015).   
The instrumental concept was further extrapolated on by Jones (1995), whose seminal 
contribution to the theory established the core idea behind IST: that firms will achieve a sustainable 
 






competitive advantage by developing relationships with stakeholders based on traditional ethics 
such as fairness, loyalty and respect (Jones, 1995; Jones, Harrison, and Felps 2018). We argue that 
although the work of Jones (1995) contributed significantly to the instrumental perspective, it is 
not without limitations. Taking an approach similar to agency theory, this seminal paper equates 
stakeholder engagement with contracts, both implicit and explicit. Yet the focus is on primary 
stakeholders, largely ignoring nonmarket or secondary stakeholders. The assumptions in this paper, 
that firms will engage fairly with stakeholders on an ethical contract basis and achieve corporate 
goals to the satisfaction of all involved, focuses only on the behavior and impact of the firm. It 
omits how dissatisfied stakeholders can in turn retaliate against firms. We believe this virtually 
one-sided debate is a contributing factor in hampering the development of IST, narrowing the focus 
on who stakeholders are and their importance to the firm. The paper discusses how the firm can 
sanction its stakeholders if contracts are deemed to have been broken but overlooks nonmarket 
stakeholders’ ability to sanction the firm.  
How to best manage the stakeholder-firm performance relationship is a question that has 
yet to be resolved (Epstein, Buhovac, and Yuthas, 2015; Garcia-Castro and Francoeur, 2016). From 
a strategic perspective, developing stakeholder relations leads to improved shareholder value 
(Hillman and Keim, 2001). But this comes with challenges. Changing characteristics and priorities 
of stakeholders, specifically nonmarket ones, have in some ways shifted the balance of power 
between primary and secondary stakeholder groups. Stakeholders have increased access to 
corporate information, and with this increased awareness comes the ability to punish firms for 
perceived grievances (Barnett, 2014). It is this perspective that we will pursue throughout the 





stakeholders, examining how to manage situations fairly and effectively, whilst maintaining value 
creation.  
In this chapter, we review the IST literature, offer a critical summary of the advances in the 
area, and suggest future avenues for research. To that end, we have identified and reviewed 109 
articles published between 1995 and 2019. We have chosen 1995 as the point of departure because 
the pioneering research on IST was published in that year. Building on the categorization used by 
Laplume, Sonpar, and Litz (2008) in their stakeholder theory review, our findings show that IST 
research can initially be divided into four groups: 1) Identification and salience; 2) Firm 
performance; 3) Corporate social responsibility (CSR); and 4) Theory debates. We advance the 
extant research by identifying a fifth theme, corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR), which has 
been largely overlooked within IST. 
 Our aim is to emphasize the importance of nonmarket stakeholders and how their potential 
to retaliate against firms could severely damage the core ethos of IST. This chapter will proceed as 
follows. First, we address the methodological approach taken for this review. Second, we identify 
the emerging themes that chart the research trajectory of IST. This will be followed by a discussion 
of the overall IST perspective and suggestions for future research opportunities. The research 
undertaken in this chapter sets the main theoretical approach in the following chapters of the thesis.  
2.2 Research Design 
2.2.1 Sample 
The scope of this review includes articles published in peer reviewed journals. Therefore, 
we have not considered other types of publications such as book chapters and conference papers. 





the sample to those published in journals rated 3* and above in the ABS Academic Journal Guide 
2019.6 Specifically, we focused on the journals belonging to the fields of International Business 
and Area Studies; General Management, Ethics, Gender and Social Responsibility; and Strategy. 
Overall, the review accounts for papers published in 31 leading peer-reviewed journals, which are 
featured in Table 1 below.  
 
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND AREA STUDIES 
Journal Ranking 
Journal of International Business Studies 4* 
Journal of World Business 4 
African Affairs 3 
Asia Pacific Journal of Management 3 
International Business Review 3 
Journal of Common Market Studies 3 
Journal of International Management 3 
Management and Organization Review 3 
Management International Review 3 
GENERAL MANAGEMENT, ETHICS AND SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY 
Journal Ranking 
Academy of Management Journal 4* 
Academy of Management Review 4* 
Administrative Science Quarterly 4* 
 
6 For more information on the ranking, please refer to: https://charteredabs.org/academic-journal-guide-2018-view/ 
(Last accessed July 27, 2020). 





Journal of Management 4* 
Academy of Management Annals 4 
British Journal of Management 4 
Business Ethics Quarterly 4 
Journal of Management Studies 4 
Academy of Management Perspectives 3 
Business & Society 3 
California Management Review 3 
European Management Review 3 
Harvard Business Review 3 
International Journal of Management Reviews 3 
Journal of Business Ethics 3 
Journal of Business Research 3 
Journal of Management Inquiry 3 
MIT Sloan Management Review 3 
STRATEGY 
Journal Ranking 
Strategic Management Journal 4* 
Global Strategy Journal 3 
Long Range Planning 3 
Strategic Organization 3 
The analysis covers papers published between 1995 and 2019. We set 1995 as the starting 
year because this is when the first papers addressing IST were published by Donaldson and Preston 





term ‘instrumental stakeholder theory’ to appropriately identify the relevant papers. We searched 
Web of Science, Google Scholar, and the journal vaults of the focal journals. However, our original 
results did not provide significant results for the purpose of this chapter. Using the specific keyword 
‘instrumental stakeholder theory’, timeframe ‘1995-2019’, and ‘title’ our results produced 5 
academic papers directly related to IST research. To widen our search, we refocused our criteria to 
include ‘abstract’, again providing very few results, adding only 12 papers. Due to the very low 
results found we amended the keyword search to include ‘topic’ to identify the relevant academic 
papers, resulting in a significant increase in IST related papers.  
Following these guidelines, our search resulted in 254 papers. We refined this search by 
applying the filter ‘articles’ to exclude book chapters, conference papers, and book reviews. 
Building on this, we applied two further filters to identify papers related to ‘business’ and 
‘management’ subjects, narrowing the results to 219 papers. We read all the papers to establish the 
extent to which each of them discussed IST. To accomplish the objective of this review, we only 
selected those studies explicitly addressing the instrumental approach to stakeholder management. 
We eliminated a significant number of papers that fell outside of our search criteria. These included 
those papers not published in our list of identified journals. Also, we discovered that our keyword 
search picked up ‘instrumental variable’ in a significant number of papers during our original 
search. The final result identified 109 academic papers investigating an instrumental approach to 
stakeholder management. We elaborated five tables listing these papers—one per each theme 
identified in the IST literature—that contain the name of the author(s), year of publication, journal, 
title and methodology used (please refer to Appendix 1 for the complete list).  
Journal and year distribution. Figure 1 represents the distribution of the IST articles 





devoted to social responsibility and ethics; namely, Journal of Business Ethics (38%), Business 
Ethics Quarterly (18%) and Business & Society (11%). Among the general management research 
journals, Academy of Management Review tops the number of publications in our sample (9%). In 
addition, Strategic Management Journal is the strategy outlet with the highest number of 
publications on IST (6%).  
It is clear that special interest journals have advanced much of the research concerning the 
instrumental perspective of stakeholder theory. However, one of the most striking findings from 
this table is the lack of papers in the area of International Business (only Journal of International 
Business Studies has published a paper on the topic). This opens numerous opportunities for future 











Figure 2.1. Distribution of articles by journal. 
Journal names: AMJ (Academy of Management Journal); AMR (Academy of Management Review); B&S 
(Business & Society); BEQ (Business Ethics Quarterly); IJMR (International Journal of Management Reviews); 
JBR (Journal of Business Research); JIBS (Journal of International Business Studies); JBE (Journal of 
Business Ethics); JOM (Journal of Management); JOMS (Journal of Management Studies); LRP (Long Range 





Apart from the publication outlets, we were interested in analyzing the distribution of the 
IST articles in our sample according to their year of publication. Figure 2 represents this evolution.7 
Donaldson and Preston (1995) and Jones (1995) are the pioneers in the discussion of the 
instrumental approach to stakeholder management. The number of studies in the topic then 
experienced a steady increase up until 2007/2009, when it surged. From then on, the number of 












Methodological focus. Figure 3 illustrates the distribution of articles based on the methods 
applied. The bulk of the papers in the sample have a theoretical focus (61%). Among the empirical 
articles, 11% focused on qualitative methods. The remaining articles opted for quantitative analyses 
 
7 Please note that we have taken three-year time intervals to improve the clarity of the figure. 





based on either secondary data (27%) or surveys (1%). These figures show that future research 














2.2.2 Analytical method 
A basic online search into stakeholder-related topics demonstrates the vast magnitude of 
the topic (Freeman, 2017). Even after establishing the parameters mentioned in the above 
subsections, we identified a significant number of papers to be reviewed. For this reason, we 
decided to use content analysis to survey the literature on IST, which is the preferred method in 
recent literature reviews (e.g. Carroll and Shabana, 2010; Laplume et al., 2008; Pisani, Kourula, 
Kolk, and Meijer, 2017). 





Content analysis is quickly becoming a popular method for qualitative and quantitative 
analyses in management research (Gaur and Kumar, 2018). It enables the researcher to identify and 
summarize the trends in the literature (Duriau, Reger, and Pfarrer, 2007; Short and Palmer, 2008), 
and with suitable computer-aided techniques can produce large volumes of data (Krippendorff, 
2004). The next step in the review process was to read all papers identified. This allowed us to 
identify and summarize the literature trends to break down the research into specific categories. 
The process involved conducting a manual content analysis in which we identified keywords in the 
title, abstract and main body of each paper to discover the specific research topic. This process 
included developing a coding scheme that could be applied across all papers included in the review 
(Gaur and Kumar, 2018). The coding scheme included: (1) specific discussion of IST, (2) 
references of Donaldson and Preston (1995) and/or Jones (1995) and (3) key words inclusive of 
‘stakeholder’; ‘firm performance’; ‘management’; ‘corporate social responsibility’; ‘salience’ and 
‘theory’. By applying this process, we were able to identify themes throughout the papers included 
in the review process.    
2.3 Major Themes in Instrumental Stakeholder Theory 
The chapter is built on the process used by Laplume et al. (2008), who conducted an 
extensive review of stakeholder theory. By applying similar techniques to systematically review 
the IST articles included in our study allowed us to identify four broad themes: 1) Identification 
and salience; 2) Firm performance; 3) CSR; and 4) Theory debates. Our research has further 
identified a fifth theme, Corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). Figure 4 shows that only 8% of 
the articles in the review revolve around identification and salience. Along similar lines, CSiR 
accounts for 8% of the articles reviewed in the literature. A higher number of studies address the 





attention, accounting for 41% of the papers included in the sample. The following subsections 












2.3.1 Identification and salience 
The basic understanding of stakeholder salience stems from Freeman’s original definition 
of a stakeholder being “any group or individual who can affect or is affected by the achievement 
of the organization’s objectives” (1984: 46). This led to several articles contributing to the debate 
around the stakeholders that deserve the most attention. Mitchell et al. (1997) provided the most 
comprehensive approach to this debate with their three-factor model of power (to shape the 
behavior of the firm), legitimacy (of the stakeholder in relation to the firm), and urgency 
(seriousness of the claims made by the stakeholder). The scope of stakeholder identification has 
widened in recent years as firms continue to become more active across different geographical 
boundaries (Crilly, 2011; Devinney, McGahan, and Zollo 2013). Yet no significant attempt has 





been made to address this issue from an instrumental perspective and there is still a small number 
of papers directly addressing stakeholder influence and engagement.  
In early research, Phillips (1997) and Van Buren (2001) discussed instrumental aspects of 
stakeholder theory in terms of the ‘principle of fairness’ and integrative social contracts theory, 
elaborating on the expected contributions of firms in terms of their impact on society. Under this 
guise, the authors attempted to identify important stakeholders through mutual benefit, justice, 
cooperation, and voluntary acceptance. Both papers struggled to clearly identify the most important 
stakeholder groups to the firm. Nonetheless, they acknowledged the negative repercussions that 
firms suffer if they are unable to adequately identify the correct groups. Questions arise concerning 
who is vulnerable, who holds the position of power and what is at stake. A broad definition of 
stakeholders is taken here with references to secondary stakeholders and the relevance of micro- 
and macro-contractors, which begins to highlight briefly the impact and importance of 
multinational enterprises (MNEs) extending beyond political and geographical boundaries. While 
both papers clearly take a normative approach to business ethics, they note that IST is crucial to 
strategic planning in terms of meeting long-term goals and objectives.  
Following up on the debate around stakeholder saliency, Kaler (2003) discussed the 
implications the shareholder-stakeholder debate, building on the typology of stakeholder theories 
(instrumental, descriptive and, normative). The paper addressed the question of what, if anything, 
is gained by taking a stakeholder approach to business. The key takeaway is the increasing 
importance of non-shareholder stakeholders and the extent to which their interests are morally 
required to be fulfilled relative to those of shareholders.  
As the literature evolves, there is a clear increased interest in understanding the importance 





from an individual perspective, examining how managers distribute scarce resources to those who 
have a legitimate claim on the organization. By balancing stakeholder interests, managers can pay 
attention, maintain support, and identify the needs of each stakeholder group. Attempting to 
advance knowledge on the impact that stakeholders have on firm performance, Eesley and Lennox 
(2006) explored the responses of secondary stakeholders to firm actions. Shortly after, Su, Mitchell, 
and Sirgy (2007) investigated the role of guanxi (Chinese term used to label interpersonal 
connections) in achieving business success. Both papers state that firms who adopt more socially 
and environmentally conscious policies take a broad approach to stakeholder identification that 
will ensure corporate goals are met. In this regard, following an instrumental stakeholder approach 
will allow for greater efficiency and effectiveness, increased legitimacy, and reduced conflict 
(Driscoll and Starik, 2004; Tashman and Raelin, 2013). 
Mitchell, Lee, and Agle (2017) have recently summarized the works that have contributed 
to extending the concept of stakeholder salience. This review brought to light some shortcomings 
in the research to date, most notably concerning the economic assumptions of the model, 
stakeholder inclusiveness, and lack of integration between the stakeholder prioritization literature 
and other stakeholder-related work. We add a fourth shortcoming to this list, in that research around 
identification and saliency has so far paid little attention to the relationship between stakeholder 
management and firm performance beyond a descriptive analysis of who, what and how firms can 
achieve this. The core argument of IST claiming that the “development of mutual trust and 
cooperation between firms and stakeholders is expected to lead to competitive advantage” (Su et 
al., 2007: 316) remains unproven. Most of the research conducted is theoretical, with just two 
papers taking an empirical approach. As a result, conducting more empirically focused work is 





2.3.2 Firm performance 
As explained in the prior subsection on identification and stakeholder saliency, it is 
important to assess the impact of stakeholders on firm performance. The research concerning firm 
performance and IST revolves around the following question: “does a one-dollar investment in a 
stakeholder group return more or less than one dollar in benefit to the firm?” (Garcia-Castro and 
Francoeur, 2016: 406).  
Pioneering work on the topic addressed stakeholder influence and examined the potential 
conflicts of interest between shareholders and non-shareholder stakeholders. Ogden and Watson 
(1999) studied this through the process of privatization of the UK water industry, focusing on how 
these new companies would address stakeholder issues. Using financial performance and customer 
service performance measurements, the authors found evidence that improving firm relationships 
with stakeholders came at a cost for shareholders. However, to sustain a long-term competitive 
advantage, it is necessary to commit to non-shareholder stakeholders as this improves the 
legitimacy and reputation of the firm. Building relationships based on trust and cooperation is seen 
as an opportunity to exploit economic interests that will lead to a competitive advantage. Berman, 
Wicks, Kotha and Jones (1999) and Heugens, Van Den Bosch and Van Riel (2002) also analyzed 
the relationship of firms with their primary stakeholders, stating that these groups have the most 
influence over resource allocation. 
Although in the early years since the introduction of IST there were some papers addressing 
how stakeholders can influence the success of businesses, scholars took primarily a normative 
focus (Hosmer and Kiewitz, 2005). As research into IST advanced, researchers explored new topics 
such as corporate identity (Berrone, Surroca, and Tribó, 2007); perceptions of justice (Hosmer and 





This impacted the scope of the definition of stakeholder groups. Research began to expand to 
examine the effects of local communities and the natural environment (Kobeissi and Damanpour, 
2009) and the relationship between corporate social performance and multinationality (Bouquet 
and Deutsch, 2008). 
Emphasis on corporate scandals in the early 2000s is a recurring theme behind the increased 
interest in IST, though again through the prism of the normative perspective of stakeholder theory 
(Cennamo, Berrone, and Gomez-Mejia, 2009; Harrison, et al., 2010; Kobeissi and Damanpour, 
2009). Firm misbehaviors brought to attention the need to account for different expectations, rules, 
norms and culture of stakeholder groups and the need to balance a diverse set of interests across 
national boundaries. Stakeholder engagement as a means of sustaining competitive advantage has 
become much more than just a symbolic gesture with the increase of public attention to social and 
environmental issues. Developing close ties to stakeholders based on mutual trust and cooperation 
creates intangible benefits that are difficult to imitate and should be used to further the firms’ 
strategic agenda (Harting et al., 2006).       
Firms are gradually looking towards building legitimacy by developing its stakeholder 
relationships as a means of improving social and moral capital. However, there is a dark side to it, 
as some studies question whether ethics and corporate activities designed to improve financial 
performance can coexist. Cennamo et al. (2009) investigated this from the managerial perspective, 
seeking to understand under what conditions individuals were more likely to engage in self-
interested behavior. Meanwhile, Bosse, and Coughlan (2016) investigated the reasons why a 
stakeholder might be willing to continue a relationship with the firm. Both papers expressed that 
ethical business policies will improve performance, build reputation and social legitimacy, enable 





both papers addressed the fact that there is a hidden cost to stakeholder management since firms 
may have limited information on their stakeholder groups, which is bound to result in conflict that 
has long-term repercussions given that the firm may not adequately address each group’s concerns.   
A final group of papers revolving around firm performance in the context of IST has begun 
to examine areas connected to nonmarket strategy, which emphasizes the importance of 
recognizing socio-political stakeholders and the environment where they operate. Nowadays, 
business activities are scrutinized at a global scale, which has motivated many firms to look at their 
corporate social performance as a response to these external pressures. Indeed, it is becoming 
increasingly important to factor in social and environmental issues in long-term strategic 
orientation to improve economic performance (Chiu and Sharfman, 2011; Garcia-Castro, Ariño, 
and Canela, 2011).  
The above is particularly salient in industries that heavily affect society and the natural 
environment, such as the extractive industries. Heinz, Dorobantu, and Nartey (2014) and Verbeke, 
Osiyevskyy, and Backman (2017) addressed the increased pressure from nonmarket or secondary 
stakeholders. Each paper provided empirical evidence that confirmed the need for examining all 
forms of stakeholder conflict and cooperation for certain projects to succeed. It is necessary to offer 
political and social support for firms to improve their financial and operational objectives. Both 
papers stated that continued support from external stakeholders is a key driver in securing long-
term financial performance and sustainable competitive advantage. The results from these papers 
provide empirical evidence suggesting that stakeholder engagement is key to long-term financial 
and non-financial success. Yet despite clear signs firms see increased performance benefits and the 
renewed academic interest in IST, questions remain regarding why IST is not a dominant strategic 





2.3.3 Corporate social responsibility  
A final set of papers addressing the importance of social stakeholders to achieve better 
outcomes links to the third major theme in IST: the debate concerning CSR and stakeholder 
management. CSR has drawn the attention of scholars for decades, spanning across multiple 
disciplines seeking to ether define the term or find a financial justification for firms incorporating 
socially responsible activities into their operations. It should be noted that some IST studies have 
addressed this issue by examining the link between corporate social performance and corporate 
financial performance (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003; Waddock 
and Graves, 1997; Wang, Dou, and Jia, 2016). In the systematic review of stakeholder theory 
conducted by Laplume et al. (2008), the authors briefly included the corporate social performance-
corporate financial performance link as part of their discussion of IST. The papers analyzing this 
relationship could arguably be covered to discuss how firms may be instrumental in their approach 
to stakeholder management. However, following alongside the logic laid out by Laplume and 
colleagues and given that our methodological approach discards studies that do not directly address 
IST, we have chosen to exclude these studies from our review. This is in line with our aim to 
unearth how IST has evolved and discover future avenues of research in the topic.  
Very few articles addressed CSR in the five years after Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
introduced IST. It was not until the early 2000s that further research was conducted on this theme, 
covering a range of topics from sustainable development (Steurer, Langer, Konrad, and Martinuzzi, 
2005) and corporate citizenship (Windsor, 2006) to NGO activism (Doh and Guay, 2006). As 
previously mentioned in this review, the actions of companies are becoming increasingly 





stakeholder management will allow firms to improve their performance, engaging in CSR should 
allow companies to send positive signals about the goodness of their actions.  
Creating long-term competitive advantage has been a key aspect in the business and society 
literature as firms have attempted to reconcile its responsibility to shareholders with responsibility 
to the wider community. Better known as the business case for CSR, academics have broached this 
concept in numerous ways, claiming that social activity is only acceptable if it is consistent with 
wealth creation (Garriga and Melé, 2004). In fact, Baden and Harwood (2013) explored the 
terminology used in CSR and found that the business case is becoming the dominant driver for 
CSR research. This is key to the instrumental debate since firms assess the tradeoff between 
improving financial performance and the cost of stakeholder engagement. In this regard, Barnett 
(2007) examined the different effect of CSR on financial performance across industries and time, 
proposing a conceptual framework to help understand the business case for CSR that incorporates 
stakeholder influence capacity and stakeholder relations.  
The business case for CSR is well aligned with the instrumental perspective of stakeholder 
theory since creating trust for financial gain is key to both areas of research. As the number of 
corporate scandals plaguing the business grew in number, a stream of research began examining 
the dark side of business activities and the potential risks firms encounter with deregulated markets, 
transition economies and globalized markets (Gond, Palazzo, and Basu, 2009). The scope of the 
research also started to expand to draw attention to the growing interest in cross-national 
comparisons of CSR strategy and how MNEs execute CSR across national boundaries. Aguilera, 
Rupp, Williams and Ganapathi (2007) discussed this by reviewing the different levels of CSR and 
stakeholder engagement and why firms are becoming increasingly active in CSR activities. The 





regulatory issues, business practices and employee attitudes when operating across national 
boundaries.  
Taking this strategic approach to CSR links the importance of stakeholder engagement to 
the financial and non-financial successes and failures of firms. Because stakeholder management 
requires both financial and human resources, effectively managing different stakeholder needs and 
demands can bring significant benefits (Waldman and Siegel, 2008). These strategic benefits are 
generally tied to improved reputation, increased efficiency, and increased competitive advantage 
as well as value creation. Surroca, Tribó and Waddock (2010) discussed how a firm’s intangible 
resources can mediate the relationship between CSR, thus improving overall performance. 
Drawing on the instrumental approach this study built on earlier works by Orlizky et al. (2003) and 
offered empirical data proving that firms that develop close ties with stakeholders ultimately 
improve performance and attain stated corporate goals. Furthermore, Husted, Allen and Kock 
(2015) attempted to push CSR away from more normative roots to align this concept more closely 
with IST by partnering with social projects, again creating value for the firm.  
This then raises questions concerning whether firms should take a broad or narrow approach 
to stakeholder management. Jamali (2008) and O’Higgins (2010) attempted to unravel how 
performance metrics help firms identify stakeholder issues that can be used as a data management 
tool to gather and compare information within and across industries. Meanwhile, Crilly (2011) 
focused on firms taking either a shareholder- or stakeholder-centric approach to managing their 
subsidiaries. At this stage, the literature seemed to advocate for a more holistic and balanced 
approach to stakeholder management as an imperative for firm survival. This helped bring attention 
to a wider range of stakeholder groups, such as secondary stakeholders (Crilly, 2011; Signori and 





The importance of secondary stakeholders became more prominent as research in the 
business and society literature took a political turn. Mäkinen and Kourula (2012: 663) stated that 
the stakeholder approach “blurs the boundaries between the political, social and economic spheres 
of society”. Wang and Qian (2011) examined corporate philanthropy as a means of gaining political 
access to achieve socio-political legitimacy, enhancing a firm’s reputation and providing access to 
critical resources. This paper discussed the positive and negative results that corporate philanthropy 
might offer firms, and how they are using it to build social and political capital. The authors stated 
that not every firm benefits from this form of donation since, despite its merits, it may divert critical 
resources away from specific operations. Linked to this, the political CSR literature provided an 
interesting turn in the IST research, even if works like Whelan (2012) warned that this stream of 
research is not always clear. Applying political activities and processes to the CSR debate 
potentially creates confusion on firms’ motivations, questioning if it is taking a stakeholder or 
shareholder model of governance. Recent works by Frynas and Stephens (2015) and Scherer (2018) 
have reviewed the literature in an attempt to clarify and integrate different phenomena, stating that 
political CSR needs to make its value explicit, and emphasizing the implications for social welfare. 
We may conclude this subsection by acknowledging the criticisms of the use of stakeholder 
theory (and the instrumental approach specifically) in trying to explain why firms behave 
responsibly. Orts and Strudler (2009) stressed the point that this is an overused theory, especially 
concerning the strategic importance to business ethics. This viewpoint causes tension in the theory, 
particularly among scholars debating the merits of applying either an instrumental or a normative 
approach to stakeholder theory (Freeman et al., 2020; Wicks and Harrison, 2017). The normative 





ways may have diminished the advancement of IST as a standalone theory (Donaldson and Preston 
1995).  
Applying a purely instrumental approach to CSR and/or ethics is potentially problematic, 
as treating stakeholder groups as a means to an end will not foster long-term trust and commitment 
(Gond et al., 2009; Osuji, 2011). Moreover, the confusion to clarify who and what exactly is a 
stakeholder, and how each stakeholder type matters to the firm, further hinders the development of 
IST. Though we see some progress on this debate—particularly the advancement of research that 
considers both primary and secondary stakeholders—the current lack of agreement impedes the 
conceptual development of IST (Driscoll and Starik, 2004; Hillman and Hitt, 2003; Stoney and 
Winstanley, 2001). Adding to this, Jones et al. (2018) have recently criticized a lack of theoretical 
and empirical research proving that IST does indeed provide a competitive advantage. The core 
ethos of IST is to build relations with stakeholders to gain competitive advantage, yet if the firm is 
unable or unwilling to identify the necessary groups, this may hinder the firm’s objectives and 
damage future relations. Finally, though we discuss realigning IST to its strategic management 
roots, this could prove more difficult than originally expected, given how challenging it is to 
reconcile this strategic perspective with more socially conscious set of stakeholders (Wicks and 
Harrison, 2017).  
2.3.4 Theory debates  
Since the term ‘stakeholder’ evolved into a theory, it has been met with criticism 
surrounding the conceptual confusion in its interpretations, generalizations, and definitions (Stoney 
and Winstanley, 2001). As mentioned at the beginning of this paper, Donaldson and Preston (1995) 
tried to reconcile the stakeholder theory debate by developing a typology of stakeholder approaches 





provided a new avenue for research, it also opened a debate on the most appropriate approach as 
the foundation of stakeholder theory overall (Freeman et al., 2010; Kaler, 2009; Wicks and 
Harrison, 2017).  
The original contribution by Donaldson and Preston (1995) stated that the normative 
approach can be considered the fundamental basis for stakeholder theory. Nonetheless, shortly after 
the publication of their work, another seminal paper by Jones (1995) championed the instrumental 
approach. The author stated that trust, trustworthiness, and competitiveness lie at the core of IST. 
As such, building relationships with key stakeholder groups that are exclusive to the firm and 
difficult to replicate will result in a long-term competitive advantage.   
Early contributions seemed to be consumed with debating which approach to take, resulting 
in little progress being made beyond identifying the three classifications and discussing the 
dominant paradigm. As an example, Reed (1999) used a critical theory perspective to address issues 
about stakeholder identification, responsibilities owed to each group, and how to resolve disputes. 
Though this paper advocated for the normative approach, it elaborated on the instrumental aspects 
of stakeholder management, which highlights the overlap and mix-up of these two dimensions of 
stakeholder theory. Increasing the confusion between the two streams, works produced in the late 
1990s and early 2000s seemed to debate the normative perspective of stakeholder theory yet add 
to the instrumental debate. Stoney and Winstanley (2001) provided a timely review that highlights 
the conceptual misunderstanding and vagueness derived from the lack of consistency in articles 
published at that time. This became more noticeable as academics began including additional topics 
into the research domain, such as stakeholder agency theory (Shankman, 1999); philosophy, ethics 






As research progressed, contributions started focusing on clearly identifiable areas of 
strategy, business ethics, corporate governance, and CSR (Hendry, 2001; Stoney and Winstanley, 
2001), placing more emphasis on balancing stakeholder interests and the importance of long-term 
objectives to improve stakeholder engagement. Jawahar and McLaughlin (2001) brough this long-
term approach to the fore by highlighting the relevance of the organizational life cycle in 
connection to stakeholder management. As with CSR, the business case for stakeholder 
engagement became a popular topic to pursue in theory debates, with authors aiming their attention 
at distinguishing between stakeholder groups, the legal responsibilities of the firm, and stakeholder 
capitalism (Cragg, 2002; Freeman, 2000; Friedman and Miles, 2002; Gibson 2000). This reignited 
the shareholder versus stakeholder debate once again, while the normative and instrumental 
dimensions of stakeholder theory still remained at odds.  
In an attempt to bring together an increasingly fragmented literature, Freeman and Phillips 
(2002) drew from the “libertarian roots” of the normative and instrumental approaches to construct 
what they labeled as stakeholder capitalism. More importantly, the paper began to underline the 
importance of stakeholder engagement at a global level and secondary stakeholder groups. 
Consequently, the theoretical discussion on stakeholder engagement increasingly veers towards 
questions about stakeholder influence and legitimacy.  
Friedman and Miles (2002) distinguished between different stakeholder groups and the 
dynamic nature of their relationships with the firm. The authors sought to underscore the 
importance of nurturing the firm-stakeholder relationship to offset potential negative and 
conflicting outcomes. Rowley and Moldoveanu (2003) changed the perspective from the firm to 





The authors acknowledged that some of them may have conflicting interests due to their 
participation in more than one stakeholder group, thus affecting their likelihood of mobilization.  
Nonetheless, stakeholder groups can also collaborate. Butterfield, Reed, and Lemak (2004) 
conducted an inductive qualitative case study to gain a deeper understanding of these 
collaborations, looking at both primary and secondary groups. Although they aimed to extend the 
descriptive angle of stakeholder theory, they also contributed to IST by addressing the need for 
proactive collaborative relations between firms and their external stakeholder groups with the 
express aim of improving firm performance. O’Connell et al. (2005) took this further as they 
explored the role of stakeholder activism on firm performance. This paper began to question 
whether stakeholders can rely upon the good intentions of the firm or if addressing stakeholder 
concerns is just pure artifact to appease certain groups who have the potential to negatively impact 
firm performance.  
Despite taking a proactive role in stakeholder engagement seemingly being essential to firm 
survival, the approach can vary across firms and industries. Some have advocated for a form of 
global governance or a form of standardized ethics as research has shifted to account for global 
stakeholders and the role of MNEs. Scherer, Palazzo, and Baumann (2006) discussed this as they 
examined MNEs taking more ‘state like’ responsibilities, asking whether firms should create global 
rules or voluntary codes of conduct to account for the citizens’ rights rather than fixating on 
shareholders. This was further examined by Gilbert and Rasche (2008) when analyzing the 
opportunities and downsides that can arise from having a set of standardized ethics initiatives.  
The theoretical discussion on business ethics and how it intertwines with IST continued for 
the remaining of the 2000s decade. Wagner-Tsukamoto (2005, 2007) examined how the creation 





the shareholder theory (e.g. Friedman, 1970). Both papers stated that the purpose of the firm is to 
increase profit and, thus, stakeholder management should by necessity be instrumental. Kaler 
(2009) also took an economic approach to suggest that shareholders and employees are the only 
important stakeholders of the firm because they serve a direct interest to the successful running of 
the firm.  
Nonetheless, Kaler’s (2009) approach seems to be rather myopic as the changing role and 
structure of firms and the business environment make it nearly impossible to ignore other 
stakeholder groups. Accounting for a wider range of stakeholders, Noland and Phillips (2010) 
discussed what the appropriate level of interaction with each group is. The authors discussed moral 
and strategic motivations behind stakeholder engagement and highlighted the necessity of going 
beyond the bare minimum expectation of satisfying stakeholder demands and, instead, invest time 
and resources to build long-term relationships. 
Advancing the knowledge on the overlap between moral and strategic aims, Minoja (2012) 
attempted to integrate strategic choices into stakeholder management decisions. As a result, the 
author proposed a framework that brings together an ambidextrous stakeholder management, 
stakeholder cooperation, an ethical commitment to stakeholders and the strategy of the firm. 
Following this line of research, Verbeke and Tung (2013) suggested adding a temporal dimension 
to stakeholder management to assess the implications of firm-level competitive advantage due to 
stakeholder agendas evolving over time. Ultimately, this strand of research recognizes firm-
stakeholder relations as a valuable resource that works towards achieving long-term competitive 
advantage.  
Indeed, stakeholder agendas are not homogeneous. Bridoux and Stoelhorst (2014) 





defends. By using low-cost airlines as an example of fairness versus arms-length stakeholder 
management, the authors found out that both approaches may have their merits depending on 
whether the stakeholders care about fairness or not.  
This once again puts into question how to best improve performance via stakeholder 
management, with more recent papers by Moriarty (2014) and Pierce and Aguinis (2015) trying to 
clarify the issue. The first one argued that stakeholders should be given control over the firm in the 
form of board membership. Meanwhile, the second focused on the concept of ‘detrimental 
citizenship behavior’ to investigate employee behaviors that, despite having the intended aim of 
improving performance, end up impacting the firm and its stakeholders negatively. 
The discussion provided in this subsection about theory debates denotes that the literature 
is still fragmented and populated with numerous questions: what approach to stakeholder 
management should managers take? Are all stakeholders equally important to the firm? How could 
stakeholders be best embedded into the decision-making process? Future works could attempt to 
advance the literature by shedding more light on these questions.  
2.3.5 Corporate social irresponsibility 
Earlier we acknowledged the rise of corporate scandals providing a renewed interest in 
stakeholder theory, yet it seems the response in this direction has been limited. Conflicting 
approaches to IST, and the fragmented nature of stakeholder theory overall, has potentially 
impacted the response in examining how socially irresponsible behavior can damage stakeholder 
relations. One area that can potentially be attributed to this lies with CSR research. Harrison et al. 
(2010) pointed out that although stakeholder theory is originally rooted in strategic management, 





Entangled within the CSR literature, this theory has in some respects become part of a one-sided 
debate, that if the firm is involved in socially responsible activities it is by default engaging with 
stakeholders also. A significant amount of research bases its assumptions on the fact that firms 
involved in CSR activities do not behave irresponsibly (Jones, et al., 2009). This can potentially 
distort the theoretical development of IST as it misses many factors that impact firm-stakeholder 
relations. 
Drawing from this perspective, Orlitzky and colleagues (2011) posed a simple question: 
can firms do well by doing good? Presenting an interesting and highly significant development for 
IST. Responsible and irresponsible managerial choices will inevitably impact stakeholders. Yet 
this question has received more attention in social movement literature, so far taking a sociological 
perspective that favors social capital over an IST approach to stakeholder engagement (e.g. 
McDonnell and King, 2013). Determining how stakeholders respond to CSiR will depend on the 
perceived grievances and which group of stakeholders are impacted most.  
How firms respond to and counteract potential disruptions, such as boycotts and protests, 
will differ substantially depending on their level of previous stakeholder engagement. Brammer 
and Millington (2008) and Qian, Gao, and Tsang (2015) investigated the influence of corporate 
philanthropy as a response to corporate risk and identified low, normal and high socially 
performing firms. Brammer and Millington (2008) highlighted that low socially performing firms 
that rarely investment in stakeholder activities are more vulnerable to sanctions in the event of 
irresponsible actions. Qian et al. (2015) complemented this evidence by suggesting that high 
performing socially responsible firms encounter increased stakeholder and investor loyalty, 
improving financial and non-financial performance, demonstrating an IST approach. High socially 





affords the firm a form of social and moral capital. This approach enables firms to build 
relationships through mutual trust, respect and fairness, the very ethos of IST.  
This is in line with the ‘insurance hypothesis’ studies that argue that investing in stakeholder 
engagement provides insurance against future negative events. Since social and moral capital have 
the potential to protect firms against retaliation (Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen, 2009; Luo, Kaul and 
Seo, 2018), incorporating an IST approach can guide firms in how to do so. Nonetheless, it shall 
be noted that the ‘insurance’ will diminish if the firm has a history of repeating negative events. 
Shiu and Yang (2017) echoed this in their study by addressing the effect of increased investment 
in stakeholder focused socially responsible activities where CSiR has occurred. This study revealed 
that long-term stakeholder engagement provides an insurance type effect when CSiR occurs. 
However, this will most likely be reduced if CSiR reoccurs because stakeholders will lose trust and 
question the sincerity of increased investment in future CSR.  
Recently, research has begun to explore the insurance concept in more detail, particularly 
where corporate philanthropy is utilized. Luo and colleagues (2018) investigate the ‘give more, 
spill more’ philosophy, where firms increase philanthropic investment to potentially overshadow 
CSiR behavior. This raises questions concerning the motives behind firms CSR activities and their 
engagement with stakeholders. The ability of stakeholders to sanction firms has progressed 
significantly. Nonmarket stakeholders are mobilizing in greater numbers, becoming increasingly 
sophisticated in their ability to address firms’ behavior. Stakeholders will reward the firm, but only 
so far, as they must know why they are rewarding the firm and for what activities. There are 
however limitations to this since firms and stakeholders alike are limited in their attention (Barnett, 





activists’ ability to influence firm performance, finding that firms can reduce risks by taking an 
IST approach to stakeholder engagement and addressing the issues that these groups may have.  
This once again raises questions concerning the financial implications of CSR and 
stakeholder engagement, evaluating how much is deemed appropriate before shareholders will 
intervene. Mishra and Modi (2013) attempted to add clarity to this ongoing debate by analyzing 
how involvement in CSiR can positively or negatively affect financial performance of firms, 
proxied by firm idiosyncratic risk in the price of stock returns. They took a shareholder perspective 
to argue that investors will punish firms they see as ‘over-leveraged’ financially, supporting the 
argument that firms will invest in their stakeholders only if they are financially profitable. Groening 
and Kanuri (2013) also analyzed investor reactions to positive and negative events, focusing on 
how firm’s shareholders perceive investments in stakeholder engagement in light of CSiR events. 
Results indicated that shareholders approve investing in stakeholder initiatives up to a point where 
they perceive that it is an unnecessary expenditure that reduces their profits. Adding to this, Price 
and Sun (2017) investigated how CSiR affects idiosyncratic risk by taking an instrumental 
perspective. Invoking a high-low matrix, the authors showed that high investments in CSR and 
building stakeholder relations reduces stock market risk. The paper suggests that positive and 
negative CSR will impact a firm’s idiosyncratic risk, being stakeholders less inclined to punish 
negative CSR when the firm develops good stakeholder relations. 
The discussion in this subsection highlights some limitations in the stakeholder and CSR 
literature. Introducing CSiR and its impact on stakeholder relationships and firm performance adds 
a new dimension to the business and society literature. Moving beyond the one-sided debates of 
‘doing good’ and ‘avoiding ‘bad’ can only add value as it identifies previously overlooked factors 





results so far. This provides new and exciting avenues for future research, which could account for 
the ability of stakeholders to reward or sanction firm behavior. 
2.4 Discussion  
Our review seeks to understand how instrumental stakeholder theory has evolved over the 
last three decades, the application of this theory and what it means for the stakeholder-performance 
debate. A general agreement in the literature states that in order to accomplish organizational goals, 
firms must engage with their stakeholder groups (Bridoux and Stoelhurst, 2014; Hillman and Keim, 
2001; Mitchell et al., 2017; Orts and Strudler, 2009). Nevertheless, we note from this review 
difficulty in previous research surrounding confusion on what and who constitutes a stakeholder, 
motivations behind forming stakeholder relationships, and the suitability of either an instrumental 
or normative approach.  
We acknowledge the contribution from Jones (1995) in promoting IST as the dominant 
perspective for firm-stakeholder relations. Nonetheless, limitations in this early contribution paved 
the way for an almost disjointed approach in the development of this theory, as this paper only 
acknowledged primary stakeholder groups. We argue that in focusing solely on primary 
stakeholders, this perspective limited the reach of this contribution and the development of IST as 
a standalone theory. We note the paper misses a nonmarket element, essentially ignoring secondary 
stakeholder groups, narrowing the impact and focus of research in the years following this 
publication. Furthermore, Jones (1995) detailed how firms can sanction stakeholders due to the 
‘contract’ nature of the relationship, yet missed a crucial point, that stakeholders can in turn 
sanction the firm. This is an important distinction where this thesis differs from the extant research 





The characteristics of primary and secondary stakeholders is addressed in the first theme, 
identification and saliency. The importance of taking a broad approach to stakeholder management 
is highlighted briefly here in the context of IST, though this is limited and done in a superficial 
capacity. Previous research seems focused on who, what and how stakeholders interact with firms. 
However, this takes a purely descriptive approach, merely detailing the actions of firm-stakeholder 
performance, without detailing why firms prioritize stakeholders and the implications of ignoring 
others.  
Tashman and Raelin (2013) proposed an interesting perspective on this, stating that firms 
are limited in their capacity to acknowledge all stakeholder needs and conflicting interests. Indeed, 
this is an issue across much of the stakeholder literature (Barnett, 2014). This line of reasoning was 
followed up in more recent works by Bridoux and Vishwanathan (2020) and Fu et al. (2019), which 
discussed how firms tend to concentrate on the most powerful stakeholder groups while ignoring 
how stakeholder needs change over time. Although these contributions advance the instrumental 
perspective, they still have to be empirically tested. We must also acknowledge that the balance of 
power is shifting between stakeholders. Groups that were previously acknowledged solely on the 
periphery of firm operations are now impacting everyday actions. This is particularly relevant for 
firms that operate across national borders, bringing in issues concerning different institutional, 
cultural, and economic factors. Nonetheless, this stream of research is focused on literature 
investigating social movements and boycotts and is largely neglected in the IST literature (e.g. 
King and McDonnell, 2015; McDonnell and Werner, 2016).      
As research progressed, identifying the characteristics of stakeholders evolved, and the 
shareholder-stakeholder debate became a prominent argument in stakeholder theory. Noted in firm 





defining stakeholder engagement in this context. Like the CSR/CFP slack resources argument, 
stakeholder literature overall remains unclear regarding what motivates firms to invest in 
stakeholder activities, specifically the instrumental perspective. Do firms engage with stakeholders 
purely to improve both financial and non-financial performance? Or do firms engage more with 
stakeholders as a reward for increased financial performance?   
We propose that firms have two options in this respect. They could view IST strategically 
as either stakeholder maximization or a shareholder expense reflecting on how stakeholder theory 
has in some respects become almost transactional in pursuing the firm-stakeholder performance 
debate, as shown by Garcia-Castro and Francoeur in 2016. Highlighting the costs of stakeholder 
engagement is important, yet it must not be a trade-off between engagement and non-engagement, 
as in some respects the cost of not implementing a strategic instrumental approach to stakeholder 
relations could potentially cost more in the future.   
  To further develop the IST approach, the focus is turning towards examining the firm-
stakeholder relationship, rather than just detailing actions taken by either group (Bridoux and 
Stoelhurst, 2014, 2016; Jones et al., 2018; Noland and Phillips, 2010). In line with these most 
recent contributions to IST, and advocating a relational approach, we agree there is a disconnect in 
the literature regarding how and why firms engage with stakeholders. Research in IST has shifted 
from just merely detailing the actions of firms as a barometer of a successful stakeholder strategy. 
Instead, keeping in line with the relational model of IST and expanding on contributions by Fu et 
al. (2019), these works propose that a strategic IST approach should involve an ongoing assessment 
of the scope (number of stakeholders involved) and intensity (amount of resources needed) 





relationships beyond a transactional approach would be more beneficial in maintaining stakeholder 
relations.  
The most recent contribution by Jones et al. (2018) highlights certain shortcomings of IST 
using a resource-based theory. The authors pose simple questions that remain largely unanswered: 
is the instrumental approach a valuable resource?; what are the costs of stakeholder engagement?; 
and what are the moderating influences on IST-firm performance? This review does not seek to 
provide these answers yet; however, we argue that taking a strategic instrumental stakeholder 
approach provides more benefits then costs. Jones and colleagues link an IST approach to a firm’s 
ability to achieve a sustained competitive advantage. However, this is challenged by Weitzner and 
Deutsch (2019), who state that further work on IST is futile, specifically from a resource-based 
perspective. These competing viewpoints highlight once again the continued conceptual confusion, 
generalizations and interpretations of an instrumental approach and stakeholder theory overall.  
Nonetheless, we hope to offer a further perspective of IST more in line with a nonmarket 
approach. This we hope realigns IST back to its origins of a strategic management perspective, 
moving away from an overused normative approach. We believe this is more compatible with the 
challenging and complex global business environment where firms currently operate. Taking an 
IST approach to stakeholder engagement has moved beyond a purely business ethics policy. While 
firms want to engage in a more ethically sound practice, the reality is somewhat different, as firms 
will implement ethical strategies with a profit-based aims and objectives. There is little doubt that 
managing stakeholder relations is an integral aspect of firm success, yet we must acknowledge the 
limitations of firms’ willingness to do this.   
After reviewing the extant research of IST, we believe that adopting a strategic instrumental 





product, cultural and country contexts will produce a significant amount of complex and competing 
demands between stakeholders and firms. Stakeholder engagement will differ across firms and 
their subsidiaries and will need to be adapted accordingly. We base this argument on works by 
Barnett (2014) and Bridoux and Stoelhurst (2014), whose discussions on the limitations of 
stakeholder attention and stakeholder gratification show how these factors impact on firm-
stakeholder relations. We use this primarily in the context of CSiR, the fifth theme identified in our 
review. We argue that under certain conditions, stakeholders will retaliate against the firm but only 
up to a point, given that numerous factors may impede stakeholder sanctions. For example, if 
stakeholders identify with the perceived victims, retaliation may occur. Furthermore, if 
stakeholders have little to no knowledge of CSiR actions, it is unlikely that they will retaliate, and 
firms will face no consequences. Whiteman and Cooper (2016) bring attention to this issue in an 
extensive longitudinal study, spanning twenty years, focused on Malaysian forestry operations in 
Guyana. This study reveals harrowing details of human rights abuses and massive environmental 
degradation, yet these instances receive little, if any attention. Moreover, the firms in this study are 
identified as members of international forestry certification organizations, despite accusations of 
CSiR (Forestry Stewardship Council). Additionally, if a stakeholder finds a product or service 
useful, despite previous unethical behaviors, they will ignore certain firm behavior, as evidenced 
by the budget airlines example discussed by Bridoux and Stoelhurst (2014). In this paper, the 
authors compare the business model adapted by Southwest Airlines and Ryanair, both successful 
but with differing stakeholder management approaches.  
The aim of this thesis is to discover if irresponsible behavior by firms will impact negatively 
on firm performance, and to what extent stakeholder engagement can buffer or intensify potential 





Figure 2.5 demonstrates how we have assessed the IST perspective. Our framework provides a 
visual description of the research process undertaken in this chapter. The framework intends to 
portray the suitability of applying IST through the lens of CSiR. Strategic management aims to 
improve overall organizational performance (Makadok, Burton and Barney, 2018), but firms do 
not operate in isolation. This interaction requires cooperation and collaboration with all stakeholder 
groups. Our framework notes that firms can take either a market or nonmarket approach to their 
core strategic decision-making processes. There are two motivations that drive stakeholder 
engagement. Our review of the literature reveals that firms can view IST as either a shareholder 
expense (investing relatively little time and resources into stakeholder engagement) or as an 
investment opportunity (working to maximize these relationships to create long-term value). The 
ultimate goal of IST is to provide a more holistic and inclusive approach for firms to achieve their 
corporate objectives. Taking a nonmarket approach would help build long-term stakeholder 
relationships, boost reputation, and achieve a competitive advantage. However, taking a purely 
shareholder-centric approach to value creation and overlooking other stakeholders, the firm is 


























2.5 Future Research Agenda 
Our review captures the trajectory of IST since its introduction as a central component of 
stakeholder theory. Stakeholder theory can be described as multi-disciplinary in nature at best and 
fragmented and contested at worst (Miles, 2012, 2017; Wasieleski and Weber, 2017). The articles 
reviewed in our analysis provide an overview of different caveats in the IST literature that open 
interesting avenues of research in this area. The first one relates to the geographic scope of 
stakeholder management. Only one of the papers included in our sample had been published in an 
IB journal, despite many firms being multinational nowadays. The interconnections between 
internationalization and IST offer numerous research questions that are yet to be answered. Future 
research could address issues like IST and institutional distance, the effect of (de)globalization on 
IST, and the differences in the salience of stakeholders across borders, among others.  
The second avenue for additional research has to do with secondary stakeholders; that is, 
nonmarket or society stakeholders. Secondary stakeholder groups have a growing importance in 
the current business scene, from influencing major projects in the extractive industry (Henisz et 
al., 2014; Verbeke et al., 2017) to shaping the outcomes of the low-cost airline industry (Bridoux 
and Stoelhorst, 2014). In some cases, the balance of power has shifted to these secondary groups, 
which can quite effectively impact performance and the achievement of strategic goals. Which 
nonmarket stakeholders (e.g. activists, governments, NGOs) have the most influence on firm 
outcomes? In which ways can they affect performance? What are the boundary conditions under 
which these stakeholders hold the upper hand? We suggest that these questions should be further 
explored, both theoretically and empirically. 
Further to this, we suggest that CSiR will provide a fruitful scope for future research in IST. 





review how CSiR impacts shareholder value (Groening and Kanuri, 2013) and idiosyncratic risk 
(Mishra and Modi, 2013; Price and Sun, 2017). However, these studies are very much shareholder 
centric and largely avoid nonmarket stakeholders. We suggest that future research could investigate 
nonmarket stakeholders’ ability to impact financial and non-financial performance in the face of 
CSiR events. Also noted in this review process is an instrumental stakeholder approach to corporate 
political activity. Firms are increasingly engaged in activities that influence legislative and 
regulatory processes. In addition to this, firms are now taking on roles that were previously the 
responsibility of governments. However, the literature has largely neglected how socio-political 
strategies of firms can impede the development of stakeholder engagement. Firm political activity 
can be viewed rather cynically, as stakeholders perceive that it only benefits firms. Applying an 
instrumental approach to empirically investigate this concept can provide a rich avenue of research.   
In this regard, our final suggestion for studies on IST is methodological. As previously 
mentioned, most of the papers in our sample are theoretical/conceptual (61%). Only 11% focused 
on qualitative methods, with the rest of them using either secondary data (27%) or surveys (1%) to 
perform their quantitative analyses. This distribution highlights that the IST literature is in need of 
more empirical work, particularly coming from primary data.       
Instrumental stakeholder theory (IST) is the strand of the stakeholder theory that links 
stakeholder management practices to performance. We have chosen to review this strand at a time 
that is becoming increasingly important to engage with stakeholder groups. Stakeholder profiles 
are changing, our extensive review provides evidence that nonmarket stakeholders are increasingly 
powerful and willing to hold firms accountable. Yet how this translates into pushing firms to 
change their practices long-term remains unclear. It is our view that stakeholder theory overall is 





foundation. Ethical business decisions will almost certainly be taken with value creation as the 
main goal. Finding the right balance between a profit-based strategy that benefits both market and 
nonmarket stakeholders is a challenge all firms must embrace.  
Are all stakeholders equally important for firms to achieve their objectives? If not, which 
ones should they serve to increase their likelihood of succeeding in the markets where they operate? 
A deeper understanding of IST is critical and timely, as several questions have yet to be answered. 
This thesis aims to extends the instrumental perspective where CSiR has occurred, in an effort to 
advance our knowledge on how stakeholder management can favor the achievement of a 
competitive advantage. Drawing on IST, in the following two chapters we provide an empirical 
analysis on the research question: Does CSiR adversely affect performance and strategic growth 
or can firms act with impunity?   
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Quantitative 
(Secondary Data) 
Orlitzky, M., Siegel, D.S., and 
Waldman, D.A. 
2011 B&S 
Strategic corporate social responsibility and environmental 
sustainability 
Conceptual 
Surroca, J., Tribó, J.A., and 
Waddock, S. 
2010 SMJ 




Brammer, S., and Millington, A. 2008 SMJ 
Does it pay to be different? An analysis of the relationship between 








Author(s) Year Journal Title Methodology 
Gambeta, E., Koka, B.R., and 
Hoskisson, R.E. 
2019 SMJ 
Being too good for your own good: A stakeholder perspective on 




Paulraj, A.,Chen, I.J,  
and Blome, C. 
2017 JBE 
Motives and performance outcomes of sustainable supply chain 
management practices: A multi-theoretical perspective. 
Quantitative 
(Survey) 
Verbeke, A., Osiyevskyy, O., and 
Backman, C.A. 
2017 LRP 
Strategic responses to imposed innovation projects: The case of 
carbon capture and storage in the Alberta oil sands. 
Qualitative 
Garcia-Castro, R.,  
and Francoeur, C. 
2016 SMJ 
When more is not better: Complementarities, costs and 
contingencies in stakeholder management. 
Quantitative 
(Secondary Data) 
Bosse, D.A., and Coughlan, R. 2016 JOMS Stakeholder relationship bonds Conceptual 
Su, W., and Tsang, E.W.K. 2015 AMJ 
Product diversification and financial performance: The moderating 
role of secondary stakeholders. 
Quantitative 
(Secondary Data) 
Henisz, W.J., Dorobantu, S., and 
Nartey, L.J. 
2014 SMJ Spinning gold: The financial returns to stakeholder engagement. 
Quantitative 
(Secondary Data) 
Chiu, S.C., and Sharfman, M. 2011 JOM 
Legitimacy, visibility, and the antecedents of corporate social 
performance: an investigation of the instrumental perspective. 
Quantitative 
(Secondary Data) 
Garcia-Castro, R., Ariño, M.A., 
and Canela, M.A. 
2011 B&S 




Harrison, J.S., Bosse, D.A., and 
Phillips, R.A. 
2010 SMJ 







Cennamo, C., Berrone, P., and 
Gomez-Mejia, L.R. 
2009 JBE Does stakeholder management have a dark side? Conceptual 
Kobeissi, N., and Damanpour, F. 2009 B&S 
Corporate responsiveness to community stakeholders: Effects of 
contextual and organizational characteristics. 
Quantitative 
(Secondary Data) 
Bouquet, C., and Deutsch, Y. 2008 JBE 




Berrone, P., Surroca, J.,  
and Tribó, J.A. 
2007 JBE 
Corporate ethical identity as a determinant of firm performance: A 
test of the mediating role of stakeholder satisfaction. 
Quantitative 
(Secondary Data) 
Harting, T.R., Harmeling, S.S., 
and Venkataraman, S. 
2006 BEQ 
Innovative stakeholder relations: When “ethics pays” (and when it 
doesn’t). 
Conceptual 
Hosmer, L.T., and Kiewitz, C. 2005 BEQ 
Organizational justice: A behavioral science concept with critical 
implications for business ethics and stakeholder theory. 
Conceptual 
Heugens, P.P.M.A.R., Van Den 
Bosch, F.A.J., and Van Riel, 
C.B.M. 
2002 B&S Stakeholder integration: Building mutually enforcing relationships. Qualitative 
Berman, S.L.,Wicks, A.C., Kotha, 
S., and Jones, T.M. 
1999 AMJ 
Does stakeholder orientation matter? The relationship between 
stakeholder management models and firm financial performance. 
Quantitative 
(Secondary Data) 
Ogden, S., and Watson, R. 1999 AMJ 
Corporate performance and stakeholder management: Balancing 











IDENTITY AND SALIENCE 
Author(s) Year Journal Title Methodology 
Tashman, P., and Raelin, J. 2013 BEQ 
Who and what really matters to the firm: Moving stakeholder 
salience beyond managerial perceptions. 
Conceptual 
Jones, T.M., Felps, W., and 
Bigley, G.A. 
2007 AMR 
Ethical theory and stakeholder-related decisions: The role of 
stakeholder culture. 
Conceptual 
Su, C., Mitchell, R.K.,  
and Sirgy, M.J. 
2007 JBE 
Enabling guanxi management in china: A hierarchical stakeholder 
model of effective guanxi. 
Conceptual 
Eesley, C., and Lenox, M.J. 2006 SMJ Firm responses to secondary stakeholder action 
Quantitative 
(Secondary Data) 
Reynolds, S.J., Schultz, F.C., and 
Hekman, D.R. 
2006 JBE 
Stakeholder theory and managerial decision-making: Constraints 
and implications of balancing stakeholder interests. 
Qualitative 
Driscoll, C., and Starik, M. 2004 JBE 
The primordial stakeholder: Advancing the conceptual 
consideration of stakeholder status for the natural environment. 
Conceptual 
Kaler, J. 2003 JBE Differentiating stakeholder theories Conceptual 
Ryan, L.V., and Schneider, M. 2003 B&S Institutional investor power and heterogeneity Conceptual 
Van Buren, H.J. 2001 BEQ 
If fairness is the problem, is consent the solution? Integrating ISCT 
and stakeholder theory. 
Conceptual 








Author(s) Year Journal Title Methodology 
Bridoux, F., and Vishwanathan, P. 2019 B&S 
When do powerful stakeholders give managers the latitude to 
balance all stakeholders’ interests? 
Conceptual 
Bundy, J., Vogel, R.M., and 
Zachary, M. 
2018 SMJ 
Organization-stakeholder fit: A dynamic theory of cooperation, 
compromise, and conflict between an organization and its 
stakeholders 
Conceptual 
Freeman, R.E., Phillips, R., and 
Sisodia, R. 
2020 B&S Tensions in stakeholder theory Conceptual 
Hahn, T., Figge, F., Pinske, J., 
and Preuss, L. 
2018 JBE 
A paradox perspective on corporate sustainability: Descriptive, 
instrumental and normative aspects. 
Conceptual 
Jones, T.M., Harrison, J.S., and 
Felps, W. 
2018 AMR 
How applying instrumental stakeholder theory can provide 
sustainable competitive advantage 
Conceptual 
Hayibor, S. 2017 JBE 
Is fair treatment enough? Augmenting the fairness-based 
perspective on stakeholder behaviour. 
Conceptual 
Zientara, P. 2017 JBE 
Socioemotional wealth and corporate social responsibility: A 
critical analysis. 
Conceptual 
Demuijnck, G., and Fasterling, B. 2016 JBE The social license to operate Conceptual 
Pierce, J.R., and Aguinis, H. 2015 MOR 
Detrimental citizenship behaviour: A multilevel framework of 
antecedents and consequences. 
Conceptual 
Bridoux, F., and Stoelhorst, J.W. 2014 SMJ 
Microfoundations for stakeholder theory: Managing stakeholders 






Miska, C., Hilbe, C., 
and Mayer, S. 
2014 JBE 
Reconciling different views on responsible leadership: A 
rationality-based approach. 
Conceptual 
Moriarty, J. 2014 B&S 
The connection between stakeholder theory and stakeholder 
democracy: An excavation and defense. 
Conceptual 
Verbeke, A., and Tung, V. 2013 JBE 
The future of stakeholder management theory: A temporal 
perspective. 
Conceptual 
Minoja, M. 2012 JBE Stakeholder management theory, firm strategy and ambidexterity Conceptual 
Noland, J., and Phillips, R. 2010 IJMR 
Stakeholder engagement, discourse ethics and strategic 
management 
Conceptual 
Kaler, J. 2009 JBE An optimally viable version of stakeholder theory Conceptual 
Agle, B.R., Donaldson, T., 
Freeman, R.E., Jensen, M.C., 
Mitchell, R.K., and Wood, D.J. 
2008 BEQ Dialogue: Toward superior stakeholder theory Conceptual 
Gilbert, D.U., and Rasche, A. 2008 JBE 
Opportunities and problems of standardized ethics initiatives—A 
stakeholder theory perspective. 
Conceptual 
Wagner-Tsukamoto, S. 2007 JBE 
Moral agency, profits and the firm: economic revisions to the 
theorem 
Conceptual 
Scherer, A.G., Palazzo, G., and 
Baumann, D. 
2006 BEQ 
Global rules and private actors: Towards a new role of the 
transnational corporation in global governance. 
Conceptual 
O’Connell, L.L., Carroll, C.U., 
Betz, M., Shepard, J.M., and 
Hendry, J.R. 
2005 BEQ 







Wagner-Tsukamoto, S. 2005 JBE 
An economic approach to business ethics: Moral agency of the firm 
and the enabling and constraining effects of economic institutions 
and interactions in a market economy. 
Conceptual 
Butterfield, K.D., Reed, R., and 
Lemak, D.J. 
2004 B&S 
An Inductive Model of Collaboration from the Stakeholders 
Perspective 
Qualitative 
Rowley, T.J., and  
Moldoveanu, M. 
2003 AMR 
When will stakeholder groups act? An interest- and identity-based 
model of stakeholder group mobilization. 
Conceptual 
Cragg, W. 2002 BEQ Business ethics and stakeholder theory Conceptual 
Freeman, R.E., and Phillips, R.A. 2002 BEQ Stakeholder theory: A libertarian defense. Conceptual 
Friedman, A.L., and Miles, S. 2002 JoMS Developing stakeholder theory Qualitative 
Heugens, P.P.M.A.R., and van 
Oosterhout, H.J. 
2002 JBE 
The confines of stakeholder management: Evidence from the Dutch 
manufacturing sector. 
Qualitative 
Hendry, J. 2001 BEQ 
Missing the target: Normative stakeholder theory and the corporate 
governance debate. 
Conceptual 
Jawahar, I.M, and McLaughlin, 
G.L. 
2001 AMR 
Towards a Descriptive Stakeholder Theory: An Organizational Life 
Cycle Approach. 
Conceptual 
Stoney, C. & Winstanley, D. 2001 JOMS Stakeholding: Confusion or utopia? Mapping the conceptual terrain. Conceptual 
Bishop, J.D. 2000 BEQ A framework for discussing normative theories of business ethics Conceptual 





Gibson, K. 2000 JBE The moral basis of stakeholder theory Conceptual 
Wijnberg, N.M. 2000 JBE 
Normative stakeholder theory and Aristotle: The link between 
ethics and politics. 
Conceptual 
Reed, D. 1999 BEQ Stakeholder management theory: A critical theory perspective. Conceptual 
Shankman, N.A. 1999 JBE 
Reframing the debate between agency and stakeholder theory of the 
firm 
Conceptual 
Donaldson, T., and Preston, L.E. 1995 AMR 
The stakeholder theory of the corporation: Concepts, evidence and 
implications. 
Conceptual 
Jones, T.M. 1995 AMR 
Instrumental stakeholder theory: A synthesis of ethics and 
economics. 
Conceptual 
































CHAPTER 3 - AN INSTRUMENTAL 
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Business and society are experiencing a fundamental change in the approach to 
performance, both in the market and nonmarket arenas. We now see an increased interest in the 
stakeholder approach to value creation, as firms work towards increasing financial performance 
and improved efficiency, but not at the expense of the wider community (Barnett, 2007; Bosse, 
Phillips and Harrison, 2009; Choi and Wang, 2009; Garcia-Castro and Aguilera, 2015). Yet despite 
this shift, in which firms increasingly seek to contribute to social, environmental and economic 
challenges, widespread public mistrust remains as to why firms would take a more stakeholder-
centric stance, especially after the most recent financial crisis and the resultant corporate scandals. 
This public skepticism is further exacerbated by a growing intolerance to corporate social 
irresponsibility (CSiR) that not only adversely impacts on societal interests but also the long-term 
interests of firms (Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2012; Nardella, Brammer and Surdu, 2020).   
To counteract this stakeholder distrust, firms are taking a more strategic approach to social 
responsibility that strategically aligns their operations, products, and services with their CSR 
programs (Lawton, Doh and Rajwani, 2014). Additionally, governments and legislative bodies are 
committing to implementing regulations aimed at reducing carbon emissions, which is pushing 
firms to innovate new and existing products and services (European Carbon Foundation, 2019). 
Firms are working to align market and nonmarket activities by implementing green technologies, 
addressing stakeholder concerns and anticipating new legislative restrictions (Schreck, 2011).  For 
example, those in the automotive industry pushing to switch to electric cars to reduce carbon 
emissions. Or those in high-tech looking to streamline product size and availability and make the 
accessories for smartphones ‘added extras’ as a means to help the environment. The European 





over emissions standards and are pushing for the introduction of universal accessories (i.e. chargers 
and headphones).1 Anticipating this new legislation, Apple Inc. is already innovating its products 
by removing certain features, ultimately forcing consumers to buy accessories after the initial 
purchase. Firms now work to overemphasize their commitment towards social responsibility but, 
in reality, these decisions are mainly profit-driven and a form of self-regulation before stricter 
standards of production are imposed (Baron, 2016).   
 The debate surrounding corporate social responsibility (CSR) mainly focuses on whether 
it is an unnecessary cost, or a strategic investment based on its impact on the financial performance 
of the firm (Kang, Germann and Grewal, 2016; McWilliams and Siegel, 2011; Porter and Kramer, 
2011). As firms move towards a more stakeholder-centric approach, evidenced by the recent 
announcement from the Business Roundtable statement committing to a wider stakeholder focus2, 
there is now increased interest in identifying a link between improved financial performance 
through strategic CSR programs (Barnett and Salomon, 2006, 2012; Flammer, 2015; Margolis and 
Walsh, 2003; Ortlitzky, Schmidt and Rynes, 2003). Nonetheless, despite this increased attention, 
there is still no empirical consensus on whether CSR positively influences financial performance 
(Flammer, 2015).  
So far, we have only discussed firms’ efforts to be more socially responsible. However, 
these efforts often collide with instances of irresponsible behavior that show the contradiction 
between doing good and doing well for shareholders (Alcadipani and de Oliveira Medeiros, 2019), 
whether this is through human rights abuse associated with the garment industry highlighted in the 
Rana Plaza collapse, the environmental damage caused by the BP Deepwater Horizon incident, or 
 
1 https://news.sky.com/story/why-iphones-might-need-the-same-charging-cable-as-androids-in-future-11910409 
(Last accessed August 3, 2020). 





the corruption linked to the collapse of Enron. Although the performance outcomes of CSR has 
drawn the attention of numerous scholars in recent decades, research has been very much one-sided 
to date, focusing on firms’ good deeds rather than whether or how they avoid doing harm (Lin-Hi 
and Müller, 2013). This in turn ignores the implications that firms are involved in irresponsible 
behaviors through intentional or accidental acts that could be financially detrimental to them.  
Only recently have studies tried to disentangle the effect of corporate social irresponsibility 
(CSiR) on firm performance (Chen, Guo, Hsiao, and Chen, 2018; Flammer, 2013; Groening and 
Kanuri, 2013, 2018; Kang et al., 2016; Kölbel, Busch and Jancso, 2017; Nardella, et al., 2020; 
Price and Sun, 2017; Shiu and Yang, 2017; Walker, Zhang and Yu, 2016). Price and Sun (2017) 
focus on market value and firm idiosyncratic risk as their performance measures, other studies use 
investor reaction and stock price (Flammer, 2013; Groening and Kanuri, 2013). Whereas Nardella 
et al., (2020) use reputation change as their dependent variable. Building upon this line of research 
and drawing on instrumental stakeholder theory (IST), this chapter seeks to unearth the effect of 
CSiR on financial and non-financial performance, proxied by the firm’s value (Tobin’s q) and 
corporate social performance (CSP) score, respectively. In addition, we suggest that this 
relationship is bound to be affected by the other strand of the firm’s nonmarket strategy (i.e. CPA). 
So far academic research into the mechanisms of CSiR has focused on the institutional 
environment (Keig, Brouthers and Marshall, 2015), attributions (Lange and Washburn, 2012) and 
CSiR as a resource (Strike, Gao and Bansal, 2006). Only recently has interest shifted to take 
account of the role that stakeholders play when CSiR occurs. This may be due to the rising 
importance of stakeholder engagement and how this has subtlety altered the balance of power 
between stakeholder groups and firms, as stakeholders become increasingly influential over policy 





Though economic and social interest may seem incompatible at times, we see opportunity 
to better align these two concepts by undertaking a more instrumental approach to building 
stakeholder relations. Taking an instrumental approach to our research highlights the contractual 
benefits of proactively engaging with stakeholders to achieve the economic and social objectives 
of the firm jointly (Jones, 1995). This includes both primary and secondary stakeholder groups. 
Based on Hillman and Keim (2001), we consider shareholders, employees, suppliers, customers as 
primary stakeholders. Meanwhile, governments and legislators, the environment, local 
communities, media, and nongovernmental organizations would qualify as secondary or nonmarket 
stakeholders (Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006; Husted, Allen and Kock, 2015).     
Nonmarket stakeholders can disrupt firm behavior through boycotts and protests 
(Markman, Waldron and Panagopoulos, 2016; Sweetin, Knowles, Summey and McQueen, 2013). 
The pursuit of stakeholder groups to hold firms accountable for their perceived actions is growing 
in strength, sophistication, and size. Specifically, powerful activist groups seek to shape policy and 
alter a firms’ strategic operations, putting pressure not only on governments but also on businesses’ 
and their value chains (Bach, 2015). For example, Greenpeace’s ‘Dirty Laundry’ campaign, which 
identified and targeted clothing manufacturers in supply chains accused of environmental and 
human rights abuses. Powerful brands such as Adidas and Nike suffered from the negative 
exposure that followed, which ensured that these firms successfully ‘detoxed’ their supply chains.3 
In this chapter, we account for nonmarket stakeholders, specifically political stakeholders, 
by examining the implications of firms engaging in financial and relational CPA. We focus on how 
firms use these tactics to buy political capital when CSiR occurs. To the extent of our knowledge, 
this is the first study that addresses this issue. We argue that lobbying expenditures and being 
 





headquartered close to the political capital of the country deepens the negative relationship between 
CSiR and performance. Former papers on the CSiR-performance link have primarily focused on 
assessing the impact of CSR investments as a form of reputational insurance when CSR and CSiR 
coexist (Brammer and Millington 2008; Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen, 2009; Luo, Kaul and Seo, 
2018). Adding to this, we acknowledge the call of researchers to: 1) treat CSiR as a standalone 
concept that is separate from CSR (Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013; Kölbel et al., 2017; Walker et al., 
2016) and 2) consider both strands of nonmarket strategy—i.e. CSR and CPA—when researching 
this topic (den Hond, Rebhein, de Bakker and Lankveld, 2014; Lawton et al., 2014; Liedong, 
Ghobadian, Rajwani and O’Regan, 2015; Mellahi, Frynas, Sun and Siegel, 2016). 
We have developed and tested a series of hypotheses on a panel-data sample of firms listed 
in Standard & Poor’s (S&P) 500 over an 11-year period (2007-2017) using random-effects 
regressions. To define our CSiR variable, we created our own unique database of CSiR events in 
which the S&P 500 firms considered had been involved by collecting and coding media 
publications included in the LexisNexis directory. This process uncovered 420 acts of CSiR that 
we classified into eight different categories (i.e. fraud; bribery and corruption; competition; 
environment; discrimination; product safety; human rights; other).  
Our results suggest that there is no significant relationship between CSiR and firms’ 
financial performance. Meanwhile, we find evidence that CSiR negatively impacts non-financial 
performance, and that financial CPA (i.e. lobbying expenditures) further deepen this relationship. 
In addition, while we do not obtain significant results for a firm’s political connections using the 
geographic measurement of ‘distance to DC’, we do find a significant negative moderating 
relationship when we define relational CPA in terms of the hiring practices of firms of ex 





In this chapter we make three central contributions to the nonmarket and instrumental 
stakeholder literatures. First, we contribute to theory by extending IST research into the nonmarket 
domain. We analyze how stakeholder relations are impacted when CSiR is uncovered. We note 
that while shareholders neither punish nor reward CSiR, stakeholders as a whole penalize it in the 
form of a lower CSP. We also contribute overall to nonmarket strategy (NMS) literature by 
analyzing CSR and CSiR as two separate constructs, which allows us to gain a broader 
understanding of the different mechanisms that affect firm performance. Further to this, we address 
nonmarket scholars calls to examine the alignment of the two strands that conform a firm’s NMS; 
that is, CSR and CPA. We make our final contribution in this chapter specifically to the CPA 
literature by taking an instrumental stakeholder approach to financial and relational CPA to 
examine how stakeholders react to this as a performance-enhancing tactic. 
 We structure the remainder of this chapter as follows. First, we conduct a literature review 
of prior CSiR research. Next, we introduce our theoretical framework and develop our hypotheses 
before discussing our methodological approach, which includes a description of the research 
setting, data collection process, variables introduced in the models, and econometric techniques 
used. We then present our key results and discuss them together with their practical implications, 
limitations, and future research directions.       
3.2 Corporate Social Irresponsibility: A Review of the Literature 
The concept of corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR) was introduced as a topic of 
discussion by Armstrong (1977), who likened CSiR to immoral decision making by executives 
with the aim of increasing shareholder value. Although this concept received some attention in the 
intervening years, it is only in the last decade that a significant attempt to understand the outcomes 





identified as one of the major challenges for practitioners, scholars and society in the 21st century 
due to increased incidents of corporate misconduct that negatively impact stakeholders and the 
natural environment (Christensen, Mackey and Whetten, 2014; Pearce and Manz, 2011).  
The concept of socially irresponsible behavior is labelled as an ‘umbrella term’, thus 
accounting for the fact that different researchers have used a variety of terms to define it and that 
it crosses over different research areas. We have captured the most prominent labels in Table 3.1.:  
Table 3.1. Most prominent labels of socially irresponsible behaviors used in the literature. 
AUTHOR YEAR TERM DEFINITION 
Coombs 2006 Crisis Management 
“(…) represents the amount of 
financial, physical, environmental, 
or emotional harm a crisis can 
inflict (…) severity increases 
perceptions of crisis 
responsibility” 
Jones, Bowd, and 
Tench 
2009 CSI 
“CSI is about being reactive as 
opposed to proactive in 
addressing corporate issues and 
the ways and means by which 
they relate to wider society. At its 
extreme CSI may entail breaking 
the law (…) operating in a CSI 
manner, can have disastrous 
social, economic and business 
consequences” 
Greve, Palmer, and 
Pozner 
2010 Misconduct 
“(…) organizational misconduct 
as behavior in or by an 
organization that a social-control 
agent judges to transgress a line 
separating right from wrong; 
where such a line can separate 
legal, ethical, and socially 







Block, and Pollock 
2010 Corporate illegality 
“(…) an illegal act primarily 
meant to benefit a firm by 
potentially increasing revenues or 
decreasing costs” 
Groening and Kanuri 2013 Positive/Negative Event 
“(…) refers to an event that either 
adds or deletes something that is 
stakeholder-positive or 
stakeholder-negative” 
Barnett 2014 CSiR 
“any publicly disclosed firm 
action that, under some set of 
conditions, a stakeholder would 
deem illegal, unethical, or socially 
irresponsible”.  
Price and Sun 2017 CSiR 
“(…) understood to describe firm 
actions which reasonable 
stakeholders consider to be 
irresponsible behavior, is 
concerned with whether firms 
engage in harmful activities that 
benefit a few but cause 
substantive net harm when 
considering all stakeholders” 
Nardella et al. 2020 Reputational Penalties 
“Specifically, reputation penalties 
occur when highly responsible 
firms are perceived as hypocritical 
and least responsible firms were 
not found culpable by a court of 
law” 
 It shall be noted that in this and the subsequent chapter we use the term CSiR consistently 
to describe irresponsible acts that firms may be involved. We do so because previous studies have 
defined CSiR in terms of misconducts as deliberate acts that are perpetrated by a firm with the 
intention to cause harm to its stakeholders (Greve et al., 2010; Pozner, 2007). Meanwhile, we hold 





into this concept. Furthermore, CSiR accounts for both deliberate and accidental acts of 
irresponsible behavior. Stakeholders will be the ones to judge these actions and punish them 
accordingly based on their perceptions, even when they might not be illegal but perhaps just 
morally wrong (Kölbel et al., 2017). Therefore, we follow the logic laid out by Barnett (2014: 677) 
in defining CSiR as “any publicly disclosed firm action that, under some set of conditions, a 
stakeholder would deem illegal, unethical, or socially irresponsible”.  
Several studies have examined the perceived actions of the firm and how key stakeholders 
attribute blame drawing on attribution and stakeholder theory (Lange and Washburn, 2012), 
seeking to discover if involvement in some form of CSiR may invoke an emotional reaction from 
key stakeholder groups and consequently impact the firm (Antonetti and Maklan, 2016). Said 
studies have made important contributions to the CSiR domain by relying on the marketing and 
psychology literatures. However, they have adopted a rather consumer-centric approach, 
overlooking reactions from other groups of stakeholders. They have mainly accounted for 
consumer scepticism (Skarmeas, Leonidou and Saridakis, 2014), moral outrage (Antonetti and 
Maklan, 2016) and organizational memory (Mena, Rintamaki, Fleming and Spicer, 2016) to debate 
how consumer reactions may result in protest behaviors—e.g. boycotts, negative word of mouth 
campaigns and picketing—aimed to force firms to act more responsibly.  
Sweetin et al. (2013) state that consumers willingly punish corporate brands for their 
perceived CSiR actions. Furthering these results, additional research has studied whether reactions 
to CSiR come from individuals or emerge as the result of collective movements (Grappi, Romani 
and Bagozzi, 2013; Nicol, 2018), and the role that the country of origin and national identity play 
in this, if any (Carvalho, Muralidharan and Bapuji, 2015). All this, in turn, will have important 





will result negatively on long-term profitability and value creation (Grappi et al., 2013), others 
question stakeholder inconsistency in holding firms accountable due to limited attention, thus firms 
may face no consequences of their CSiR actions (Barnett, 2014) 
In this regard, the business case for CSR and CSiR has been an overarching theme in the 
literature, showing the intimate relationship between both concepts in practice as well as in 
academia. Yet the debate concerning the role firms play in the business and society debate has been 
quite one-sided so far, the rationale being that if a firm is ‘doing good’ then it is ‘avoiding bad’ 
(Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013). This would in turn lead to the assumption that firms that invest in CSR 
are fulfilling their social responsibility. However, involvement in socially responsible activities 
does not automatically mean that firms are completely avoiding doing harm (Cai, Jo and Pan, 2012; 
Crilly, Ni and Jiang, 2016; Kang et al., 2016; Muller and Kräussl, 2011; Strike et al., 2006).  
Reality is more nuanced than this straightforward relationship and there may be different 
shades of grey in the continuum between CSR and CSiR. For instance, certain firms may create a 
CSR profile in order to improve reputation and build legitimacy that serves them as insurance in 
the event of CSiR (Fiaschi, Giuliani and Nieri, 2017; Shiu and Yang, 2017; Muller and Kräussl, 
2011). This kind of tactic is open to criticism since it can be viewed as a cynical means of 
controlling the message firms wish to broadcast, talking the talk but not walking the walk. In 
addition, Lange and Washburn (2012) acknowledge that involvement in CSiR is likely to be 
remembered far longer than CSR activities. In fact, corporate reputation is a valuable resource that 
takes time to build (Barnett, 2018; Deephouse, 2000; Hall, 1992), but can be easily damaged. 
Nonetheless, despite the potential downsides that investing in CSR to offset CSiR may 
display, it can be particularly advantageous for stigmatized businesses or for those from 





al., 2016). As an example, Kotchen and Moon (2012) conclude that firms operating in industries 
with a higher CSiR profile will ultimately invest more in CSR programmes rather than proactively 
work to reform any issues at hand. More recently, Luo et al. (2018) have investigated this 
phenomenon by focusing on the US petroleum industry, concluding that ‘firms who give more, 
spill more’. They argue that only sincere stakeholder engagement and relationships built on mutual 
trust can go some way to holding firms accountable for their actions. Based on this assumption, it 
could be said that the more informed key stakeholder groups are, the more they will hold firms 
accountable for their actions, probably resulting in a reduction of CSiR actions. 
Stakeholders have easier access to new communication and media platforms and corporate 
information (Enderwick, 2018), which affects the knowledge that they possess about any of firms’ 
wrongful doings. Media reports provide them with evidence that they perceive as being more 
trustworthy than that published by the firms themselves. As such, the CSR activities that firms 
report are often seen as an attempt at self-promotion or greenwashing (Greenwood, 2007). 
Meanwhile, media reports are viewed as an independent indicator of corporate misconduct, 
potentially prompting stakeholder retaliation (Kölbel et al., 2017). Yet despite increased media 
attention stakeholders often accept at face value a firm’s commitment to behaving responsibly. 
Though firms are increasingly transparent in communicating their actions, some scholars have 
noted that firms can still deceive their stakeholders by failing to deliver on proposed CSR policies 
(Crilly, Hansen and Zollo, 2016). This is consistent with the argument laid out by Barnett (2014), 
who discusses the cognitive constraints that restricts the ability of stakeholders to assess all aspects 
of firm behavior, thus limiting their retaliation capacity.  
In the following section we put our focus on stakeholders and the instrumental stakeholder 





financial performance of firms and how this relationship may be moderated by their 
political activity. 
3.3 Theory and Hypotheses 
Drawing on instrumental stakeholder theory (Donald and Preston, 1995; Jones, 1995), our 
theoretical framework seeks to further the study of the relationship between stakeholder 
engagement and performance (financial as well as non-financial). Highlighted as an important 
strand of stakeholder theory, IST promotes effective management of firm-stakeholder relations 
based on mutual trust and cooperation aimed at increasing competitive advantage. Taking its 
origins from transaction cost economics (e.g. Williamson, 1975) and stakeholder theory (Freeman, 
1984), IST is ideally placed to understand the complexity of firm-stakeholder relationships. It 
weighs the almost contractual type benefits of applying a proactive strategy to engage with 
stakeholders to achieve the economic and societal aims and objective of the firm (Jones, 1995).  
IST has been previously used in the strategic management and business and society 
literature (e.g. Gambeta, Koka and Hoskisson, 2018; Harrison, Bosse and Phillips, 2010; Henisz et 
al., 2014; Margolis and Walsh, 2003). Examining the cause and effect process of decision making 
in firm-stakeholder relations, IST considers how managerial decisions to improve stakeholder 
relations enhance firm performance, and poor stakeholder management leads to a loss of potential 
long-term growth (Bosse and Coughlan, 2016). This makes it ideally placed to analyze how acts 
of CSiR can impact negatively on important stakeholder relations and potentially damage firm 
performance. Indeed, a renewed interest in the instrumental approach to the strategy-performance 
discussion (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2014) has opened some interesting areas of research. 
Nonetheless, as evidenced by the systematic review conducted in the previous chapter, the 





Our research aims to contribute to IST by examining if and how an instrumental stakeholder 
approach can be fully realized when firms are involved in CSiR actions that harm their 
stakeholders. Our assumption of the IST approach is further questioned as we investigate the 
impact of lobbying activities by firms involved in CSiR. Research concerning firm’s political 
activity and stakeholder theory is also underdeveloped, since studies have so far focused mainly 
on social capital theory to determine stakeholder relations (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015).We also 
seek to address this research gap by determining whether CPA strategies can buffer or intensify the 
outcomes of CSiR. Figure 3.1. summarizes the relationships that we hypothesize in the chapter and 
that we explain in more detail in the following subsections. 




































3.3.1 CSiR and financial performance  
Although studied to a lesser extent than CSR, several scholars have tried to shed more light 
on the CSiR and financial performance relationship in recent years. As previously mentioned in 
this chapter, increased media scrutiny puts firms’ irresponsible actions in the spotlight, which 
negatively affects financial performance by making them more visible to stakeholders (Flammer, 
2013; Kölbel et al., 2017). This, in turn, may trigger a response from them. For instance, 
shareholders might punish firms in the stock markets by lowering their share price (Carberry, 
Engelen and van Essen, 2018; Groening and Kanuri, 2013, 2018).  
But… why would firms participate in irresponsible acts if they are bound to have negative 
effects on their performance? Mishina et al. (2010) investigate the conditions under which high 
performing firms may engage in illegal acts that damage performance, citing as triggers for 
managers to willingly engage in CSiR. The authors argue that failure to meet what may seem 
abnormally high market performance expectations could encourage the firm to take unusually high 
risks, deemed either illegal or ethically wrong by both internal and external stakeholders. Yet it is 
not only deliberate acts of CSiR that can adversely affect firm performance. Muller and Kräussel 
(2011) analyze this through the lens of natural disasters and corporate responsiveness, finding that 
firms with a high reputation for CSiR experience adverse effects on share price.  
Nonetheless, firms’ awareness and preparedness for the potential of increased financial risk 
due to CSiR via increased social responsibility may serve them as an insurance mechanism that 
protects them from possible retaliation and further losses (Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Luo and 
Bhattacharya, 2009), even if this insurance-like effect has a limit and its influence will rapidly 





angels’ or ‘pure evil’ and the existing literature acknowledges this by examining how CSR and 
organizational reputation affect the relationship between CSiR and firm performance. 
Evidence suggests that if firms are heavily involved in CSR policies and practices, and 
invest in stakeholder engagement, this will reduce the negative impact on the firm (Barnett and 
Salomon, 2012; Walker et al., 2016). This is obvious in controversial industries who invest heavily 
in social responsibility to improve firm value (Cai et al., 2012). And it also becomes apparent at 
firm level, as papers such as Groening and Kanuri (2018), Kölbel et al. (2017), Nardella et al. 
(2020), Price and Sun (2017), and Walker et al. (2016) suggest. 
Walker et al. (2016) assess the differing effects of CSR and CSiR on firm performance, 
pushing the term ‘angel-halo effect’. Using ESG ratings from US-based firms, the results of this 
study show that if a firm is engaged in both CSR and CSiR activities, this results in increased 
financial performance. Though both these concepts impact differently on performance, results 
indicate that while acts of CSiR can damage reputation and affect stock price, overall financial 
performance continues to improve if a firm has a proven CSR record. Kölbel et al. (2017) seem to 
echo this logic, as they explore how involvement in CSR can reduce the impact of stakeholder 
sanctions when a firm is involved in social irresponsibility.  
Research by Price and Sun (2017) empirically analyze the impact of CSiR on market 
performance, suggesting that involvement in socially irresponsible activities will impact 
negatively. The authors use IST to empirically show firms fully engaged in CSR can minimize 
CSiR and reduce stock market risk.  Interestingly, results also indicate where a firm have a low 
CSR profile, these will also perform better over high CSR achieving firms if they are found to have 
engaged in morally questionable behavior. In Groening and Kanuri (2018), the authors sought to 





a firm’s stock trading volume. Using tactics such as impression management, the paper addresses 
how a firm’s involvement in CSR activities has an almost insurance-like effect on firm 
performance.  
More recently, Nardella et al. (2020) examined the relationship between CSiR and 
organizational reputation. Highlighting the unwanted attention of stakeholders who attribute blame 
to firm involvement in CSiR, Nardella and colleagues propose stakeholder perceptions of previous 
CSR and CSiR will affect firm reputation in the event of future CSiR. Although any incidents of 
CSiR actions will have a negative impact on the firm, the results of this study show that 
involvement in CSR activities such as philanthropy will create a positive reputational effect that 
contributes to positive abnormal returns.  
Taking the above arguments as a whole, it becomes clear that an effective stakeholder 
management is therefore key to achieve a good financial performance. Because CSiR deteriorates 
the relationship between firms and their stakeholders, we suggest that firms will be more exposed 
to downturns in their financial performance. Hence, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 1a. CSiR contributes to negative financial performance. 
3.3.2 CSiR and non-financial performance  
We have so far addressed studies that have sought to establish a relationship between CSiR 
and financial performance, analyzing the factors contributing to understanding this phenomenon. 
Yet non-financial performance measures are equally important and can be a significant factor in 
improving a firm’s overall performance (Surroca, Tribó and Waddock, 2010).  
An extensive body of the strategic management literature establishes a link between CSR 





and Walsh, 2003; Orlitzky et al., 2003). Although most empirical studies suggest a slight positive 
association, there is still no final agreement on the shape that the relationship between these two 
variables displays. Scholars have criticized the omission of specific variables such as research and 
development, advertising, and intangible resources as evidence of the inconsistency of empirical 
results these studies have produced (Barnett, 2007; McWilliams and Siegel, 2000).  
In this chapter, we consider the corporate social performance (CSP) of the firm to be an 
effective measure of non-financial performance. Although prior works have sometimes used CSR 
and CSP somewhat interchangeably, we shall differentiate between both concepts. In line with Luo 
and Bhattacharya (2009) we identify CSR as the policies and programs that firms engage in (e.g. 
cause-related marketing and corporate philanthropy), which are aimed at improving overall 
performance. By contrast, we understand CSP as the outcome of said programs and the 
stakeholders’ overall assessment based on the success or failure of these initiatives compared to 
those of the firm’s competitors (Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Orlitzky et al., 2017). It is this 
assessment that can determine if stakeholders can reward or punish a firm based on its perceived 
actions. Therefore, for the purposes of this chapter, CSP will constitute the non-financial 
performance measure of a firm’s CSR policies and practices.   
Taking an instrumental approach to stakeholder management, Surroca and colleagues 
(2010) state that developing intangible resources will help a firm strengthen the relationships with 
both its market and nonmarket stakeholders, thus enhancing its CSP. But CSP is open to risk in the 
event of firm’s involvement in CSiR. Godfrey et al. (2009) highlight that exposure to CSiR actions 
will result in firms reducing their financial investment in CSP programs due to their decreased 
shareholder value and the significant financial penalties they will likely incur as a result of their 





ultimately impacting negatively on financial performance and can also create considerable damage 
to stakeholder relations.   
Indeed, the reputational effects of CSiR is a prominent point of discussion in recent 
literature, in which the perceptions of stakeholders and how they attribute blame in the event of 
CSiR are discussed in connection to how firms use CSP as a means of building moral capital. 
Brammer and Pavelin (2005) predict that firms increase their social investments as a means of 
securing and shielding their reputation in the event of irresponsible behaviors, which aims to deflect 
the attention away from their actions and reduce the impact of stakeholder retaliation. Yet, this 
could act against the firm in unexpected ways should the firm be a repeat offender. Though the 
idea of irresponsible behavior is varied across the literature (Nardella et al., 2020), there is 
agreement that stakeholders will hold firms accountable for their perceived actions (Lange and 
Washburn, 2012).  
How stakeholders attribute blame in the event of CSiR actions may be determined on the 
amount of CSiR committed by firms. Price and Sun (2017) seem to confirm this in their assessment 
of CSiR and the differing expectations of the stakeholders associated with the firm. The authors 
highlight the risk to market value in the continued involvement of CSiR due to the enduring 
psychological nature of stakeholders and their ability to hold firms accountable. However, 
shareholders may have a slightly more forgiving perspective than other stakeholder groups. While 
stakeholders can willingly punish firms (Sweetin et al., 2013), investors could overlook certain 
behaviors as long as they do not negatively impact on financial performance. As noted by Minor 
and Morgan (2011), firms cannot pursue this type of activity long-term because overcompensating 





 Whereas Hypothesis 1a focused on the market performance of firms involved in CSiR, 
which we may assimilate to the response of shareholders to socially irresponsible acts, this 
Hypothesis 1b is more welcoming of the responses of the different stakeholders linked to the firm. 
In line with the existing literature, we propose that CSiR will damage the relationships that the firm 
has with said stakeholders, therefore suggesting that: 
Hypothesis 1b. CSiR contributes to negative non-financial performance (CSP) 
3.3.3 The moderating role of corporate political activity on the CSiR-performance link   
Our next set of hypotheses investigates whether and how firms’ corporate political activity 
(CPA)—the second related stream of nonmarket strategy—influences the relationship between 
CSiR and performance. As firms take on more politically active roles, they develop corporate 
actions designed to influence the outcomes of regulatory processes in their favor (Baron, 1995; 
Hadani, Doh and Schneider, 2018; Lawton et al., 2014 Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). Assuming 
that most publicly listed firms are involved in some form of political activity, these strategies will 
by necessity be industry and context specific, contributing to the heterogeneity of political activities 
across firms.   
Though the motivations behind CPA are quite broadly defined, Hillman and Hitt (1999) 
divide them into three categories: (1) financial; (2) informational and constituency building; and 
(3) relational. Each type consists of various actions ranging from corporate lobbying and political 
donations (either individual or in group through political action committees or PACs) to the 
development of personal relationships with political figures, among others (Hillman, 2003; 
Hillman, Keim and Schuler, 2004; Schuler, Rehbein and Cramer, 2002; Shirodkar and Mohr, 





now influencing how governments shape policy, which can in turn affect business-government 
interactions. However, firms can only influence policy decisions by creating political access 
(Werner, 2015), which results in a significant increase in firms engaging in political activities.  
Political activities are generally aimed at reducing regulation and lowering tax rates and 
tariffs (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014). However, these benefits are primarily tied to the firm 
with little thought to other key stakeholder groups. Used as a means of building political capital 
and in some cases as an insurance mechanism (Hadani et al., 2018), financial and relational CPA 
dominates the discussion in the literature (de Figueiredo and Richter, 2014; Hadani and Schuler, 
2013; Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). Previous studies have focused on how 
it can influence government policy concerning corporate tax rates (Richter, Samphantharak and 
Timmons, 2009); investor reactions (Werner, 2017); creation of political ties and capabilities 
(Holburn and Zelner, 2010; Sun, Mellahi, and Wright, 2012); home institutional pressures 
(Shirodkar, Konara and McGuire, 2017; Zhang, Zhao and Ge, 2015); and political risk (De Villa, 
Rajwani, Lawton and Mellahi, 2018; Puck, Rogers and Mohr, 2013).  
For the purposes of this chapter, we are going to focus on financial and relational CPA, 
which we proxy by lobbying expenditures and distance from the headquarters of the firm to the 
political capital of the country, respectively.  
Financial CPA. Firms are increasingly investing resources in activities aimed at 
government actors who can influence policy in their favor. This is often done at the expense of 
other important stakeholder groups. Consequently, it is difficult to see how CSR and lobbying can 
complement each other while simultaneously taking an instrumental stakeholder approach.  
Research shows that lobbying activity has grown significantly, with firms donating five times more 





form of financial CPA (Eun and Lee, 2019). Despite growing interest in financial CPA, there 
remains little consensus on its long-term benefits (Hadani and Schuler, 2013). Most will agree that 
involvement in lobbying will improve firm performance (e.g. Kim, 2019; Oliver and Holzinger, 
2008; Werner, 2017). A practice-based example that illustrates this point is the aerospace company 
Lockheed Martin, whose $55-million investment in lobbying has yielded them $90 billion in 
defense contracts over said timeframe (Ridge, Ingram and Hill, 2017). However, other studies have 
found that this type of nonmarket strategy negatively affects financial performance (Aggarwal, 
Meschke and Wang, 2012; Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). 
Since the primary agenda for a firm’s political activity is to influence policy decisions in 
their favor, investments are focused on the specific agency and departments whose interests affect 
firm interests. Donations are therefore non-candidate specific and follow a pattern of long-term 
strategy aimed at increased political access and influence (Hadani et al., 2019; Werner, 2017). This 
single-minded strategy can perhaps alienate other important stakeholder groups that view this type 
of political influence with deep suspicion. Indeed, increased financial lobbying is becoming a 
significant factor in how stakeholders view firms, potentially damaging firm reputation 
(McDonnell and Werner, 2016).   
From an instrumental stakeholder angle, we suggest that the firms’ stakeholder engagement 
strategies will be put into question if they are involved in CSiR, further damaging their performance 
(both financial and non-financial). We thus hypothesize that: 
H2a. Financial CPA deepens the negative relationship between CSiR and financial performance. 






Relational CPA.  Relational CPA is identified under different terms, yet the common 
construct is to develop political ties (Rajwani and Liedong, 2015). Following Kostovetsky (2015), 
in this chapter we take on a geographic-based measure (distance of firm headquarters to the 
political capital of the country; in our case, Washington DC), to assess the strength of political 
connections in the face of CSiR actions. Most firms’ political strategies seem to allow for both 
financial and relational activities. To build long-term relationships with policymakers, firms 
participate in a myriad of initiatives, from actions such as directly engaging in-house lobbyists or 
offering former politicians lucrative corporate board positions (Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Hillman 
and Hitt, 1999) to strategically investing in corporate philanthropy with the aim of building political 
capital (Rehbein and Schuler, 2015).  
Even if the benefits are questionable, we can also see a significant increase in this type of 
political activity (Akey, 2015). While it is generally noted that developed countries with 
functioning legal systems do not need to engage in relational CPA to gain a competitive advantage, 
this is not necessarily true. Previous research into relational CPA has primarily investigated factors 
concerning former politicians as board members (Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Goldman, Rocholl 
and So, 2009) and information strategies directly targeting policymakers, where firms provide 
specific policy makers with information regarding public policy related to their industry (Hillman 
and Hitt, 1999; Kolk and Pinkse, 2007). More recently, research has shifted to corporate sponsored 
activism (McDonnell, 2016) and shareholder activism (Hadani et al., 2019) that seek to secure a 
competitive advantage, access to scare resources and gain political insurance.  
Relational CPA is more difficult to investigate compared to financial CPA since authors 
use different measures in its study, given that the definition of ‘connections’ can be vague. For 





policymakers and Senate Committee Members (Faccio, 2006; Kostovetsky, 2015) and political 
board appointments (Goldman et al., 2009). From a stakeholder perspective, relational CPA means 
actively engaging with governmental stakeholders. In principle, this could help improve 
performance as suggested by prominent nonmarket strategy works (e.g. Baron, 1995). However, 
we suggest that this might not hold in the face of CSiR. Other stakeholders may perceive the 
development of political connections as a form of legal bribery that encourages firms to increase 
their risk taking and become more involved in actions that may be viewed as acts of CSiR— 
mistakenly believing that the relationships established provide political insurance against socially 
irresponsible behaviors. Therefore, we propose the following: 
H3a. Non-financial CPA deepens the negative relationship between CSiR and financial 
performance. 
H3b. Non-financial CPA deepens the negative relationship between CSiR and non-financial 
performance. 
3.4 Methodology   
3.4.1 Sample and data collection 
This chapter analyses the financial and non-financial performance impact of CSiR and its 
nonmarket boundary conditions. To test our hypotheses, we use a sample of firms indexed in the 
S&P 500 in 2007, covering a time span of 11 years (2007 to 2017). As Werner (2015) puts it, 
choosing this sample is most appropriate to perform analyses like ours for three key reasons: 1) 
S&P 500 members are particularly engaged in and sensitive to nonmarket initiatives; 2) the 
companies are representative of major industries leading the American economy (please see Table 





Table 3.2. S&P 500 companies by industry (%). 
2-DIGIT SIC CODES INDUSTRY PERCENTAGE 
01 to 09 Agriculture, forestry and fishing 0,00 
10 to 14 Mining 5,37 
15 to 17 Construction 1,19 
20 to 39 Manufacturing 38,37 
40 to 49 Transportation and public utilities 13,12 
50 to 51 Wholesale trade 3,18 
52 to 59 Retail trade 8,15 
60 to 67 Finance, insurance and real state 19,28 
70 to 89 Services 10,93 
90 to 99 Public Administration 0,40 
 
The timeframe that we have selected is also relevant as it reflects a period of immense 
socio-political change due to repercussions of widespread corporate misconducts revealed after the 
2008 financial crisis (Jones, 2010). In addition, the year 2007 marked a growing interest in social 
media, which contributed to a dramatic increase in the visibility of the good and not-so-good deeds 
of companies. Figure 3.2. displays the Google search trend of the social media keyword over the 
period of our study, showing the increased popularity that this concept has experienced worldwide 



















Source: Google Trends. 
2007 is also the year when the global financial crisis starts bringing to light some questionable 
business practices, which also increased the attention put in CSiR behaviors, as illustrated in Figure 
3.3. 









































































The data collection process was consistent with the aims and objectives of the thesis as a 
whole and, more specifically, with those of this chapter. It shall be noted that one of the key 
contributions of our study relies in the novel database on CSiR actions that we developed for this 
thesis. Following similar studies in areas of social movement, CSiR and the corporate reputation 
literature (King, 2008; Kölbel et al., 2017; Luo et al., 2018; Muller and Kräussl, 2011; Nardella et 
al., 2020), we collected and coded media publications included in the LexisNexis directory. To 
identify relevant news items, we used the following keywords: accus*; boycott; fine*; fraud; guilty; 
harass*; irresponsible; jail; lawsuit; legal proceedings; misconduct; product recall; scandal; sue*; 
unethical, violat*. We double-checked that we had not overlooked any CSiR event by running an 
additional wider Internet search for each of the companies involved in the study. 
The above process allowed for variation in the type, content and geographic location of the 
CSiR actions identified as well in the outlet where the information was published (McDonnell and 
King, 2013; McDonnell and Werner, 2016). After having identified the news items linked to our 
keywords and period of interest, we performed a manual content analysis to code them and verify 
that there were no duplicates or articles unrelated to the scope of our study. As a result, the final 
version of the database contains 420 CSiR events for which we have coded the following 
information summarized in Table 3.3.: 
Table 3.3. CSiR database items. 
ITEM DEFINITION 
Event code Coding number to facilitate the identification of the CSiR event 
Company name Name of the S&P 500 firm involved in the CSiR event 
Year Year when the CSiR event took place (2007 to 2017) 





Media source Media source reporting the CSiR event 
CSiR issue Description of the CSiR event 
CSiR type 
Type of CSiR event (i.e. fraud; bribery and corruption; competition; 
environment; discrimination; product safety; human rights; other). 
Instigator(s) Individuals and/or organizations exposing the CSiR event 
Resolved 
Indicates whether the CSiR issue has been resolved or it is still 
outstanding. 
Outcome 
Describes the consequences of the CSiR event (e.g. fine, boycott, 
case dismissal, casualties…).  
 
It should be noted that the reliability and validity of using media sources as data has both 
supporters and critics. Concerns principally stem from the potential selection bias of the researcher 
and description bias of the reported publication (Earl, Martin, McCarthy and Soule, 2004; Ortiz, 
Myers, Walls and Diaz, 2004). Geographic location, political affiliations and institutions have also 
been previously identified as potential factors that can impede the reliability of the data (Oliver and 
Maney, 2000). Nonetheless, we believe that by expanding the keyword search to account for a wide 
range of CSiR events taking place across multiple countries, we have managed to reduce the 
selection bias of the events included in the database.  
To create the additional variables included in the study, we have also turned to secondary 
data, which we have retrieved from a wide range of sources, such as COMPUSTAT, companies’ 
annual reports, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC), Thomson Reuters ASSET4, 
the Centre for Responsive Politics. We will expand on each of them in the section below when we 





3.4.2 Variables  
3.4.2.1 Dependent variables 
The dependent variables in the analyses featured in this chapter are financial and non-
financial performance.  
Financial performance. We proxied financial performance by the Tobin’s q of the firm, 
which authors have used profusely in the performance literature due to its ability to capture 
shareholder expectations of the firm’s future performance (Price and Sun, 2017). We calculated 
this measure following Chung and Pruitt’s formula (1994): 





• MVE: market value (stock price x outstanding shares) at the end of the financial year. 
• PS: liquidation value of the outstanding preferred stock. 
• DEBT: short-term liabilities net of short-term assets plus book value of any long-term debt. 
• TA: book value of total assets. 
We retrieved the required data from COMPUSTAT and tried to complement any missing 
values by checking the companies’ annual reports and the SEC website. 
Non-financial performance. As previously mentioned, we used CSP as our non-financial 
performance measure. To create this variable, we relied on Thomson Reuters ASSET4’s equal-
weighted rating construct that accounts for the environmental, social, economic, and corporate 





firm’s CSP that affect both primary and secondary stakeholders (Hillman and Keim, 2001). Table 
3.4. offers additional information on the definition of these CSP pillars included in ASSET4: 
Table 3.4. Definition of the pillars that conform CSP. 
CSP PILLAR DEFINITION 
Environmental 
Measures a company’s impact on living and non-living natural systems, 
including the air, land and water, as well as complete ecosystems. It 
reflects how well a company uses best management practices to avoid 
environmental risks and capitalize on environmental opportunities in 
order to generate long-term shareholder value. 
Social 
Measures a company’s capacity to generate trust and loyalty with its 
workforce, customers and society, through its use of best management 
practices. It is a reflection of the company’s reputation and the health 
of its license to operate, which are key factors in determining its ability 
to generate long term shareholder value. 
Corporate Governance 
Measures a company’s systems and processes, which ensure that its 
board members and executives act in the best interests of its long-term 
shareholders. It reflects a company’s capacity, through its use of best 
management practices, to direct and control its rights and 
responsibilities through the creation of incentives, as well as checks and 
balances in order to generate long term shareholder value. 
Economic 
Measures a company’s capacity to generate sustainable growth and a 
high return on investment through the efficient use of all its resources. 
It is reflection of a company’s overall financial health and its ability to 
generate long term shareholder value through its use of best 
management practices. 





ASSET4 uses objective and publicly available data coming from reliable sources such as 
stock exchange filings, CSR and annual reports, NGO websites and several print and digital media 
publications. Former research in the domain of CSR and CSiR has commonly used the ASSET4 
database because it provides a comprehensive and consistent methodology that has proven to be 
accurate, reliable and empirically valid (e.g. Cheng et al., 2014; Eccles et al., 2014; Flammer and 
Kacperczyk, 2019; Hawn and Ioannou, 2016; Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012; Jackson et al., 2020; 
Jain and Zaman, 2020; Nardella et al., 2020; Rathert 2016).  
3.4.2.2 Independent variable 
The independent variable in this chapter is the accumulated number of CSiR events a firm 
has been involved in from 2007 until year t. As previously explained in the data collection 
subsection, we created a database containing these events by collecting and coding media 
publications mainly included in the LexisNexis directory (although we ran an additional Internet 
search to verify that we were not missing any additional instances of CSiR). Figure 3.4. shows the 
percentage of firms in the sample that have been involved in CSiR events. 55% of them have not 
reported any CSiR during the period of study. As for the remaining 45%, most of them have been 
caught in either 1 or 2 instances of CSiR. Only less than 10% of the sample have participated in 





















Figure 3.5. complements this information by displaying the number of CSiR events 
included in the database by year and type. The bars display a sort of U shape that reaches its peak 
in 2017. Fraud cases are the most common across the period, followed by those related to 

















Figure 3.5. Number of CSiR events by year and type. 
 
Before moving to the explanation of the moderating variables, we shall note that we favor 
the definition of independent variable as the firm’s CSiR track record over the CSiR events in t 
partly because of reverse causality issues. In this regard, it could be argued that not only CSiR 
impacts performance, but performance also impacts the likelihood of CSiR. To rule out this 
possibility, we ran several Granger causality tests (1969). Our results pointed out that, while that 
performance does not affect the CSiR track record of the firm [Tobin’s q (χ2 = 1.430; p-value = 
0.232); CSP (χ2 = 0.047; p-value = 0.828)], it does influence whether it is involved in CSiR in a 
certain year [Tobin’s q (χ2 = 16.333; p-value = 0.000); CSP (χ2 = 15.257; p-value = 0.000)]. 
3.4.2.3 Moderating variables 
In this chapter we analyze the moderating effect of CPA on the relationship between CSiR 









































relational actions are two of the main CPA mechanisms. Based on this argument and following 
recent papers by Hadani et al. (2018, 2019), we distinguish in our analysis between financial and 
relational CPA. 
Financial CPA. The variable equals the lobbying expenditures of the firm in the U.S. 
within a certain year. We gathered the data from the Centre for Responsive Politics 
(opensecrets.org). This measure as well as the Centre for Responsive Politics dataset are widely 
accepted in the CPA literature, with many authors relying on them in their analyses (e.g. Delmas, 
Lim and Nairn-Birch, 2016; Kim, 2019; McKay, 2010; Shirodkar et al., 2017). 
Relational CPA. We proxied this variable by the distance (in miles) from the firm 
headquarters to the U.S. political capital, Washington D.C. In doing so, we attempt to capture the 
social connections potentially established between the firm and the highest-level political scene in 
the country with the aim of providing political influence. 
3.4.2.4 Control variables 
We controlled for several aspects that may also affect firm performance to rule out 
alternative explanations of our results. First, we controlled for firm size (measured as the total 
number of employees) and leverage (long-term debt to total assets). We retrieved the data to build 
these variables from COMPUSTAT, the companies’ annual reports and the SEC website. 
Second, we added several control variables related to the CSiR events included in the 
analysis:4 type of CSiR (fraud, bribery and corruption, competition, environment, discrimination, 
product safety, human rights, and other); as well as dummies reflecting whether the firm had been 
fined or boycotted as a result of the CSiR event, and whether the CSiR issue was still outstanding 
 





at the end of the study’s timeframe. Following previous studies such as Kölbel et al. (2017) and 
Wang and Li (2019) we also controlled for the reach and severity of the CSiR event. Reach details 
the exposure to a potential audience that each article can reach based on the readership numbers 
and geographic range. Consistent with the standard practice, we categorized the published articles 
into three levels of reach: low, which includes industry and local publications as well as regulatory 
press releases (e.g. SEC, FTC, EPA); medium, which includes publications that have national 
importance and a readership of over 150,000 people; and high, which includes articles published 
in print and digital outlets that are considered to have a strong global presence (e.g. New York 
Times, Wall Street Journal, BBC, CNN). From this information, we built a measure that varies 
between 0 and 3 depending on the degree of reach (0 = no CSiR event; 1 = low reach; 2 = medium 
reach, 3 = high reach). As for the severity variable, this refers to the degree of harshness of the 
consequences faced by the firms who were involved and sanctioned due to their CSiR acts. We 
once again categorized them into low, medium and high and crated a measure varying between 0 
and 3 depending on the degree of severity (0 = no CSiR event; 1 = low severity; 2 = medium 
severity, 3 = high severity). Table 3.5. below provides a detailed breakdown of the criteria followed 
to create these categories:  
Table 3.5. Criteria used to build the severity variable. 
CATEGORY CRITERIA 
Low 
• No fine or fine/settlement of less than $50 million. 
• Contract violation. 






• Fine/settlement between $50 and $250 million.  
• Fine/settlement of less than $50 million but accompanied by a 
policy change or restatement of earnings. 
• Boycott/activism resulting in policy change. 
High 
• Fines/settlements of more than $250 million. 
• Criminal convictions. 
• Closed operation/firm. 
• Discrimination cases resulting in pay-out and job losses. 
• Dramatic drop in share prices.  
 
We also controlled for this factor by including a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if 
the firm belongs to the Fortune’s 50 Most Admired Companies list and 0 otherwise.5 We added 
another dummy variable taking the value of 1 if there is a right-wing party governing the State 
where the firm is headquartered and 0 otherwise. Finally, we introduced industry and year 
dummies. 
3.4.2.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 3.6. contains the correlations and descriptive statistics of the key variables included 
in the analyses of this chapter. We mean-centered the main effect (i.e. CSiR) and the continuous 
moderating variable (i.e. lobbying expenditures) prior to calculating the interaction terms to prevent 
any high correlations between them (Jaccard and Turrisi, 2003). As appears on the table, most of 
the pairwise correlations are low (below 0.5) except for the one between reach and severity (0.89). 
However, our results are robust to the removal of these variables, which suggests that 
 
5 For more information on the methodology of this ranking, please visit: https://fortune.com/worlds-most-admired-





multicollinearity is not a concern in our models. This is further confirmed by a Variance Inflation 
Factor (VIF) analysis of the variables included in the models containing the independent, 
moderating and control variables since the mean VIFs of the regressions are below the cutoff value 














Table 3.6. Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
  Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Tobin’s q 1.61 0.98 0.07 7.65 1.00        
2 CSP 77.90 21.27 4.80 97.47 0.13 1.00       
3 CSiR 0.00 0.80 -0.39 5.61 -0.00 0.10 1.00      
4 Lobbying expenditures 0.00 3.93 -2.67 42.84 -0.08 0.24 0.24 1.00     
5 Distance to DC -0.00 842.98 -445.08 3619.92 -0.03 -0.04 -0.00 -0.09 1.00    
6 Size 67.84 149.89 0.09 2300.00 0.08 0.16 0.04 0.22 -0.06 1.00   
7 Leverage 0.23 0.14 0.00 1.65 0.08 -0.04 -0.04 -0.08 0.00 -0.00 1.00  
8 Party ruling the State 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.05 -0.37 0.06 -0.03 1.00 
9 Most admired 0.11 0.32 0.00 1.00 0.19 0.19 0.14 0.28 0.05 0.39 -0.08 0.04 
10 Bribery and corruption 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 -0.03 -0.00 0.23 0.08 0.02 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 
11 Competition 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.05 0.26 0.08 -0.02 0.00 0.02 0.03 
12 Environment 0.01 0.12 0.00 1.00 -0.03 0.05 0.22 0.13 0.05 0.04 -0.00 -0.05 
13 Discrimination 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 -0.03 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 -0.02 
14 Product safety 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.03 0.17 0.05 -0.03 0.01 -0.01 0.02 
15 Human rights 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.08 0.03 0.09 0.00 -0.01 0.03 0.01 0.00 
16 Other 0.00 0.02 0.00 1.00 -0.00 0.00 0.04 0.04 -0.01 0.00 -0.02 0.01 
17 Fined 0.01 0.08 0.00 1.00 0.02 0.03 0.11 0.07 -0.03 0.02 0.02 0.03 
18 Boycott 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 0.07 0.00 0.05 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.01 
19 Outstanding 0.01 0.11 0.00 2.00 0.03 -0.00 0.23 0.04 0.02 0.00 -0.01 -0.05 
20 Reach 0.20 0.70 0.00 3.00 0.00 0.05 0.49 0.15 0.01 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 






  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 
9 Most admired 1.00             
10 Bribery and corruption -0.01 1.00            
11 Competition 0.07 0.05 1.00           
12 Environment 0.04 0.04 0.05 1.00          
13 Discrimination 0.02 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 1.00         
14 Product safety 0.04 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00        
15 Human rights 0.06 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 1.00       
16 Other -0.01 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 -0.00 1.00      
17 Fined 0.07 0.03 0.20 0.30 -0.00 0.11 -0.00 -0.00 1.00     
18 Boycott 0.06 0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.00 0.09 -0.00 0.41 -0.00 1.00    
19 Outstanding 0.08 0.26 0.11 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.28 -0.00 -0.01 0.14 1.00   
20 Reach 0.08 0.37 0.48 0.35 0.14 0.27 0.22 0.08 0.19 0.18 0.32 1.00  












We present the results of our panel-data Generalized Least Squares (GLS) regressions in 
Tables 3.6. and 3.7. The final sample is composed of 300 firms and 2,533 observations. We shall 
note that we have some non-systematic missing observations due to some companies ceasing their 
activity or getting delisted during the period of study. We also lost some observations because of a 
lack of available data. 
Table 3.7. reports the main results of the five panel-data GLS regressions with Tobin’s q as 
the dependent variable. Model I only includes the control variables; Model II adds the main effect 
(i.e. CSiR) together with the moderating variables (i.e. lobbying expenditures and distance to DC); 
Models III and IV also introduce the individual interaction effects of CSiR; finally, Model V 
includes all the variables entered in the analysis. The results in this table do not back our hypotheses 
related to financial performance (H1a, H2a and H3a). The CSiR coefficients do not show a 
significant relationship between this variable and the firm’s Tobin’s q. The coefficients of the 
interactions between CSiR and lobbying expenditures as well as CSiR and distance to DC also lack 
significance. Therefore, we cannot confirm that CPA deepens the negative relationship between 
CSiR and the firm’s Tobin’s q. 
 
Table 3.7. Main results of the panel-data Tobin’s q regressions. 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 
      
CSiR  -0.045 -0.042 -0.045 -0.040 
  (0.123) (0.164) (0.122) (0.184) 
Lobbying expenditures  -0.010* -0.009 -0.010* -0.009 
  (0.077) (0.106) (0.070) (0.109) 
Distance to DC  -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 -0.000 
  (0.601) (0.600) (0.616) (0.616) 
CSiR*Lobbying expenditures   -0.001  -0.002 





CSiR*Distance to DC    -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.385) (0.344) 
Size -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** -0.001** 
 (0.019) (0.028) (0.027) (0.027) (0.026) 
Leverage 0.596** 0.581** 0.581** 0.589** 0.592** 
 (0.024) (0.028) (0.028) (0.025) (0.025) 
Party ruling the state -0.045 -0.049 -0.049 -0.048 -0.047 
 (0.321) (0.277) (0.279) (0.281) (0.286) 
Most admired 0.207** 0.214** 0.214** 0.212** 0.213** 
 (0.018) (0.014) (0.014) (0.015) (0.015) 
Bribery and corruption -0.078 -0.067 -0.064 -0.067 -0.061 
 (0.202) (0.271) (0.290) (0.275) (0.317) 
Competition -0.039 -0.024 -0.024 -0.028 -0.028 
 (0.639) (0.775) (0.779) (0.737) (0.740) 
Environment -0.021 0.003 0.006 0.013 0.018 
 (0.723) (0.956) (0.926) (0.840) (0.774) 
Discrimination -0.037 -0.044 -0.044 -0.048 -0.048 
 (0.668) (0.610) (0.612) (0.580) (0.580) 
Product safety 0.157* 0.161* 0.163* 0.153* 0.156* 
 (0.063) (0.057) (0.054) (0.066) (0.060) 
Human rights 0.170 0.166 0.164 0.162 0.159 
 (0.417) (0.442) (0.445) (0.449) (0.456) 
Other -0.785*** -0.748*** -0.742*** -0.758*** -0.747*** 
 (0.004) (0.007) (0.008) (0.006) (0.007) 
Fined 0.119 0.117 0.120 0.108 0.113 
 (0.206) (0.217) (0.208) (0.261) (0.241) 
Boycott 0.518* 0.499* 0.498* 0.501* 0.499* 
 (0.061) (0.078) (0.078) (0.075) (0.075) 
Outstanding -0.183 -0.181 -0.179 -0.181 -0.178 
 (0.114) (0.128) (0.134) (0.127) (0.135) 
Reach -0.021 -0.017 -0.017 -0.018 -0.018 
 (0.382) (0.499) (0.505) (0.475) (0.483) 
Severity 0.024 0.031 0.030 0.034 0.032 
 (0.455) (0.314) (0.330) (0.278) (0.300) 
Constant 0.857*** 0.852*** 0.852*** 0.855*** 0.855*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Industry and year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Wald 𝜒2 19177.01 20245.37 20478.54 20125.93 20457.90 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,553 2,553 2,553 2,553 2,553 
Number of firms 300 300 300 300 300 
Robust pval in parentheses 






Table 3.8. displays the main results of the five panel-data GLS regressions with CSP as the 
dependent variable. Model I only includes the control variables; Model II adds the main effect (i.e. 
CSiR) together with the moderating variables (i.e. lobbying expenditures and distance to DC); 
Models III and IV also introduce the individual interaction effects of CSiR; finally, Model V 
includes all the variables entered in the analysis. In line with hypothesis H1b, CSiR has a negative 
impact on the firm’s social performance. This relationship is deepened by the firm’s lobbying 
expenditures, as predicted in hypothesis H2b. Hypothesis H3b does not receive support since the 
coefficient of the interaction between CSiR and distance to DC is not significant. As such, whereas 
financial CPA moderates the relationship between CSiR and CSP, relational CPA does not. As 
Figure 3.6. illustrates, lobbying expenditures deepens the negative relationship between CSiR and 
CSP. 
Table 3.8. Main results of the panel-data CSP regressions. 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 
      
CSiR  -2.203*** -1.835*** -2.203*** -1.806*** 
  (0.000) (0.008) (0.000) (0.007) 
Lobbying expenditures  0.249** 0.301** 0.249** 0.304** 
  (0.040) (0.016) (0.040) (0.016) 
Distance to DC  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.522) (0.514) (0.531) (0.531) 
CSiR*Lobbying expenditures   -0.164**  -0.177** 
   (0.030)  (0.019) 
CSiR*Distance to DC    -0.000 -0.000 
    (0.925) (0.710) 
Size 0.016* 0.014* 0.013* 0.014* 0.013* 
 (0.056) (0.082) (0.091) (0.082) (0.091) 
Leverage -10.551** -11.219** -11.123** -11.185** -10.979** 
 (0.043) (0.028) (0.029) (0.028) (0.030) 
Party ruling the state -0.372 -0.301 -0.277 -0.295 -0.253 
 (0.749) (0.794) (0.810) (0.799) (0.828) 
Most admired 0.447 0.327 0.428 0.321 0.412 
 (0.657) (0.742) (0.670) (0.747) (0.682) 
Bribery and corruption -0.520 -0.462 0.041 -0.461 0.085 





Competition -2.391 -1.726 -1.658 -1.743 -1.721 
 (0.129) (0.270) (0.276) (0.253) (0.248) 
Environment -2.452* -1.641 -1.285 -1.603 -1.105 
 (0.097) (0.274) (0.368) (0.338) (0.498) 
Discrimination -4.130** -3.821** -3.810** -3.835** -3.867** 
 (0.022) (0.022) (0.023) (0.024) (0.022) 
Product safety -1.186 -0.697 -0.432 -0.728 -0.537 
 (0.467) (0.659) (0.782) (0.634) (0.726) 
Human rights -0.542 -0.956 -1.179 -0.970 -1.253 
 (0.837) (0.689) (0.628) (0.684) (0.608) 
Other 1.484 2.844 3.864 2.805 3.784 
 (0.685) (0.463) (0.324) (0.471) (0.338) 
Fined 0.104 -0.006 0.484 -0.042 0.378 
 (0.964) (0.998) (0.832) (0.986) (0.871) 
Boycott -2.561 -3.554 -3.723 -3.548 -3.709 
 (0.462) (0.332) (0.313) (0.334) (0.319) 
Outstanding -4.575* -3.355 -3.101 -3.356 -3.085 
 (0.057) (0.151) (0.178) (0.151) (0.180) 
Reach 0.081 0.452 0.491 0.449 0.479 
 (0.893) (0.468) (0.424) (0.473) (0.437) 
Severity 1.244* 1.267* 1.113* 1.276** 1.138* 
 (0.068) (0.052) (0.087) (0.048) (0.077) 
Constant 66.764*** 66.975*** 66.962*** 66.986*** 67.008*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Industry and year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Wald 𝜒2 5913.00 5844.27 5627.49 5853.98 5630.37 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,553 2,553 2,553 2,553 2,553 
Number of firms 300 300 300 300 300 
Robust pval in parentheses 












































3.4.4 Additional tests 
Apart from the core analysis that we display above, we run some additional regressions to 
further investigate the issue at hand. The dimensions conforming CSP can affect both primary and 
secondary stakeholders. To refine the effect on each type of stakeholders, we divided our CSP 
variable into two variables according to the type of stakeholder that the dimensions acknowledged 
affect. Building upon previous works such as Hillman and Keim (2001), we consider ASSET4 
economic and corporate governance scores to be the ones affecting primary stakeholders. 





stakeholders. Our results—featured in Tables 3.9. and 3.10.—are consistent with the regressions 
examining both types of stakeholders jointly. 
Table 3.9. Main results of the panel-data CSP regressions (primary stakeholders). 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 
      
CSiR  -1.909*** -1.616** -1.909*** -1.534** 
      
  (0.004) (0.031) (0.002) (0.017) 
Lobbying expenditures  0.035 0.076 0.032 0.085 
  (0.754) (0.494) (0.777) (0.456) 
Distance to DC  0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 
  (0.934) (0.944) (0.891) (0.890) 
CSiR*Lobbying expenditures   -0.135  -0.172** 
   (0.120)  (0.046) 
CSiR*Distance to DC    -0.001 -0.001 
    (0.348) (0.228) 
Size 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 0.007 
 (0.163) (0.183) (0.205) (0.178) (0.202) 
Leverage -13.256*** -13.787*** -13.705*** -13.478*** -13.279*** 
 (0.002) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.002) 
Party ruling the state -0.237 -0.177 -0.162 -0.124 -0.089 
 (0.807) (0.852) (0.864) (0.897) (0.927) 
Most admired -0.339 -0.324 -0.237 -0.382 -0.287 
 (0.799) (0.803) (0.857) (0.768) (0.826) 
Bribery and corruption -1.506 -1.325 -0.917 -1.309 -0.784 
 (0.391) (0.470) (0.600) (0.473) (0.649) 
Competition -1.276 -0.688 -0.628 -0.845 -0.817 
 (0.389) (0.640) (0.667) (0.564) (0.574) 
Environment -2.255 -1.462 -1.168 -1.097 -0.608 
 (0.143) (0.313) (0.382) (0.522) (0.707) 
Discrimination -6.586** -6.460** -6.462** -6.582** -6.622** 
 (0.018) (0.019) (0.019) (0.016) (0.014) 
Product safety -1.582 -1.212 -1.002 -1.499 -1.321 
 (0.336) (0.450) (0.534) (0.352) (0.421) 
Human rights -0.442 -0.751 -0.944 -0.887 -1.174 
 (0.879) (0.773) (0.720) (0.741) (0.669) 
Other -7.516* -6.183 -5.321 -6.544 -5.559 
 (0.078) (0.164) (0.231) (0.152) (0.228) 
Fined 0.673 0.592 0.988 0.260 0.661 
 (0.758) (0.781) (0.641) (0.906) (0.761) 
Boycott -0.972 -1.853 -2.002 -1.791 -1.960 
 (0.819) (0.673) (0.650) (0.691) (0.668) 
Outstanding -4.272** -3.496* -3.279* -3.504* -3.229* 
 (0.034) (0.058) (0.054) (0.063) (0.061) 
Reach 0.259 0.557 0.587 0.523 0.551 





Severity 0.976 1.080* 0.957* 1.165** 1.035* 
 (0.113) (0.064) (0.094) (0.048) (0.074) 
Constant 71.009*** 70.448*** 70.440*** 70.558*** 70.581*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Industry and year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Wald 𝜒2 96205.30 99691.20 101745.96 101454.23 103645.62 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,553 2,553 2,553 2,553 2,553 
Number of firms 300 300 300 300 300 
Robust pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
Table 3.10. Main results of the panel-data CSP regressions (secondary stakeholders). 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 
      
CSiR  -1.512*** -1.256** -1.515*** -1.295** 
  (0.007) (0.049) (0.005) (0.039) 
Lobbying expenditures  0.358*** 0.393*** 0.359*** 0.389*** 
  (0.007) (0.003) (0.005) (0.003) 
Distance to DC  -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 -0.001 
  (0.473) (0.469) (0.460) (0.461) 
CSiR*Lobbying expenditures   -0.112*  -0.096 
   (0.076)  (0.139) 
CSiR*Distance to DC    0.001 0.000 
    (0.300) (0.450) 
Size 0.023** 0.020** 0.019** 0.019** 0.019** 
 (0.011) (0.015) (0.017) (0.016) (0.017) 
Leverage -1.623 -2.191 -2.129 -2.438 -2.329 
 (0.731) (0.634) (0.643) (0.595) (0.612) 
Party ruling the state -0.250 -0.141 -0.123 -0.179 -0.154 
 (0.834) (0.906) (0.918) (0.882) (0.898) 
Most admired 0.984 0.823 0.891 0.867 0.915 
 (0.296) (0.394) (0.352) (0.370) (0.341) 
Bribery and corruption 0.260 0.174 0.519 0.162 0.461 
 (0.876) (0.915) (0.759) (0.922) (0.788) 
Competition -1.888 -1.445 -1.400 -1.328 -1.318 
 (0.128) (0.233) (0.239) (0.259) (0.256) 
Environment -0.981 -0.523 -0.281 -0.782 -0.512 
 (0.470) (0.716) (0.841) (0.608) (0.734) 
Discrimination -0.828 -0.464 -0.452 -0.361 -0.375 
 (0.684) (0.806) (0.811) (0.845) (0.840) 
Product safety -0.465 -0.061 0.122 0.152 0.258 
 (0.764) (0.969) (0.936) (0.920) (0.863) 
Human rights 0.494 0.156 0.008 0.257 0.106 





Other 3.945 4.786* 5.473** 5.049** 5.575** 
 (0.109) (0.059) (0.032) (0.048) (0.030) 
Fined -0.514 -0.589 -0.252 -0.346 -0.115 
 (0.753) (0.723) (0.876) (0.838) (0.945) 
Boycott -1.633 -2.329 -2.440 -2.373 -2.458 
 (0.485) (0.333) (0.311) (0.330) (0.312) 
Outstanding -3.893* -2.759 -2.590 -2.756 -2.612 
 (0.064) (0.158) (0.187) (0.162) (0.188) 
Reach -0.247 0.043 0.070 0.069 0.086 
 (0.629) (0.931) (0.887) (0.891) (0.863) 
Severity 1.010 0.939 0.833 0.875 0.800 
 (0.133) (0.151) (0.214) (0.181) (0.231) 
Constant 54.488*** 55.191*** 55.182*** 55.112*** 55.124*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
      
Industry and year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Wald 𝜒2 3321.27 3463.11 3331.80 3454.80 3343.50 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,553 2,553 2,553 2,553 2,553 
Number of firms 300 300 300 300 300 
Robust pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Besides distinguishing between primary and secondary stakeholders, we conducted an 
additional test where we used an alternative measure of relational CPA; namely, the number of 
revolvers that firms employ. We retrieved this information from the Centre for Responsive Politics 
(opensecrets.org), which defines revolvers as government regulators, Congressional staff and even 
members of Congress who take new jobs with lobbying firms and private sector organizations that 
they often used to supervise. Consistent with our core results, Table 3.11. shows that the interaction 
between CSiR and the number of revolvers in the firm is non-significant in the Tobin’s q 
regression. However, compared to our core results, it is negative and significant in the CSP 
regression. This seems to give support to the hypothesis that relational CPA deepens the negative 






Table 3.11. Main results of the panel-data regressions (relational CPA measured as number of 
revolvers). 
 Model I Model II 
 Tobin’s q CSP 
   
CSiR -0.041 -1.964*** 
 (0.176) (0.004) 
Number of revolvers -0.001 0.077** 
 (0.408) (0.014) 
CSiR*Number of revolvers -0.000 -0.033* 
 (0.920) (0.066) 
Size -0.001** 0.012 
 (0.038) (0.122) 
Leverage 0.583** -11.002** 
 (0.028) (0.028) 
Party ruling the state -0.042 -0.396 
 (0.343) (0.728) 
Most admired 0.212** 0.258 
 (0.015) (0.802) 
Bribery and corruption -0.073 -0.125 
 (0.226) (0.954) 
Competition -0.027 -1.528 
 (0.746) (0.319) 
Environment -0.007 -1.459 
 (0.898) (0.315) 
Discrimination -0.039 -3.753** 
 (0.654) (0.026) 
Product safety 0.157* -0.239 
 (0.061) (0.877) 
Human rights 0.160 -0.983 
 (0.455) (0.688) 
Other -0.733*** 4.042 
 (0.009) (0.308) 
Fined 0.120 0.512 
 (0.206) (0.818) 
Boycott 0.496* -3.442 
 (0.075) (0.335) 
Outstanding -0.169 -3.588 
 (0.154) (0.110) 
Reach -0.014 0.407 
 (0.586) (0.498) 
Severity 0.026 1.267** 
 (0.416) (0.045) 
Constant 0.832*** 66.831*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
   
Industry and year dummies Included Included 
   





 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,553 2,553 
Number of firms 300 300 
Robust pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 














Finally, we carried out a Durbin-Wu-Hausman test to discard endogeneity issues in our 
variable of CSiR. The test turned out to be non-significant (Tobin’s q regression: 𝜒2 = 1.95, p-
value = 0.1631; CSP regression: 𝜒2 = 1.69, p-value = 0.1939), thus indicating that this variable 
does not seem to be endogenous. We shall note that to run the Durbin-Wu-Hausman test, we 






3.5 Discussion  
In this chapter we seek to better understand the potential impact of CSiR on firm 
performance. Using a sample of S&P 500 firms and a unique dataset of CSiR events, we explore 
the following: (1) the effect of CSiR on financial and non-financial performance; and (2) the 
moderating effects of CPA, investigating the financial and relational tactics used by firms to 
strengthen their competitive advantage. In our additional tests we also put the focus on whether 
these relationships differ depending on whether we refer to primary or secondary stakeholders.   
Broadly speaking, our findings suggest that there is no significant relationship between 
CSiR and firms’ financial performance. In contrast, they show that CSiR negatively impacts non-
financial performance, and that lobbying expenditures further deepens this negative relationship. 
Interestingly, while we do not obtain significant results for a firm’s political connections using the 
geographic measurement of ‘distance to DC’, we do find a significant negative moderating 
relationship when we define relational CPA in terms of  the hiring practices of firms of ex 
government employees (i.e. ‘revolvers’).  
In the first chapter we noted that firms are under increasing pressure from their stakeholder 
groups to behave more responsibly and to strategically align their stakeholder strategy with their 
performance goals. However, our dataset shows that there are still large corporations that fail to 
keep an unblemished record, being involved in various actions of corporate wrongdoing. Based on 
IST, we see these as having the potential to erode any gains that the firms may make. It seems that 
the paradox of ‘being good while being bad’ is still a workable solution for many firms in today’s 
complex and competitive business environment (Strike et al., 2006). Referring to our definition of 
CSiR, firms engage in both accidental and intentional CSiR acts, adding a level of complexity to 





there is no significant relationship between CSiR and financial performance, there is a negative 
impact of CSiR on non-financial performance. We suggest that these results are in line with 
Groening and Kanuri’s (2013) claim that shareholders may find CSiR an acceptable behavior under 
certain conditions, for instance, investors may see short-term financial loss more acceptable 
compared to the clean-up costs associated with environmental damage. Meanwhile, using a broader 
definition of the dependent variable via CSP that considers additional stakeholders that may be 
directly impacted by firm CSiR actions (e.g. nonmarket stakeholders), we observe that firms are 
more likely to be punished (Oikonomou et al., 2012; Surroca et al., 2010; Wang and Bansal, 2012).  
Our use of Tobin’s q reflects investor expectations, so while CSiR may draw some initial 
backlash when the CSiR is exposed, more long-term consequences are not anticipated. By 
analyzing the performance of the firm in capital markets separately to firm’s non-financial 
performance, we gain a more detailed understanding of how stakeholders interpret CSiR events. 
Our financial performance results build on prior studies that show that shareholders will accept a 
short-term shock on performance should this be an isolated incident that they anticipate has no 
further repercussions on long-term performance (Kang et al., 2016; Groening and Kanuri, 2013; 
Price and Sun, 2017; Walker et al., 2016). Being shareholders primary stakeholders, we could 
argue that there is no clear sanction of this group related to the firms’ CSiR incidents. In fact, 
shareholders may even expect some instances to CSiR in their quest to achieve their strategy-
performance objectives. Studies such as Kölbel et al. (2017) and Walker et al. (2016) show that, 
where CSR and CSiR coexist, firms see no negative financial repercussions. Indeed, these studies 
event report an increase in financial performance due to a CSR insurance-like effect.  
In this chapter we also tested whether CSiR negatively impacts on a firm’s non-financial 





works such as Chen et al. (2018), Price and Sun (2017) and Walker et al. (2016), which focus on 
financial measures. We use CSP as our measure of non-financial performance using the weighted 
scores that Thomson Reuters ASSET4 database assigns to firms concerning their economic, 
environmental, social and governance activities. The successful outcomes of CSR policies and 
initiatives are reflected through enhanced corporate reputation, brand loyalty, operational 
efficiency, and employee commitment, as firms increasingly see the benefit of this strategic 
approach (Godfrey et al., 2009; McWilliams and Siegel, 2011). However, this requires high levels 
of investment of firm resources, which will subsequently be heavily undermined when CSiR 
occurs. Our results show the damage to CSP in the face of CSiR is more visible than financial 
performance downturns. In fact, according to Lange and Washburn (2012), stakeholders will 
remember CSiR events far longer than CSR actions, which means that stakeholders could continue 
punishing the firm long after the event has occurred.  
Besides examining the impact of CSiR both on financial and non-financial performance, 
our study contributes to the existing nonmarket strategy and instrumental stakeholder theory 
literatures by considering the moderating effect of CPA as a means of reputational or political 
capital which, to the extent of our knowledge, has been overlooked by prior works. We specifically 
examine how stakeholders perceive financial and relational CPA when they coexist with CSiR. 
Whereas our findings evidence that financial CPA (i.e. lobbying expenditures) further damages the 
relationship between CSiR and CSP, they show no link between relational CPA (i.e. distance from 
the firm headquarters to DC) and CSP. We have found no significant relationship in either case 
when using financial performance as our dependent variable.  
We interpret these results as shareholders not having a solid stance for or against CPA when 





political connections if CSiR occurs. Meanwhile, when we consider the reaction of additional 
stakeholders through CSP, we see evidence that financial CPA damages stakeholder relationships. 
Given that the aim of CPA is to influence government policy in the favor of firms to enhance their 
competitive performance (Lawton et al., 2013; Oliver and Holzinger, 2008; Schuler et al., 2002), 
this result might be caused by the loss of stakeholder trust and their perception that the firm is 
engaged in shady activities that prompt them to behave more irresponsibly.  
Interestingly, we see no negative repercussions from our analysis with the geographical 
measurement of relational CPA. Political connections through proximity could be viewed as a more 
naturally occurring relationship that firms do not manipulate. This point is somewhat validated by 
the additional test that we ran in which we modified the definition of our relational CPA variable. 
When using the number of revolvers instead of the distance from the firm headquarters to DC, we 
find a significant moderating relationship that resembles that of financial CPA. We suggest that 
this may result due to stakeholders’ awareness of firms actively pursuing political connections to 
generate political capital, which they likely perceive as an attempt by firms to hide or cover up 
their actions. 
All in all, stakeholders seem to regard CPA as having a dark history side to it, often seeing 
it as a form of legal bribery. This is further enhanced when CSiR occurs. It is important to note 
here that, nonmarket researchers seek to align the two strands of nonmarket strategy– i.e. CSR and 
CPA (den Hond et al., 2014; Lawton et al., 2014; Liedong et al., 2015). However, while some 
researchers have shown that this is indeed possible in certain circumstances, our research suggests 
that when CSiR occurs and firms are simultaneously involved in CSR and CPA via lobbying, any 
gains made through these practices are eroded. This could be interpreted as CSiR making it almost 





3.6 Limitations and Future Research Directions  
 An important aspect of this research is centered around how firm actions positively and 
negatively affect primary and secondary stakeholders. We note early in the chapter that stakeholder 
profiles are shifting, as previously dismissed stakeholder groups are becoming increasingly more 
vocal and active on social media platforms. This is an important point for firms to pay more 
attention to. As firms invest in more areas of CSP to boost reputation, brand loyalty and employee 
morale, we note the importance of engaging with stakeholder groups to build long-term 
relationships. Stakeholder attention plays an important role in the ability of these groups to sanction 
firms, as certain grassroots organizations grow, these can have implications for firms who may 
engage in tactics seen as covering up their actions. It is important for firms to go beyond just 
superficial reputation boosting tactics that may provoke stakeholder retaliation when CSiR actions 
are uncovered.  
 Building on this, we note with interest a rise in shareholder activism. Institutional 
shareholders are becoming more aware and engaged in environmental, social and governance 
(ESG) issues that have the potential to impact on their investments. These shareholders and 
investment groups can apply pressure to firms to divest from certain investments deemed harmful. 
This can be particularly related to the oil and gas and other ‘sin’ industries, particularly concerning 
links to environmental issues. Our results suggest that shareholders may be forgiving when CSiR 
occurs, however, with growing participation of big investment in this type of activism, where CSiR 
occurs, shareholders may see a threat to their investment and could apply pressure to the firm.  
 Additionally, we see our research having important implications for firms who are engaging 
in increased levels of political activity. Indicated in our results, CPA activity can damage 





stakeholders. We are seeing large, high profile firms increasing their political investments far 
beyond what is invested in CSP activities. As attention from stakeholders on this activity grows, 
firms will want to prepare for how this can damage stakeholder relations and erode any gains made 
by taking an instrumental approach.      
Despite several contributions of the analysis presented in this chapter, there are also some 
limitations that offer interesting opportunities for further research. First, our sample is restricted to 
S&P 500 firms, which means that we focus on large corporations that are based in the US. Future 
studies could examine whether our results hold in other research settings, such as developing 
countries and/or small and medium enterprises (SMEs). 
We also see an opportunity to build on research by Nardella et al. (2020) by exploring the 
impacts of the individual CSiR categories developed from our CSiR database. Using an 
instrumental approach, a more detailed analysis of each CSiR category and its potential impact on 
market and nonmarket stakeholders could expand on how and under what circumstances 
stakeholders might be more likely to sanction firms.  
Another interesting avenue to explore is the growing activism of grassroots campaigns that 
are working to expose serious firm CSiR acts through online social media campaigns. Lately there 
has been a rise of online activists such Sleeping Giants6 and Stop Funding Hate7 that are running 
successful campaigns targeting some of the biggest brands in the world to stop advertising on big 
technology platforms such as Facebook, Instagram and other social media platforms. We conceive 
this as evidence of firms actively changing their market and nonmarket strategies due to stakeholder 
 
6 https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/20/business/media/sleeping-giants-breitbart-twitter.html (Last accessed July 7, 
2020). 





pressures. Furthermore, though we acknowledge the impact of stakeholders’ ability to boycott 
firms based on their perceived prior CSiR actions, we do not understand yet the true implications 
of these actions in terms of firms’ change of behavior. Are they genuine in their pledges to ‘do 
better’ or is this just virtue signaling to its stakeholders to avoid short-term negative impacts?  
Additionally, future research could conduct an event study on cumulated abnormal returns 
before, during and after identified CSiR actions. CSiR has largely been neglected by business and 
society researchers, yet this concept offers extremely fruitful opportunities to understand 
organizational behavior in what we are experiencing as extremely turbulent times for firms and 
their stakeholders.  
Finally, we would call for future research to advance the CPA literature using stakeholder 
theory frameworks because, as we pointed out earlier in this chapter, the CPA literature has largely 
ignored the impact of firm political actions on stakeholder relationships. For instance, it could be 
interesting to investigate how nonmarket stakeholders perceive political appointments to executive 
boards.    
So far, we have explored how CSiR impacts on financial and non-financial performance. 
In the final empirical chapter in this thesis, we turn our attention to the effect of CSiR on the wider 
core strategic decisions that firms implement. We will examine how CSiR influences external 
growth decisions, specifically focusing on mergers and acquisitions (M&As).   
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Firms face an increasingly complex and competitive global business environment. Pressure 
goes beyond meeting shareholder expectations, given the growing importance of other stakeholder 
groups external to the organization (Muller, 2018). Seeking higher shareholder returns may result 
in negative events where, in some instances, stakeholders face serious consequences beyond 
financial loss (Godfrey, Merrill and Hansen, 2009; Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013). For this reason, 
research on how to preserve shareholder wealth without adversely affecting other stakeholders has 
grown substantially in the last decade, as evidenced in the previous chapter (e.g. Nardella, Brammer 
and Surdu, 2020; Price and Sun, 2017; Strike, Gao and Bansal, 2006). The pursuit of “do good” 
and “do-no-harm” research has gained traction with the rise of corporate misconduct, both 
accidental and intentional (Crilly, Hansen and Zollo, 2016; Muller and Kräussl, 2011). However, 
contradictory evidence of firm behavior and its impact on firm performance calls for further 
research. Firms, specifically large multinationals, have shown significant capacity for philanthropic 
behavior (Muller and Kräussl, 2011). Yet, at the same time, they willingly engage in irresponsible 
practices such as shifting operations to locations with lax regulations and contributing to social 
issues and environmental pollution (Surroca, Tribó and Zahra, 2013).    
These practices call into question firm strategic decision making, how these actions impact 
stakeholders, and the inevitable effects on firm performance. As discussed in the previous chapter, 
accounting for nonmarket factors is increasingly important, particularly at an international level. 
Global supply chains, different institutional environments and changing consumer behavior are all 
factors that drive firm response and shape their competitive environment (Altura, Lawrence and 





such, market and nonmarket drivers push firms to take a more holistic approach to address these 
issues with their stakeholders. 
Taking an instrumental stakeholder perspective, the strategic use of corporate social 
responsibility (CSR) has numerous benefits for firm performance (Baron and Diermeier, 2007; 
Husted and Allen, 2007), both domestically and internationally.  Researchers have identified 
advantages of strategic CSR, such as reducing the cost of doing business across national borders 
(Eden and Miller, 2004); new product development connected to eco-labeling (McWilliams and 
Siegel, 2011); and premium pricing (Husted and Allen, 2007). Yet others still see CSR as a 
shareholder expense (Chen, Lu and Liu, 2019). Most arguments stem from the financial 
implications of CSR and whether it is profit enhancing (McWilliams, Siegel and Wright, 2006; 
Siegel and Vitaliano, 2007). Improved reputation (Doh, Howton, Howton and Siegel, 2010), the 
role of institutions (Campbell, Eden and Miller 2012), and organizational legitimacy (Schrempf-
Stirling, Palazzo and Phillips, 2016) are just some of the topics explored through this nonmarket 
focus. Nonetheless, despite the diversity in research topics, the shareholder versus stakeholder 
debate in value creation is still the most prolific.  
Though CSR has become a mainstream aspect of academia and business practice, it is still 
largely associated as either value adding or destroying, and research has developed along these 
lines (Yin and Jamali, 2016). The questions of how, why, and whether firms should engage in 
socially responsible business practices remains unclear (Schreck, 2011). Nevertheless, while the 
strategic benefits of CSR as performance boosters are continually contested, the concept of 
corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR) is largely absent from these debates. Taking a strategic 
approach to CSR can be met with distrust from stakeholders if firms have been involved in CSiR. 





performance has the potential to impact firm growth. Prior studies have shown that firms with high 
CSR profiles that also engage in CSiR will lose trust from stakeholders, leaving them vulnerable 
to stakeholder sanctions (Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Groening and Kanuri, 2013). These actions 
also impact investor confidence, as CSiR may signal that the firm will be unable to recover from 
the resulting consequences (Carberry, Engelen and Van Essen, 2018). However, an alternative 
strand of research has recently begun to investigate CSR as a risk management strategy in which 
firms use responsible initiatives as reputational insurance against CSiR (Minor and Morgan, 2011; 
Nardella et al., 2020).  
Building on these prior works this chapter explores options available to firms that divert 
attention from CSiR behavior, analyzing how firms adapt new strategic plans that signal to 
investors that they have the necessary resources for future growth. It is our point that firms involved 
in CSiR will seek to realign core strategies by announcing new investment decisions at home and 
abroad. Nevertheless, choosing the most appropriate external growth strategy is a complex process 
determined by internal constraints and the external environment (Hitt and Tyler, 1991; Meyer, 
Estrin, Bhaumik and Peng, 2009).  
The above corporate decision has sparked research concerning firm-industry characteristics 
(Reddy, 2014), location choice (Kim and Aguilera, 2016), national culture (Kogut and Singh, 
1988), and institutional diversity (Jackson and Deeg, 2006). It is generally understood that firms 
can expand their operations inorganically through  joint ventures (Kogut, 1988; Lane, Salk and 
Lyles, 2001), strategic alliances (Grant and Baden-Fuller, 2004; Gulati, 1995), and/or mergers and 
acquisitions, both domestic and cross border (Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Shimizu, Hitt, 





Despite the abundance of research on these topics, there is no general agreement on the 
suitability of either of these strategies. Factors concerning product/industry relatedness, degree of 
integration, regulatory barriers, and environmental uncertainly affect this strategic choice (Dikova 
and Brouthers, 2016). Indeed, the existing literature suggests that growth strategies are firm and 
industry specific, where the importance of strategy-related aspects may be of significant value to 
one firm but of less importance to another (Ghauri and Buckley, 2003; Hennart and Reddy, 1997; 
Reddy, 2014; Yin and Shanley, 2008).  
However, literature and practice suggests mergers and acquisitions (M&A)1 are the most 
popular or preferred growth strategy for firms to pursue (e.g. Bauer, Dao, Matzler and Tarba, 2017; 
Bauer and Metzler, 2014; Capron, 1999; Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Das and Kapil, 2012; 
Datta, 1998; Ferreira, Santos, de Almeida and Reis, 2014; Gaur, Malhotra and Zhu, 2013; Kling, 
Ghobadian and O’Regan, 2009). M&As allow firms to grow at a faster rate due to access to already 
established production facilities, distribution networks, and customer base (Huyghebaert and 
Luypaert, 2010). Besides, they are considered a cheaper alternative compared to other external 
growth strategies because payment processes may involve stock options, limiting the use of a firm’s 
cash flow (Reddy, 2014).  
Despite increased turbulence in financial and political arenas (e.g. Brexit, trade conflicts, 
and the financial crisis), M&A activity continues to grow across the globe. In 2017, a reported total 
of 52,740 transactions took place worldwide, with an estimated value of $3.7 trillion dollars.2 In 
2019, JP Morgan reported a further increase of M&A activity valued at $4.1 trillion, evidence of 
the presumed popularity and importance of this method of growth.3 Yet research is split on positive 
 
1 We use M&A and merger interchangeably throughout this chapter.  
2 https://imaa-institute.org/mergers-and-acquisitions-statistics/ (Last accessed February 29, 2020). 





returns from this type of investment. Indeed, a significant proportion of research reports that the 
majority of M&As fail, with some citing failure rates of over 70 percent (Bauer and Matzler, 2014, 
Bauer et al., 2017; Brouthers, 2002; Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Christensen, Alton, Rising 
and Waldeck, 2011).  
We take note of prior literature that establishes M&A as an important strategic tool to create 
economic value. Despite the abundance of research on this topic, there is inconsistency concerning 
the causes of its high failure rate (Bauer and Matzler, 2014; Brouthers, van Hastenburg and van 
den Ven ,1998; Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006; Chatterjee, 2009; Cording, Harrison, Hoskisson 
and Jonsen, 2014; Sarala, Junni, Cooper, and Tarba 2016; Stahl and Voight, 2008). This chapter 
will focus on M&A announcements, as research points that a significant number of M&As fail or 
are abandoned at this early stage of negotiations (Angwin, Paroutis and Connell, 2015).  
The M&A process is a set of complex negotiations with multiple stakeholders using 
significant and valuable resources, though stakeholder engagement is notably absent from the 
research in this domain (Barney, 1998; Bettinazzi and Zollo, 2017; Waddock and Graves, 2006). 
Consequently, the high failure rate in the early stages leaves us questioning the motivations behind 
firms increased activity in this regard. In this chapter, we address this issue by examining corporate 
reputation and corporate political activity (CPA) as moderating factors in the relationship between 
CSiR and the number of announced M&As.  
 M&As are one of the most important strategic choices that firms will make to access 
valuable resources and enter new markets (Deng and Yang, 2015). M&As—both domestic and 
cross-border—encounter numerous barriers, such as geographic and cultural distance, different 
institutional and legislative systems, and evolving stakeholder interests (Shimizu et al., 2004). 





on the success or failure of M&As. Despite this, nonmarket factors within the M&A context have 
been scarcely researched in strategic management and international business (Ahammad, Tarba, 
Liu, Glaister and Cooper, 2016; Clougherty, 2003; 2005; Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2014). It is 
only recently that scholars have begun to investigate CSR and CPA in this context, specifically 
exploring whether socially responsible investments create wealth for shareholders (Atkas, de Bodt, 
and Cousin, 2011; Chen and Gavious, 2015); the effect of CSR on bid premiums (Gomes, 2019); 
and the role of political connections in M&As (Croci, Pantzalis, Park and Petmezas, 2017). Yet 
despite this new turn in research, contributions have so far been limited to shareholder wealth, thus 
ignoring other important stakeholders.  
 Concentrating solely on economic factors that can influence the outcomes of investment 
strategies can lead to a rather narrow focus. Because M&A performance is a multidimensional 
construct, researchers must look beyond returns on shareholder value (Hawn, in press). Building 
on our research in the previous chapter, we extend instrumental stakeholder theory (IST) into the 
M&A domain. We aim to expand the debate to address the impact of both primary (e.g. 
shareholders, employees, suppliers) and secondary (e.g. governments, environment, media, local 
community) or ‘nonmarket’ stakeholders. We argue that M&A research now needs to focus on 
nonmarket factors and move from the shareholder dominant focus that has shaped its theoretical 
and empirical development. Social, cultural, and political factors contribute to the success or failure 
of firms’ strategic action, and dismissing these factors as irrelevant could be a significant 
contributor to the high failure rate of M&As. 
Accounting for nonmarket factors in the pre-announcement phase to create synergies 
between bidder and target firms that have similar practices can perhaps further facilitate the 





activity, strategic complementarity and cultural fit are key (Bauer and Matzler, 2014). Despite 
cultural fit being primarily associated with affecting cross-border transactions, issues with 
organizational culture can also affect domestic ones. For example, United-Continental Airlines 
merger announced in 2010 is well documented as being extremely problematic.4 Described as a 
poorly executed merger, many conflicts ensued between the newly merged United Continental, its 
employees and other stakeholder groups. Among others, a toxic corporate culture, chaotic policies 
causing various employee contract disputes, and unstable and changing senior management teams. 
Strategic fit and potential synergies using a nonmarket approach could have identified issues at 
early stages of this merger. Yet most policies and practices were misaligned, severely damaging 
not just financial performance, but also reputation and stakeholder relations.5 
 In this chapter, we account for nonmarket factors that influence the core strategic decision-
making processes of firms. More specifically, we focus on the influence of exposed firm CSiR 
behavior on M&A announcements (both domestic and cross-border), and the moderating effect of 
corporate reputation and CPA. We explore whether firms increase M&A announcements to signal 
to investors that the firm is financially secure despite potential negative outcomes of CSiR, such as 
costly lawsuits, fines, and reduced sales. We do so by considering M&A announcements worldwide 
and in a subset of developing countries. Moreover, we investigate if firms’ corporate reputation 
and lobbying expenditures buffer or deepen the relationship between CSiR and M&A 
announcements. We expect that firms with a good corporate reputation announce a higher number 
of M&As when CSiR occurs. Meanwhile, we suggest that those firms that partake in lobbying will 
 
4 https://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-hiltzik-toxic-united-wells-20170411-story.html (Last accessed April 
29, 2020). 
5 https://www.forbes.com/sites/deniselyohn/2018/03/28/how-to-fix-united-airlines-culture-problem/#62d1f143fd3d 





cut down the number of M&As under these circumstances. To the extent of our knowledge, this is 
the first study to address these issues.  
We have tested the above hypotheses on a panel-data sample of firms listed in Standard & 
Poor’s (S&P) 500 over an 11-year period (2007-2017) using a Generalized Estimating Equation 
(GEE) negative binomial specification. The key dependent variable is the number of M&A 
announcements, which we have built from Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
data. Like in the previous chapter, our main independent variable is CSiR in year t, created from 
our unique database of CSiR events. Our results suggest there is a partially significant negative 
relationship between firm involvement in CSiR and the increase in M&A announcements. This 
relationship turns nonsignificant in the case of M&As announced in developing countries. These 
results change when we consider the firms’ CSiR record rather than their irresponsible behaviors 
in year t, as then evidence suggests that firms involved in CSiR increase their M&A 
announcements, probably with the aim of deflecting attention from its stakeholders. In addition, 
whereas our findings highlight that lobbying expenditures negatively moderate the relationship 
between CSiR and M&A announcements, they show that corporate reputation positively moderates 
this relationship. Our results support our argument that where CSiR occurs, firms will engage in a 
series of tactics aimed at avoiding retaliation from nonmarket stakeholders (Surroca et al., 2013).   
 In this chapter we make three central contributions to the nonmarket, instrumental 
stakeholder theory, and M&A literatures. Firstly, we extend M&A literature into the nonmarket 
domain by exploring how CSiR and CPA impact on a firm’s core strategic processes. We analyze 
the broader role that these nonmarket factors have on firm decision making and the growing 
importance of firms accounting for social and environmental factors in their investment decisions. 





allows for a deeper analysis of the factors that impact the outcomes of firm behavior. Secondly, we 
extend the instrumental stakeholder approach into the M&A domain. Prior literature has so far 
focused exclusively on primary stakeholders affecting the M&A process. By introducing 
nonmarket stakeholders in our analysis instead of focusing on shareholders, we are advancing the 
literature on the factors that may impact on the success or failure of M&As. Additionally, we 
introduce signaling theory as a complement to IST (Connelly, Certo, Ireland and Reutzel, 2011). 
We extend this theory into the nonmarket domain by analyzing how CSiR can distort the message 
that firms wish to convey regarding their strategic activity. Finally, we make our contribution to 
CPA and reputation literatures by analyzing how stakeholders react to firms using these concepts 
as risk management strategies where CSiR has occurred.       
We structure the remainder of this chapter as follows. First, we conduct a literature review 
of prior M&A research and discuss the emerging nonmarket aspects in this literature. Next, we 
introduce our theoretical framework and develop our hypotheses before discussing our 
methodological approach, which includes a recap of the research setting and data collection 
process. We then introduce the variables, data sources, and econometric technique chosen to 
perform the empirical analysis. Afterwards, we present our key results and discuss them together 
with their practical implications, limitations, and future research directions.    
 4.2 Literature Review 
 Ghauri and Buckley (2003) define M&As as the process where two separate organizations 
form a single, new enterprise to pursue organizational goals of growth and expansion to new 
markets, both domestic and international. According to studies by Calipha, Tarba, and Brock, 
(2010) and Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), firms may choose from three categories of mergers; 





conglomerate (firms in unrelated industries). Described as being multidisciplinary in nature 
(Cartwright and Schoenberg, 2006), M&A research has attracted the interest of scholars from 
financial economics, strategic management and organizational behavior (Bauer and Matzler, 2014; 
Birkinshaw, Bresman and Hakanson, 2000). Each stream of research focuses on different factors 
affecting firm performance and the decisions and motivations behind corporate strategy. Yet 
predominantly scholars seek to understand how M&A action creates firm value.  
Early research attempted to mark M&A activity concentrated on what has been described 
as ‘Merger Waves’ (Haleblian, Devers, McNamara, Carpenter and Davidson, 2009). Six major 
waves are identified indicating to a major uptake in M&A activity at specific points in time, 
coinciding with increased academic contributions. These merger waves reveal intense activity 
across industry and charts to some extent the changing business environment, particularly in North 
America (Harford, 2005; Lubatkin and Lane, 1996; Mitchell and Mulherin, 1996; Yaghoubi, 
Yaghoubi, Locke and Gibb, 2016). Starting in the late 1890s, associated with industrial production 
and heavily focused on monopolies, this follows on through pre- and post-World War eras when 
concentration was on manufacturing. A third wave is linked to popularity in business concerning 
conglomerates around the 1950s onwards (Lubatkin and Lane, 1996), continuing through three 
more waves ranging from hostile takeovers in the 1980s, leading on to the onset of globalization, 
characterized by an increase on cross border M&As. We acknowledge the significant contribution 
to the literature that charting this development of M&A activity entails, as industry and academia 
document technological, economic and regulatory changes in the global business environment 
(Harford, 2005; Mitchell and Mulhern, 1996). Nevertheless, this is not our focus, as our intent here 
is to highlight an almost one-sided approach to financial and shareholder wealth creating research 





 M&A transactions take place over three distinct phases: due diligence, pre-negotiation, and 
post-integration (Angwin, 2001; Angwin et al., 2015; Birkinshaw et al., 2000). Each stage of this 
process requires detailed analysis of all factors affecting the successful outcome of the M&A. We 
note that significant focus on M&A research centers around the post-integration phase as 
researchers seek to discover if the assumed synergistic gains, often touted as motivations for 
mergers, are realized. Initial research contributed mainly to the finance literature and investigated 
the value adding ability of M&As, though empirical results are somewhat mixed. The assumption 
that the acquirer firm, as the instigator of these transactions, is the main beneficiary has not been 
definitively proven (Haleblian et al., 2009). Lubatkin (1987) and Barney (1998) cited no significant 
improvement in shareholder returns for the acquiring firm, which Singh and Montgomery (1987) 
also echoed by stating that any financial gain in the early stages of M&As is felt by target firms. 
Fuller, Netter, and Stegemoller (2002) described acquirers as encountering negative stock gains, 
with any combined financial gains only benefitting the target firm, leaving questions surrounding 
the motivations of firms that actively engage in M&As. If, as research suggests, there is little 
financial gain, what other goals do M&As achieve?   
As the number of mergers increased globally, research expanded to investigate potential 
synergies from these transactions that transcended accounting and market-based measures. 
Concepts such as strategic relatedness and compatibility (Capron and Hulland, 1999; Larsson and 
Finkelstein, 1999) as well as degree and speed of integration and cultural compatibility (Angwin, 
2004; Brouthers, 2002) gained traction. Brouthers, et al. (1998) further categorized merger motives 
as economic, personal, and strategic. Each category produced a broad range of topics that scholars 
have pursued to better understand the aims and objectives of mergers. Meanwhile, King, Dalton, 





focused on deal characteristics concerning relatedness of merger firms (e.g. Capron and Hulland, 
1999; Lubatkin, 1987); acquisition experience (e.g. Haleblian and Finkelstein, 1999; Hayward, 
2002); and method of payment (e.g. Chang, 2002; Fuller et al., 2002), thus limiting the scope of 
variables used to identify what drives firms to engage in M&As. Furthermore, King and colleagues 
pointed out that empirical studies so far have been insufficient in linking these variables to 
improved firm performance. Limitations of these studies seem to have an overemphasis on 
accounting and market-based measures and a disregard for other external factors that potentially 
affect the successful outcomes of M&As (Cartwright, Teerikangas, Rouzies and Wilson-Evered, 
2012; Haleblian et al., 2009). We highlight here the necessity of bridging multiple levels of 
analysis, particularly from the nonmarket domain to further develop the M&A literature.  
Economic and strategic motives are the most prominent categories investigating M&As, as 
firms look for new opportunities to exploit to their advantage (Conklin, 2005). Firms will seek to 
increase market power (Ghauri and Buckley, 2003), asset redeployment (Anand and Singh, 1997) 
and access new resources and capabilities (Deng and Yang, 2015). Additionally, research has 
sought to understand how strategic fit (Bauer and Matzler, 2014), cultural compatibility (Brouthers, 
2002; Chakrabarti, Gupta-Mukherjee and Jayaraman, 2009) and potential synergies (Chatterjee, 
1986; Zaheer, Castañer and Souder, 2013) allow firms to add and build on their existing strengths 
and combat weaknesses (Gomes, Angwin, Weber and Tarba 2013). The expected outcomes of 
these firm investment decisions align with providing market entry opportunities to increase market 
power (Haleblian et al., 2009); access critical resources, both human capital and natural 
(Uhlenbruck, Rodriguez, Doh, and Eden, 2006); and improve efficiency and cost reduction across 






Building on these motivations behind firm’s external growth strategies we acknowledge the 
added complexity of pursuing cross-border M&As. Seen as an attractive foreign market entry 
mode, cross-border M&As have increased substantially in recent years (Brouthers, 2002; Kim and 
Aguilera, 2015; Kling, Ghobadian, Hitt, Weitzel and O’Regan, 2014). While there is no doubt that 
expansion, particularly from an international perspective, presents many benefits, it does come 
with its own set of challenges. Restructuring and transferring operations across countries that may 
be geographically and culturally distant (Erel, Liao and Weisbach, 2012) and encountering new 
political and economic conditions require firms to adjust rapidly to new working environments 
(Conklin, 2005). These differences are bound to create a ‘liability of foreignness’ (Hymer, 1976; 
Zaheer, 1995) and/or ‘liability of outsidership’ (Johanson and Vahlne, 2009) that increase the entry 
barriers firms need to overcome to increase their likelihood of success in host countries. Yet despite 
these challenges, M&A is a key external growth option, often critical to a firm’s success (Bauer 
and Matzler, 2014; Cording et al., 2014).  
Again, we see here an opportunity to align nonmarket policies and practices as a way of 
reducing conflicts of interest, and confusion and uncertainty for stakeholders that mergers often 
cause (Arouri, Gomes and Pukthuanthong, 2019). Yet so far, research concerning the main drivers 
behind M&As has largely ignored potential synergies with nonmarket stakeholders, taking a 
shareholder-centric approach (Bettinazzi and Zollo, 2017). Though arguments still conceive CSR 
as wealth destroying for shareholders, in strategic management and international business research 
this seems to be changing (e.g. Ioannis and Serafeim, 2012; McWilliams and Siegel, 2011). As 
legal, political and cultural factors grow in importance to business decisions, engaging with both 






Our focus on the announcement phase highlights how crucial nonmarket factors are in this 
process. M&As are subject to country, industry, and firm level factors (Shimizu et al., 2004). In 
the earliest phase of a merger when acquirers perform a due diligence process (Angwin, 2001), 
careful consideration of nonmarket factors should be included. The pre-negotiation phase is 
generally where most decisions regarding mergers are made. Potential issues and creation of 
synergies will most likely be assessed at this stage. Firms will consider relatedness and 
complementarity factors to create potential synergies even if these two concepts are vastly 
different, which has caused confusion in previous research (Kim and Finkelstein, 2009). As 
evidenced by our earlier example of the United-Continental Airlines merger, complementary 
processes are not a guaranteed means of success, and other important factors need to be addressed.  
Broad strategic objectives, search, and screening processes and financial evaluations are all 
conducted in the early negotiation phase. Nonetheless, M&A scholars are not accounting for social 
and environmental assessments that seem to be prevalent in industry, evidenced by the increase in 
CSR reporting by publicly listed firms (Marano, Tashman and Kostova, 2017). Other issues at the 
announcement phase concern communication and information, particularly in cross-border 
transactions (Angwin, 2015; Angwin, Mellahi, Gomes, and Peter 2016). Firms can encounter 
information asymmetry in the acquisition process, more so across national borders (Junni, Sarala, 
Tarba and Weber, 2015). Performing extensive, multi-level due diligence, that includes nonmarket 
factors can help reduce inherent information asymmetry in these transactions. This process will be 
easier in target firms that have enhanced CSR profiles, as they will be more open and transparent 
(Gomes and Marsat, 2018).   
We see opportunities to introduce nonmarket factors as measures of analysis to expand 





synergies are difficult concepts to measure and accessing information detailing success and failures 
of mergers in terms of synergy is also complex. Previous empirical studies have relied on 
quantitative archival data, case studies and survey-based results, using small sample sizes 
(Cartwright et al., 2012). Further to this, Bauer and Matzler (2014) highlighted that it takes three 
to five years to see successful results from mergers, adding to uncertainty and empirical issues in 
this research stream. Nonetheless, despite the apparent lack of nonmarket factors in the M&A 
literature, a growing number of scholars have recently begun to investigate the impact of CSR and 
political connections on M&As. In the subsection below we provide a review of these studies.  
4.2.1 M&A literature in a nonmarket context 
Attempts to address M&As in a nonmarket context is still relatively new and is more 
aligned with shareholder value. The small number of papers analyzing the relationship between 
CSR and a firms’ external growth strategies are done from the perspective of adding or detracting 
from shareholder wealth. Additionally, very few papers are delving into political activity that firms 
engage in to influence the outcomes of M&As, particularly where regulatory approval is required 
(Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2014). M&A motivations are varied, and beyond issues of growth, 
merger activity can be viewed as a response to threats external to the firm. Issues such as 
increased/decreased regulation, stakeholder activism and technological innovation/disruption all 
factor in strategic decisions (Deng, Kang, and Low, 2013; Levy and Egan, 2003). In the two 
previous chapters we have shown the importance of managing the business and society relationship 
and the relevance of forming alliances with stakeholders to improve overall performance. In a 
practical sense, firms may already account for these factors, as we see firms producing annual CSR 
reports detailing areas of involvement in social and environmental activities (Deng et al., 2013), 





M&A literature reflects this and bridges this disconnect between industry and academia (Aktas et 
al., 2011).  
There is little doubt that the literature on M&As has advanced, as evidenced by the volume 
of academic papers, books and industry reports available. Yet they are not without limitations. The 
majority of research can be divided into four thematics (i.e. strategic, financial, organizational and 
process), with a focus on providing a return on the acquirer firms’ investments (Bauer and Matzler, 
2014; Cartwright et al., 2006; Seth, Song, and Pettit, 2002). This shareholder focused intensity 
could well be a significant part of the high failure of M&As. The financial implications of 
integrating CSR into investment decisions are an increasingly important topic, and do not 
necessarily indicate financial loss (Porter and Kramer, 2006). Indeed, as the debate concerning 
shareholder expense verses stakeholder maximization continues, there is a shift in shareholder 
priorities whereby investors and analysts start perceiving the value enhancing benefits of strategic 
CSR (Luo, Wang, Raithel and Zheng, 2015). 
Shareholders and investors now view CSR as a form of value creation rather than 
destruction. Institutional investors and stock analysts are pursuing socially responsible strategies 
to attract potential shareholders. Furthermore, investors are now under pressure to divest firms 
from irresponsible investments in controversial industries (Luo et al., 2015; Ioannou and Serafeim, 
2012). Atkas et al. (2011) were arguably the first to investigate CSR impacting on M&A activity, 
doing so under the guise of socially responsible investments (SRI). The authors discussed SRI in 
terms of value creation or value destruction for shareholder returns. Differentiating between the 
acquirer and target firm in their analysis, results supported the value creation perspective in terms 
of shareholder returns. Moreover, this study indicated that if a target firm is a high CSR performer, 





showing that acquirer firms will improve their CSR performance by absorbing practices already in 
place in the target firm. This highlights potential synergies between both firms, lending support to 
the learning hypothesis, where firms adopt or adapt new processes during the acquisition phase 
(Junni et al., 2015).  
Heavily focused on the effect of CSR on shareholder wealth, the CSR research in the 
context of M&As so far discounts other important nonmarket stakeholders. Deng at al. (2013) 
followed this trend by investigating two opposing views in the CSR/performance debate: 
stakeholder maximization value and shareholder expense view. Similar to the slack resource’s 
argument (Kang, Germann, and Grewal 2016), the authors questioned whether CSR activities 
improve financial performance or improved financial performance increases investment in CSR. 
Their empirical evidence supported a stakeholder maximization view, suggesting that integrating 
CSR and stakeholder relations into strategic decisions like mergers has its merits and ultimately 
creates shareholder value. Additionally, this paper supported that accounting for CSR measures 
can improve aspects of post-merger integration.  
For the most part, M&A scholars have regarded CSR as a shareholder expense. However, 
a small stream of research is beginning to recognize the wider benefits that stakeholder engagement 
can bring to the M&A process. Gomes and Marsat (2018) did this by investigating how acquiring 
firms can use CSR to reduce risk and increase transparency, aiming to increase bid premiums. This 
paper began to delve into other intangible benefits that CSR brings, such as improved reputation 
that helps to build goodwill and develops a form of reputational insurance. This is particularly 
relevant where CSiR has occurred, as firms will aim to use these reputational gains to avoid closer 





CSR to create synergies, break down cultural barriers and reduce conflict may allow for smoother 
integration between firms.     
Increased engagement in responsible initiatives is creating more attractive investment 
opportunities (Gomes, 2019), which suggests that firms assess the suitability of acquiring high and 
low CSR performing firms in terms of specific risks or potential synergies. We note that firms that 
produce CSR annual reports are more transparent, with readily available information for acquiring 
firms (Kölbel and Busch, 2019). This can be even more relevant in cross-border M&A activity 
since reliable information is more difficult to obtain. Information concerning a firm’s past social 
performance in areas ranging from working conditions, supply chain activity and local community 
interaction can contribute to the valuation of proposed M&A deals. The more information acquirer 
firms have on nonmarket factors affecting target firms, the better the outcome of the proposed 
merger (Gomes and Marsat, 2018).  
Additionally, firms with little to no CSR activity can face difficulties, as implementing or 
adopting new processes can be costly and requires significant investment (Arouri et al., 2019). 
Moreover, certain stakeholders may potentially object to M&As, particularly where CSiR has 
occurred. Poor reputational issues and spillover effects from prior bad behavior could inevitably 
impact the success of the M&A. Arouri and colleagues (2019) are the first paper to explore this 
through an M&A context, using a high-low CSR matrix to empirically assess how CSR may reduce 
uncertainty in the M&A process. Chen and Gavious (2015) however provide a different view, 
analyzing the relationship between CSR and M&A valuation, finding no evidence that CSR either 
improves investors’ profit or increases the valuation of M&A activity for the acquiring firm, again 





As an international expansion strategy, M&As are considered one of the most important 
options that firms have in terms of managing environmental uncertainty (Hillman, Withers, and 
Collins 2009; Deng and Yang, 2015). Broadly speaking, economic systems, political and social 
institutions, and geographic environment characteristics will factor into merger decisions. Yet these 
factors in M&A research seem to have developed separately from a nonmarket perspective. As we 
question motivations behind M&As, particularly cross-border mergers, we note the lack of research 
relating to firm political activities despite the regulatory issues that they may encounter throughout 
the process. An extensive review conducted by Xie, Reddy and Liang (2017) investigated the rise 
in interest of cross-border transactions, and noted that motivations are not dissimilar to domestic 
M&As. This may be a reason why research on cross-border and domestic M&As have relied on 
nonmarket issues equally. 
M&A location choice should reflect the market and nonmarket strategies firms pursue, yet 
research is limited on integrating these concepts in this context (Ahammad et al., 2017). Firms that 
expand globally will do so to increase market power, reduce costs, and gain access to new resources 
and capabilities (Deng and Yang, 2015). Yet doing so exposes firms to different institutional and 
regulatory frameworks, political systems, and cultural barriers that increases risk surrounding 
M&A activity. Firms that face political pressure will look to offer incentives for politicians to either 
approve or block potential mergers, with potentially lucrative corporate board positions and 
financial donations. Studies have shown that these investments are linked to increased firm value 
and are a necessary aspect of a firm’s corporate strategy (Faccio, 2006; Faccio, Masulis and 
McConnell, 2006). And, unlike investment in strategic CSR, there seems to be no negative 






In the context of mergers, firms engage with their political environment for a number of 
reasons. Opposition to both domestic and cross-border M&As can occur if these actions result in 
potential job losses to local communities. Also, if firms look to expand overseas to locations with 
lax regulatory environments to take advantage of cheap labor, they can encounter resistance, either 
on one specific merger or other future deals (Croci, et al., 2017). Other areas that have sparked 
interest of political activity concerns antitrust issues (Clougherty, 2003, 2005), and mergers in 
heavily regulated industries (Holburn and Zelner, 2010).  
Xie and colleagues (2017) raise an important question on merger motives that is particularly 
relevant to this research. Are firms more inclined to select target firms based on locations with 
institutional voids, and would firms with a history of CSiR consider these location choices due to 
weak institutional frameworks and political uncertainty? Our research aims to address such 
limitations in M&A literature, as we consider the impact of CSiR and the level of M&A activity 
by firms. We also investigate the role that corporate reputation plays in these growth strategies and 
how lobbying expenditures further impact the relationship between CSiR and the number of M&As 
announced by the firms. As we move into discussing the theoretical stance and our hypotheses 
development, the above topics will be further expanded in the following section.   
4.3 Theory and Hypotheses Development 
Scholars studying the outcomes of M&A activity have mostly applied transactions cost 
economics (Brouthers and Brouthers, 2003), resource dependence theory (Bauer et al., 2017; 
Hillman et al., 2009), and agency theory (Haleblian et al., 2009) as their theoretical frameworks. 
As previously mentioned in the literature review, a majority of M&A research has prioritized 
increasing shareholder wealth and firm financial performance as driving forces behind this 





other influencing factors. We note the absence of important nonmarket stakeholders further adds 
to the limitations on providing reasons behind the high failure of M&As. However, recent studies 
have expanded their scope to incorporate CSR and other stakeholder groups, as evidenced by a 
recent contribution from Bettinazzi and Zollo (2017). While the addition of stakeholder orientation 
to the M&A literature is a timely contribution, this focuses on primary stakeholders, overlooking 
the impact of secondary stakeholders on strategic decisions.  
We seek to build on this research and contribute to the M&A literature by challenging the 
‘implicit assumption’ that other stakeholder groups involved in the M&A process are accounted 
for in research (Bettinazzi and Zollo, 2017). To contribute to the advancement of nonmarket 
research we will investigate the influence of nonmarket stakeholders on the number of announced 
M&As. In keeping with an instrumental stakeholder approach, we also introduce signaling theory 
as a complement to our theoretical framework so that we might better understand why firms engage 
in external growth strategies even in the face serious financial and non-financial risk.  
 Signaling theory is primarily linked to the reduction of information asymmetry between the 
various parties involved in specific business activities (Connelly, et al., 2011). Originally rooted in 
economics and finance literature (Ross, 1973; Spence, 1973, 2002), signaling theory sets out to 
distinguish between high- and low-quality firms, in terms of their ability to signal positive and 
negative information about firm behavior. Making a distinction between the signaler (high-quality 
firm) and the receiver (low-quality firm or stakeholder), the theory seeks to determine the dominant 
firm’s ability to signal relevant information regarding firm actions and the cost of doing so. 
Moreover, signaling theory draws attention to how stakeholders may react to specific information 






  Over time, this theory integrated into other concepts to complement various management 
frameworks, specifically favored by strategic management scholars (Connelly et al., 2011; Bergh, 
Connelly, Ketchen and Shannon, 2014). Used as a means of directing attention, either towards or 
away from specific issues, signaling theory can reduce uncertainty in situations where certain actors 
have incomplete information. This can be done through a variety of means, such as the media 
(Deephouse, 2000, Weigelt and Camerer, 1988) and CSR (Janney and Gove, 2011; Kölbel and 
Busch, 2019). Bergh et al. (2014) highlight that stakeholders will look for ‘signals’ that translate 
into actions or policies set out by firms regarding their intention to act on their stated objectives.  
The stakeholder-firm performance question is built on information asymmetries between 
all parties involved. Firms have specific information about their actions and strategic intent that 
they may or may not want to inform certain parties about. Whether and how firms choose to 
disseminate this information to its various stakeholders could in certain cases damage stakeholder 
relations (Carberry et al., 2018). We highlighted this inconsistency between firms and their 
stakeholders in the previous chapter, suggesting that firms will mislead their stakeholders, or rely 
on the fact that they have limited attention. Firms could be hopeful that certain stakeholder groups 
stay unaware of specific firm behavior, actively working towards ensuring that information 
asymmetry is not reduced (Barnett, 2014). The significance of this limited stakeholder attention to 
certain firm activity affects how stakeholders sanction firms, ultimately determining if they face 
consequences or not. 
Firms can use this to their advantage by signaling to stakeholders their good intentions 
through specific CSR policies (Crilly, Zollo and Hansen, 2012). Nonetheless, we question this 
logic, as there are often discrepancies between the promised actions of the firm and the actual 





of CSiR activity. If a firm has a high CSR profile, this signals organizational legitimacy (Chiu and 
Sharfman, 2011). Yet this message gets confused, perhaps even delegitimized, when firms are 
involved in CSiR. In this respect, a high CSR profile will signal successful non-financial 
performance outcomes to investors, but CSiR further erodes the trust built with other stakeholders 
involved. Using this point we believe that signaling theory will add to our theoretical framework. 
Signaling theory has been introduced into entry mode literature in several contexts. Used 
as a means to reduce adverse selection, Reuer and Ragozzino (2012) used this theory to promote 
M&As suitability over joint ventures. Other studies have investigated the merits of knowledge 
sharing and human capital (Coff, 2002); stock market reaction (Zhang and Wiersema (2009); and 
acquisition premiums (Reuer, Tong, and Wu 2012). As our focus concerns M&A announcements, 
we seek to understand how acquirer firms signal their intentions in this crucial early stage. 
Successful integration is essential to M&A success and the firm’s ability to create value, though it 
seems that disregarding a nonmarket approach in the pre-negotiation phase can ensure failure in 
later post-merger phases (Cording et al., 2014). 
 We argue that previous research overlooking stakeholder maximization in favor of a 
shareholder expense approach has contributed to this. By applying IST early in the pre-
announcement phase, investigating potential synergies with high CSR performing firms signals not 
only to investors, but to all stakeholders in the bidder and target firm, that the acquirer has identified 
areas of concern that could potentially cause problems in future phases. Cultural barriers, 
specifically in cross-border mergers can be an issue for the acquiring firm, and therefore aligning 
CSR policies and practices is one way to create trust in the M&A process.  
However, fully integrating an IST approach comes at a cost (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2014), 





weighing, and addressing conflicting demands (Reynolds, Schultz and Hekman, 2006) might be 
viewed as increased risk to M&A activity. Arguments put forward concern the over allocation of 
economic and managerial resources, redirecting value away from shareholders. However, the 
positive outcomes of stakeholder engagement within the context of M&A corporate strategy, 
outside of shareholders, has been scarcely addressed.   
Figure 4.1. summarizes our proposed hypotheses, which we have developed to investigate 
how firms’ involvement in CSiR impacts their corporate investment decisions and how corporate 
reputation and CPA moderate this relationship. 





























4.3.1 CSiR and M&A announcements  
Firms engaging in M&As may do so for a variety of reasons, such as asset-seeking, 
increased market power, and financial diversification (Capron and Guillen, 2009). In the previous 
section we questioned how these M&A motivations are mainly centered around financial 
reasoning, highlighting how this one-sided approach can contribute to their high failure rate. While 
we agree that synergistic opportunities through financial, operational, strategic, and cultural 
cooperation are all legitimate factors for firm growth, we suggest that other factors may motivate 
firms to engage in this type of strategic action. Specifically, we propose that firms may use M&A 
announcements as a means of deflection or distraction after CSiR incidents have occurred.  
M&As have been described as a mechanism for firm survival where firms will seek new 
opportunities in times of uncertainty (Capron and Guillen, 2009). Involvement in CSiR is one 
mechanism that can be a major source of firm disruption, pushing firms to find innovative solutions 
that signal to investors and other stakeholders their ability to overcome these incidents. Based on 
signaling theory (Spence, 1973), we suggest that firms will continue to pursue M&As where serious 
CSiR has occurred to distract attention from prior bad behavior.  
The assumption of signaling theory is that information is not dispersed equally between all 
parties involved in specific transactions (Spence, 2002). Previous research suggests decision 
makers send signals that relay information concerning firm actions (e.g. investment decisions) to 
receivers (e.g. target firms, investors), who use this information to determine the viability of the 
proposed transaction (Reuer et al., 2012). The value of this information differs between the acquirer 
and target firms, as due to information asymmetry one party will have superior knowledge over the 





the acquirer firm may withhold important information concerning past actions, or simply use the 
M&A as a way to signal to stakeholders that it has come out of the CSiR event relatively unscathed.  
Consequently, we follow a similar logic to the research conducted by Haleblian, Pfarrer, 
and Kiley, (2017), whose results empirically supported that firms with high reputations will on 
average have a higher rate of M&As to maintain investors’ high expectations of growth and value 
creation. Nonetheless, this may be viewed as artificially boosting reputation by pursuing strategic 
actions that could harm the firm at a later date. As firms engage in mergers to maintain reputation, 
the long-term success rate of this strategy remains uncertain. While boosting reputation and 
distraction strategies may have some short-term performance benefits, the resulting fallout from 
abandoning M&As could have serious repercussions, such as significant legal fees and a 
considerable waste of resources (Zhou, Xie and Wang, 2016).     
Significant empirical research has shown that firms receive a short-term boost in share price 
during the announcement phase of an M&A, usually by analyzing 5-day cumulative abnormal 
returns (Asquith, 1983; Cho and Ahn, 2017; Faccio, et al., 2006; Masulis et al., 2007; Mitchell and 
Stafford, 2000). Positive investor reaction is based on their perception of the firm’s ability to secure 
future cash flow (Groening and Kanuri, 2013). But these presumed short-term financial gains that 
send a positive signal that imbue investor confidence in firm actions may be misleading. In the 
event of CSiR, the signal of confidence can be misconstrued by both investors and nonmarket 
stakeholders, thus reducing the strength of the signal that firms intend to send. CSiR consequently 
distorts the signal that firms seek to convey, which ultimately destroys trust and damages 
stakeholder relations (Connelly et al., 2011). We argue that firms may use M&A announcements 





the repercussions of the irresponsible behavior for the firm and the impact that it has had on its 
ability to grow. Therefore, we hypothesize that: 
Hypothesis 1: Corporate social irresponsibility is positively associated with the total 
number of M&A announcements. 
4.3.2 CSiR and M&A announcements in developing countries   
Cross-border M&As are a popular form of international expansion as firms seek new ways 
to improve performance in an increasingly competitive business environment (Erel et al., 2012; 
Zhu, Ma, Sauerwald and Peng, 2019). However, the value that firms gain from these transactions 
is unclear, particularly in developing countries that may have high entry barriers that hamper the 
process (Li, Li and Wang, 2016; Lebedev, Peng, Xie and Stevens, 2015; Shimizu et al., 2004). 
Although we acknowledge there are alternative entry modes into foreign countries like joint 
ventures and greenfield ventures, our focus remains on M&As as a tool of foreign expansion 
(Buckley, Yu, Liu, Munjal, and Tao 2016; Deng and Yang, 2015; Dikova and Brouthers, 2016; 
Shimizu et al., 2004).  
We argue that firms’ involvement in CSiR—either intentional or accidental—exposes them 
to serious repercussions, legal challenges and loss of investor confidence (Koh, Qian and Wang, 
2014; Lin-Hi and Blumberg, 2012; Lin-Hi and Müller, 2013; Price and Sun, 2017). As a result, 
they may look for alternative solutions to avoid this reoccurring and investing in developing 
countries with weaker institutional frameworks could be one of them. In an era of intense 
globalization, the ability of firms to move across geographic markets may seem a simple choice, 
yet this is fraught with issues. Along with different economic and cultural differences, firms will 





firms to relocate to developing countries, we apply an institution-based view to assess how different 
institutional frameworks affect firm operations (Peng, 2002, 2003; Peng, Sun, Pinkham and Chen, 
2009).  
Institutions make up formal (regulations, laws, property rights, economic and political 
markets) and informal (norms, culture and ethics) rules that structure the political, economic and 
social environments where firms operate (North, 1990). Firms may see developing economies as a 
route for short-term means of value creation where environmental uncertainty is high (Peng, 2003). 
We use cross-border M&As to determine if firms seek opportunities to deploy assets, practices and 
resources to locations where weaker institutional framework may provide less scrutiny of firm 
behavior (Anand and Singh, 1997; Capron and Guillen, 2009; Surroca et al., 2013).       
In times of environmental uncertainty firms will by necessity adjust their strategic format 
and look at alternative sources to divert threats to operating practices (Cantwell, Dunning, and 
Lundan, 2010). Yet, while significant research covers financial performance as motivations, there 
is a relative lack of research on cross-border M&As as an ‘escape response’ to pressures in the 
home location of firms (Oliver, 1991; Surroca et al., 2013; Witt and Lewin, 2007). We anticipate 
that firms will increase its announcements of M&As in developing countries as an avoidance tactic 
where firms are facing serious consequences due to CSiR. Developed economy firms are 
increasingly engaging in cross-border M&As located in developing economies (Graham, Martey 
and Yawson, 2008). Firms will enter a new location to access facilities, low cost labor, and supply 
chains already established by the target firm. This ensures that firms circumvent many access 
issues, helping firms reduce costs and gain easier access to resources (Jackson and Deeg, 2008).  
Moving into developing economies is viewed as a major opportunity to exploit new markets 





conditions, rules and customs; or implement their own structures and operations, leveraging their 
own significant resources to pressure host country firms to adapt (Peng, 2003). Nonetheless, firms 
looking to invest in developing economies to avoid scrutiny will be met with suspicion as these 
locations are open to exploitation (Xie et al., 2017). We highlight this as an important factor in this 
thesis as we seek to understand how CSiR is a deciding factor for firm’s external growth strategies. 
Firms may look to increase their presence in developing countries to escape perceived restrictive 
legislation and regulation (Lewin and Witt, 2007), tax avoidance (Gul, Khedmati and Shams, in 
press), or access to cheap labor (Chen et al., 2019).  
Following from the above arguments, we expect that firms involved in CSiR increase the 
number of M&As that they announce in developing countries, whose institutions may be more 
indulgent than those of developed countries, and thus suggest that: 
Hypothesis 2: Corporate social irresponsibility is positively associated with the number 
of M&A announcements in developing countries. 
4.3.3 The moderating effect of corporate political activity 
 Having established that firms have several motives for engaging in M&A activity, such as 
the escape response previously discussed, we now seek to understand how a firm’s political 
strategies moderates the relationship between CSiR and the number of announced M&As. It is a 
well-established fact that firms participate in corporate political activities (CPA) with the goal of 
influencing government policies in their favor (Aggarwal et al., 2012; Baron, 1995; Faccio, 2006; 
Hillman and Hitt, 1999; Lawton, McGuire, Rajwani 2013; Schuler, Rehbein and Cramer, 2002).  
 Investments like M&As make up one of the most crucial strategic choices that firms can 





embarking on M&As will need to account for the costs and risks involved and ensure that the 
appropriate level of support from all stakeholder groups is provided. Combining the resources of 
two firms is a complicated process, and in many cases appropriate regulatory approval is needed 
(Clougherty, 2005; Holburn and Vanden Bergh, 2014). Yet the political process involved in these 
corporate transactions has scarcely been researched. This is an important aspect for both domestic 
and cross-border M&As since regulatory bodies in both the home and host location can delay or 
object the proposed M&A. Government interference, where legislators highlight areas of concern 
to their own constituents during M&A announcements are a threat to the successful outcome of 
M&A activity. Potential job losses, scaling back assets, and corporate restructuring are areas of 
concern that encourage firms to partake in political activity to preempt potential backlash from 
politicians (Capron, 1999; Croci et al., 2017). These issues ensure that firms engage with the 
appropriate legislators and politicians to find a suitable solution for all stakeholders involved. 
However, firms seeking to sway government policies in their favor at the expense of important 
nonmarket stakeholders will generally attract negative attention (Croci et al., 2013).  
 We would anticipate a negative reaction to this process when firms seek to invest in 
developing countries as an escape mechanism due to CSiR, Research shows both positive and 
negative outcomes where firms use lobbying strategies. There is extensive literature detailing the 
dark side connected to it (Hadani and Schuler, 2013; Werner, 2017). Nonetheless, it can also benefit 
companies. For instance, Ridge, Ingram and Hill (2017) provide examples of firms in heavily 
regulated sectors such as aerospace and defense, which engage in extensive lobbying to obtain 
government contracts and corporate tax breaks in return.  
We argue that firm lobbying activities will negatively affect the relationship between 





agencies who receive the financial contribution, and in most cases stakeholders outside of this 
primary group will see little or no benefit (Werner, 2017). Where CSiR has occurred, stakeholder 
groups who may already have suffered consequences due to the firm’s irresponsible behavior can 
introduce measures to disrupt potential M&As. Excessive lobbying donations can further enhance 
the negative response from nonmarket stakeholders given the “dark” connotations often associated 
to them. Where firms need cooperation from all stakeholders for M&As to succeed, lobbying 
activities can further alienate important groups (Waddock and Graves, 2006).  
 Where CSiR has occurred, firms may be tempted to increase the number of political 
donations as an insurance mechanism to avoid potential restrictions of proposed M&As. However, 
this greatly depends on the strength of the formal and informal institutions in place in the home 
and host country where the proposed M&A takes place. While political donations in the United 
States is an accepted and legal practice (Hadani and Schuler, 2013), it may be viewed as bribery in 
other locations (Keig, Brouthers and Marshall, 2015). Either way, lobbying activity can create a 
negative reaction from stakeholders and signal to investors that the firm is unable to adequately 
respond to issues relating to firm performance by itself. For this reason, we propose the following 
hypothesis: 
Hypothesis 3: Lobbying expenditure negatively moderates the relationship between 
corporate social irresponsibility and M&A announcements 
4.3.4 The moderating effect of corporate reputation 
 Besides CPA, in this chapter we also seek to understand whether and how corporate 
reputation affects the relationship between CSiR and M&A announcements. Although scholars 





(Love and Kraatz, 2009). Reputation is increasingly referred to as a strategic resource which firms 
invest in to protect and enhance (Barney, 1991; Roberts and Dowling, 2002; Love and Kraatz, 
2009), as it provides them with the ability to charge premium prices, access scarce resources, 
enhance performance, and increase employee retention, customer satisfaction and brand loyalty 
(Chun, 2005; Barnett, Jermier and Lafferty, 2006; Fombrun, Gardberg and Barnett, 2000; Lange, 
Lee and Dai, 2011). Firms engage in specific behavior to essentially build reputational capital, 
which can protect them against future bad behavior (Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Godfrey, 2005; 
Wang and Qian, 2011). Recent research has begun to explore how firms use reputation to avoid 
scrutiny and deflect attention from actions that may be perceived as harmful to stakeholders (Muller 
and Kräussl, 2011). Nevertheless, firm reputation is fragile, subject to change and can be easily 
tarnished through irresponsible firm actions (Fombrun et al., 2000).  
Reputation is built on firm past actions that affect their stakeholder groups (Fombrun and 
Shanley, 1990). The perception of key stakeholders is then used to measure the success of a firm’s 
reputation, based on how well it responds to the demands and expectations of key stakeholder 
groups (Lange et al., 2011; Morsing and Schultz, 2006; Wartick, 2002). Stakeholder perception is 
therefore a key mechanism to maintaining a high-profile reputation, ensuring the necessity of firms 
to take an instrumental approach to its stakeholder relations. CSR is one mechanism that firms use 
to signal to stakeholders their good intentions by investing in resources that demonstrates a firm’s 
commitment and builds goodwill (Brammer and Pavelin, 2005; Campbell et al., 2012). However, 
the core of an IST approach to stakeholder relations is building trust to form these relationships. 
Therefore, engaging in CSiR actions sends mixed signals to stakeholders as these actions are 





Based on signaling theory, firms will ‘signal’ their good intentions through CSR actions 
and will build long-term stakeholder relations, thus enhancing their reputation (Goyal, 2006). 
Additionally, socially responsible firms can attract investors and reduce information asymmetry 
between them and their stakeholders. Viewed as more transparent with their actions, continued 
engagement with stakeholders’ further signals a firm’s intentions of future compliance and 
legitimacy (Miller, Eden, and Li, 2018).  
Depending on the actions that firms take to build their reputation, stakeholder perception 
can impact on its success or failure (Riordan, Gatewood, and Bill, 1997). Firms with a high CSR 
reputation may find themselves incurring more severe consequences when involved in 
irresponsible behaviors (Maon, Vanhamme, De Roeck, Lindgreen and Swaen, 2019). We argue 
here that high reputation as a measure of success can be misleading for stakeholders. Reputation is 
closely linked to firm performance. As such, if firms are viewed as financially successful, this is 
often misconstrued as a performance measure equating reputation with innovation, ethical practices 
and social and environmental responsibility (Brown and Perry, 1994; Love and Kraatz, 2009; 
Pfeffer, 2016). Consequently, when CSiR occurs this sends conflicting signals to nonmarket 
stakeholders, as equating financial success often overlooks other important mechanisms affecting 
corporate performance.  
Empirical measures of good reputation such as Fortune’s Worlds Most Admired Companies 
(WMAC) survey is evidence of this. The survey, based on financial success is completed by 
industry peers that are seen as prioritizing financial outcomes ahead of other important indicators 
(Chun, 2005). This can distort the results as the survey may seem biased and raises expectations of 
better behavior than the firm is willing to provide, as financial success is used to overcompensate 





reputation as a barometer of good performance. Firms may buy moral capital through enhanced 
CSP programs to build reputation, deflecting attention from bad behavior. Firms’ announcements 
of their ‘good deeds’ to overshadow news surrounding firm bad behavior gives merit to the ‘give 
more, spill more’ concept. They would therefore rely on information asymmetry across different 
nonmarket stakeholders who may be unaware of prior CSiR actions.  
In strategy and IB literature the concept of reputational capital has produced interesting 
results, we look to extend this by investigating this concept further, analyzing its usefulness after 
CSiR occurs (Godfrey, 2005). We see how firms have used the nonmarket environment to their 
advantage through lobbying and responsible initiatives to build up reputational capital with 
stakeholders (Rodriguez, Siegel, Hillman and Eden, 2006). Significant literature has studied the 
effects of these nonmarket factors on financial performance (Barnett and Salomon, 2006; Brammer 
and Millington, 2008), access to finance (Cheng, Ioannou and Serafeim, 2014), and shareholder 
reactions (Flammer, 2013). However, we now see scholars begin to address the role that non-
financial performance plays in a nonmarket context. Brammer and Pavelin (2005) stated that 
increasing corporate social investment will act as a form of moral capital and can prevent 
stakeholder retaliation where CSiR has occurred. Meanwhile, Godfrey et al. (2009) described the 
benefits of CSR activities to buy goodwill with stakeholders as insurance against negative events. 
Though this work did not prove that CSR increases firm value, the authors discussed that 
reputational capital would preserve firm value in times of crisis. Using CSR and firm reputation to 
reduce risk also works towards preserving shareholder wealth. 
Nevertheless, there is a downside to using reputation as insurance. As we highlighted in the 
previous chapter, CSR literature tends to be categorized as ‘firms doing well by doing good’, yet 





Luo et al. (2018) provided empirical support of firms engaging in strategic action that is reputation 
enhancing, while simultaneously being involved in CSiR. Using the oil industry as an example, 
this research shows that firms will purposely invest in CSR to build a form of insurance for future 
CSiR events. However, questions remain surrounding the cost and benefits of this strategy. While 
this may be necessary for ‘sinful industries’ (Cai, Jo, and Pan, 2012), there is a limit on how long 
firms may use this strategy. Shiu and Yang (2017) provided empirical results showing how 
reputational capital begins to lose value as the number of CSiR that the firm is involved in increase. 
Though investment in this type of strategic action may protect shareholder wealth through long-
term CSR engagement, relationships with other nonmarket stakeholders could be damaged. These 
tactics could be viewed as diverting resources away from other necessary causes, leading to 
potential retaliation. Indeed, firms may feel complacent with this form of reputational insurance 
and could cut back measures that are in place to protect nonmarket stakeholders.  
In the early pre-negotiation phase where investigations are carried out to assess the 
suitability of each transaction, different stakeholder groups outline their objectives to each stated 
merger (Parvinen and Tikkanen, 2007). Performance improvement, value creation, and increased 
competitiveness are generally the most commonly associated goals behind these corporate actions. 
However, if firms were to use M&As announcements as a distraction from previous behavior, this 
would endanger the more traditional objectives being met, threatening successful M&A outcomes. 
But using corporate reputation as an insurance mechanism could convince targets to partake in the 
M&A as well as signal to investors the firm’s ability to adapt to crisis situations, earning approval 
from shareholders, thereby increasing investment. Consequently, we expect that: 
Hypothesis 4: Corporate reputation positively moderates the relationship between corporate 





4.4 Methodology  
In this chapter we examine the impact of CSiR on the number of announced M&As as well 
as the moderating effects of lobbying expenditures and corporate reputation. To do so, we use a 
sample of S&P 500 firms over a period of 11 years (2007 to 2017).6 In the following subsections 
we elaborate on the variables, data sources, and econometric technique chosen to perform the 
empirical analysis. 
4.4.1 Variables 
4.4.1 Dependent variable 
The key dependent variable is the number of announced M&As. We have gathered the data 
to build this variable from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions database. Prior 
research on M&As has used this database to investigate both domestic and cross-border 
transactions (e.g. Dikova, Sahib and van Witteloostuijn, 2009; Faccio and Masulis, 2005; Zhou, 
Xie and Wang, 2016), some even within the nonmarket context (e.g. Atkas et al., 2011; Croci et 
al., 2017).   
We collected a sample of M&As announced between January 1, 2007 and December 31, 
2017 in which the bidder was a firm indexed in the S&P 500. This search we produced a sample 
of 11,024 M&A deals. Figure 4.2. shows the yearly distribution of said deals. Although there is a 
slight decrease in the number of announced M&As after the 2008 financial crisis, the numbers are 
quite constant across the years considered in the study. 
 
6 We use the same sample to perform our analysis in Chapters 3 and 4. We have thus refrained from providing a 
description of the sample in this subsection to avoid redundancies. For a more detailed explanation, please refer to the 















Variations in the number of announced M&A deals are more evident across industries. As 
Figure 4.3. illustrates, most of them belong to the 1) manufacturing and 2) finance, insurance and 
real estate industries, with over 3,800 and 2,800 announced M&As, respectively. The numbers in 
the latter may have been driven by the consolidation efforts of financial services firms that took 
place during the 2008 financial crisis. At the other extreme, we find firms in construction and 














































We created a second dependent variable from the information on announced M&As to test 
our second hypothesis, which suggests a positive relationship between CSiR and the number of 
announced M&A deals in developing countries. We therefore specify this second dependent 
variable as the count of M&A deals that the bidder (one of the S&P 500 firms included in our 
sample) has announced with a target located in a developing country.7 We used data from the 
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD)8 and the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF)9 to discern which countries are ‘developing’ (as opposed to ‘developed’). 
We only included in this category those countries listed by both organizations as being less 
developed. Table 4.1. provides a list of countries included in each category. 
 
7 We gathered the data on the location of the announced M&A deal from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and 
Acquisitions database. 
8 Data retrieved from: 
https://unctadstat.unctad.org/en/classifications.html#:~:text=Development%20status%20groups,Trade%20and%20D
evelopment%20in%201964. (Last accessed July 30, 2020). 
9 Data retrieved from: https://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2018/02/weodata/groups.htm (Last accessed July 30, 
2020).  




Transportation and public utilities
Wholesale trade
Retail trade







Table 4.1. Classification of countries according to their level of development.10 
 
10 Baseline list of countries extracted from the IMF website:  
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The pie chart in Figure 4.4. shows the distribution of announced M&A deals in our sample 
by location. It can be observed that the percentage of home country deals is slightly higher than 
that of foreign deals (57% versus 43%). Among the foreign deals, developing economies have 
attracted a higher percentage of announced M&As from the firms in our sample than more 
developed locations. 











4.4.2 Independent variable 
The independent variable in this chapter is the number of CSiR events that the firm has 
been involved in during year t. As mentioned already in Chapter 3,11 we created a CSiR database 
by collecting and coding media publications mainly included in the LexisNexis directory. We used 
the following keywords to identify the relevant news items: accus*; boycott; fine*; fraud; guilty; 
 
11 For a more detailed description of the data gathering and codification, please refer to the Methodology section 
included in Chapter 3. 
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harass*; irresponsible; jail; lawsuit; legal proceedings; misconduct; product recall; scandal; sue*; 
unethical, violat*. We complemented this information gathering process with a more generic 
Internet search to verify that we were not overlooking any additional instances of CSiR.  
4.4.3 Moderating variables 
Corporate Political Activity (CPA). We proxy the CPA of the firm by its total lobbying 
expenditures. Following Croci et al.’s (2017) paper on CPA in the M&A context, we obtained the 
data from the Centre for Responsive Politics (opensecrets.org).  
Corporate reputation. We define this variable as a dummy that takes the value of 1 if the 
firm is listed in Fortune’s World’s Most Admired Companies12 in year t and 0 otherwise. This list 
is a widely used proxy of corporate reputation in the strategic management literature (e.g. Fombrun 
and Shanley, 1990; Barchiesi and Fronzetti Colladon, in press; McDonnell and King, 2013; Staw 
and Epstein, 2000; Tetrault, Sirsly and Lvina, 2019). According to the methodology posted on their 
website, Fortune collaborates with management consulting firm Korn Ferry to determine the best-
regarded companies in 52 industries. To do so, “Korn Ferry asks executives, directors, and analysts 
to rate enterprises in their own industry on nine criteria, from investment value and quality of 
management and products to social responsibility and ability to attract talent. A company’s score 
must rank in the top half of its industry survey to be listed”.13 
4.4.4 Control variables 
In this chapter we also introduced some control variables that may affect the number of 
announced M&As to rule out alternative explanations of our findings. First, we controlled for firm 
 
12 https://fortune.com/worlds-most-admired-companies/ (Last accessed July 30, 2020). 






size (measured as the total number of employees). Because firms’ financial structure, profitability 
and growth prospects can also affect whether they announce a new M&A, we also controlled for 
their leverage (long-term debt to total assets); return on assets (ROA); and Tobin’s q, calculated 
using Chung and Pruitt’s formula (1994)14. We retrieved the data to build these variables from 
COMPUSTAT, the companies’ annual reports and the SEC website. 
Additionally, we added several control variables related to the CSiR events included in the 
analysis:15 type of CSiR (fraud, bribery and corruption, competition, environment, discrimination, 
product safety, human rights, and other); as well as dummies reflecting whether the firm had been 
fined or boycotted as a result of the CSiR event, and whether the CSiR issue was still outstanding 
at the end of the study’s timeframe. We also controlled for the reach of the articles found in terms 
of readership numbers and geographic range and severity of the consequences of the CSiR event.16 
The following bullet points summarize the definition of the two measures: 
• Reach: sum of the reach of the CSiR events in year t. Each event is codified as follows: 0 
= no CSiR event; 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high. 
• Severity: sum of the severity of the CSiR events in year t. Each event is codified as follows: 
0 = no CSiR event; 1 = low; 2 = medium; 3 = high. 
Finally, we added a dummy taking the value of 1 if there is a right-wing party governing 
the State where the firm is headquartered and 0 otherwise, and industry and year dummies. 
 
14 Tobin’s q = 
𝑀𝑉𝐸+𝑃𝑆+𝐷𝐸𝐵𝑇
𝑇𝐴
; where MVE = market value;  PS = liquidation value of the outstanding preferred stock; 
DEBT = short-term liabilities net of short-term assets plus book value of any long-term debt; and TA = book value of 
total assets. 
15 We created all the control variables outlined in this paragraph based on our unique CSiR database. 
16 The reach and severity variables come from Chapter 3, which includes a more detailed description of each of them. 





4.4.5 Descriptive statistics 
Table 4.2. features the correlations and descriptive statistics of the key variables included 
in the analyses of this chapter. All our variables include one lag except for the dependent variables. 
We did so to alleviate potential reverse causality concerns and to better capture the effect of CSiR 
on the number of announced M&As (Wan and Hoskisson, 2003). Following Jaccard and Turrisi 
(2003), we mean-centered the main effect (i.e. CSiR) as well as the continuous moderating variable 
(i.e. lobbying expenditures) prior to calculating the interaction terms to prevent any high 
correlations between them. Although most of the pairwise correlations that appear on the table are 
low (below 0.5) except for some linked to reach and severity (>0.8). Nonetheless, our results are 






Table 4.2. Descriptive statistics and correlations. 
  Mean S.D. Min Max 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 
1 Number of announced M&As 3.04 4.64  0.00 50.00 1.00        
2 Number of announced M&As (developing) 0.50 1.36  0.00 23.00 0.69 1.00       
3 CSiR 0.00 0.32 -0.09 2.91 0.12 0.10 1.00      
4 Lobbying expenditures 0.02 3.93 -2.65 42.86 0.29 0.20 0.16 1.00     
5 Corporate reputation 0.11 0.31 0.00 1.00 0.32 0.25 0.12 0.29 1.00    
6 Size 69.54 155.71 0.09 2300.00 0.19 0.19 0.04 0.22 0.40 1.00   
7 Leverage 0.23 0.16 0.00 1.65 -0.13 -0.09 -0.04 -0.08 -0.10 -0.02 1.00  
8 ROA 4.87 13.38 -548.44 76.91 0.05 0.02 -0.02 0.04 0.08 0.05 -0.12 1.00 
9 Tobin's q 1.58 0.95 0.07 7.70 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.08 0.19 0.06 0.03 0.28 
10 Party ruling the State 0.77 0.42 0.00 1.00 0.13 0.08 -0.01 0.06 0.04 0.06 -0.02 0.01 
11 Fraud 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.12 0.11 0.49 0.05 0.05 0.02 -0.04 -0.03 
12 Bribery and corruption 0.02 0.13 0.00 1.00 0.05 0.03 0.44 0.07 0.00 0.01 -0.03 -0.01 
13 Competition 0.02 0.15 0.00 1.00 0.06 0.03 0.53 0.08 0.08 0.00 0.01 0.01 
14 Environment 0.01 0.11 0.00 1.00 -0.01 0.02 0.39 0.13 0.04 0.04 -0.01 -0.02 
15 Discrimination 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.17 0.00 0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
16 Product safety 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.00 0.26 0.06 0.03 0.01 -0.02 0.02 
17 Human rights 0.00 0.06 0.00 1.00 0.00 0.01 0.20 0.00 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.03 
18 Fined 0.01 0.07 0.00 1.00 0.01 -0.00 0.26 0.07 0.06 0.02 0.00 -0.00 
19 Boycott 0.00 0.05 0.00 1.00 -0.00 0.01 0.14 0.02 0.06 0.02 0.01 0.02 
20 Outstanding 0.01 0.11 0.00 2.00 0.02 0.03 0.35 0.04 0.08 -0.00 -0.01 0.02 
21 Reach 0.20 0.70 0.00 3.00 0.11 0.10 0.91 0.15 0.10 0.03 -0.04 -0.01 








  9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 
9 Tobin's q 1.00              
10 Party ruling the State 0.09 1.00             
11 Fraud -0.06 -0.02 1.00            
12 Bribery and corruption -0.03 -0.02 0.00 1.00           
13 Competition 0.04 0.03 -0.01 0.06 1.00          
14 Environment -0.03 -0.05 -0.02 0.04 0.05 1.00         
15 Discrimination -0.03 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 0.04 -0.01 1.00        
16 Product safety 0.06 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 0.02 -0.01 -0.01 1.00       
17 Human rights 0.09 0.00 -0.01 -0.01 0.03 -0.01 -0.00 -0.01 1.00      
18 Fined 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.03 0.20 0.27 -0.00 0.11 -0.00 1.00     
19 Boycott 0.08 0.01 0.10 0.06 0.05 -0.01 -0.00 0.09 -0.00 -0.00 1.00    
20 Outstanding 0.04 -0.05 0.10 0.24 0.13 0.14 0.11 0.11 0.28 -0.01 0.14 1.00   
21 Reach 0.01 -0.02 0.51 0.40 0.48 0.34 0.14 0.27 0.21 0.20 0.18 0.32 1.00  










4.5 Analytical Procedure 
Our dependent variable of the number of announced M&As is non-negative and integer 
valued. Following Cameron and Trivedi (2013), we ran overdispersion tests to choose between a 
Poisson or a negative binomial— the two most suitable model specifications for this type of 
dependent variable. The test rejected the null hypothesis of no overdispersion. Hence, we favored 
the negative binomial specification. Specifically, we used generalized estimating equation (GEE) 
population-averaged negative binomial models with an exchangeable correlation structure and 
robust standard errors. We favored this analytical procedure over random and fixed-effects 
specifications because it is efficient and accounts for unobserved heterogeneity (Krishnan and 
Kozhikode, 2015). 
4.6 Results 
Tables 4.3. and 4.4. report the GEE negative binomial regression results derived from our 
analysis. The final sample includes 2,592 observations pertaining to 304 firms. The main reasons 
that we lose observations are either a lack of available data or because firms disappear by ceasing 
their activity or getting delisted during the study timeframe. Nonetheless, the missing observation 
are non-systematic and, therefore, we do not anticipate any bias in our results. 
The dependent variable in Table 4.3. is defined as the number of announced M&As. Model 
I is the baseline model that includes the control variables only. Model II adds the main effect (i.e. 
CSiR) as well as the moderating variables (i.e. lobbying expenditures and corporate reputation). 
Models III and IV also account for the each of the interaction effects of CSiR. Finally, Model V 





Table 4.3. GEE negative binomial regressions predicting the count of announced M&As. 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 
      
CSiR  -0.292 -0.113 -0.571*** -0.397** 
  (0.134) (0.589) (0.002) (0.039) 
Lobbying expenditures  0.049*** 0.051*** 0.048*** 0.051*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Corporate reputation  0.561*** 0.563*** 0.543*** 0.538*** 
  (0.004) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005) 
CSiR*Lobbying expenditures   -0.016  -0.027** 
   (0.135)  (0.024) 
CSiR*Corporate reputation    0.293** 0.419*** 
    (0.019) (0.002) 
Size 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.002) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Leverage -1.256*** -0.879*** -0.867*** -0.877*** -0.855*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
ROA 0.013** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 0.013*** 
 (0.024) (0.009) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
Tobin’s q 0.097 0.058 0.058 0.057 0.057 
 (0.147) (0.331) (0.327) (0.336) (0.333) 
Party ruling the state 0.368*** 0.338*** 0.335*** 0.339*** 0.336*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.001) (0.000) (0.001) 
Fraud 0.412* 0.718** 0.563* 0.915*** 0.748** 
 (0.068) (0.020) (0.074) (0.002) (0.012) 
Bribery and corruption 0.131 0.482* 0.334 0.721*** 0.583** 
 (0.525) (0.066) (0.226) (0.009) (0.038) 
Competition 0.478** 0.722** 0.568* 0.913*** 0.749** 
 (0.018) (0.013) (0.058) (0.001) (0.012) 
Environment 0.133 0.472 0.332 0.724* 0.602 
 (0.617) (0.210) (0.369) (0.054) (0.105) 
Discrimination 0.378 0.821** 0.671* 1.076*** 0.928** 
 (0.331) (0.034) (0.088) (0.007) (0.023) 
Product safety 0.274 0.569 0.418 0.799** 0.652* 
 (0.353) (0.114) (0.242) (0.028) (0.064) 
Human rights 0.056 0.432 0.236 0.607* 0.368 
 (0.847) (0.211) (0.504) (0.072) (0.290) 
Fined -0.009 -0.040 -0.022 -0.063 -0.052 
 (0.977) (0.914) (0.951) (0.872) (0.888) 
Boycott -0.372 -0.333 -0.362 -0.350 -0.409 
 (0.336) (0.314) (0.293) (0.282) (0.236) 
Outstanding 0.128 -0.030 -0.004 -0.139 -0.150 
 (0.526) (0.874) (0.981) (0.416) (0.350) 
Reach -0.021 -0.026 -0.026 -0.017 -0.015 
 (0.811) (0.781) (0.781) (0.854) (0.877) 
Severity 0.005 -0.066 -0.066 -0.077 -0.080 




Constant 0.301 0.412** 0.422** 0.393** 0.401** 
 (0.134) (0.038) (0.034) (0.047) (0.043) 
      
Industry and year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Wald 𝜒2 376.22*** 469.59*** 460.82*** 553.53*** 582.03*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,592 
Number of firms 304 304 304 304 304 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Contrary to the proposed positive relationship between CSiR and the number of M&As 
announced by the firm in H1, our results show a negative relationship between these two variables 
(even if it is not constant across all models). This seems to suggest that CSiR is punished in the 
M&A context, either because of the difficulties of finding a partner or because of financial 
restrictions derived from the event (e.g. payment of fines, payments to victims, lower sales). 
Interestingly, the results support our expected relationships in H3 and H4. In line with H3, lobbying 
expenditures negatively moderates the relationship between CSiR and the number of announced 
M&As (β = -0.027; p-value = 0.024). And consistent with H4, corporate reputation positively 
moderates the aforementioned relationship (β = 0.419; p-value = 0.002). 
Figures 4.5. and 4.6. provide a graphical illustration of the above results. In Figure 4.5., it 
can be observed that firms with no CSiR are more prone to announce new M&As. However, as 






















Figure 4.6. also reflects some interesting findings around the moderating effect of corporate 
reputation, defined as a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if the firm is listed in Fortune’s 
World’s Most Admired Companies in year t and 0 otherwise. Firms that do not appear on this list 
are less prone to announce new M&As as the number of CSiR events they are involved in 
increases. By contrast, those firms that appear on the list (the ones with the highest corporate 
reputation), not only do not decrease their M&A activity but actually increase it, which could be 




















As for the control variables in this set of regressions, the size and profitability of a firm 
have a positive impact on the number of announced M&As. By contrast, the more indebted the 
firm is, the less likely it will pursue an M&A. It is also interesting to note that some types of CSiR 
events have a positive and significant effect on the number of announced M&As; namely, fraud, 
bribery and corruption, competition, and discrimination. This may suggest that not all CSiR 
instances are punished equally. We shall also mention that firms headquartered in states where the 
Democratic party is in power are more prone to announce new M&As. 
H2 expected a positive relationship between CSiR and the number of M&As announced in 




number of M&As in developing countries as our dependent variable (see Table 4.4). The 
coefficient of the CSiR variable does not have the expected sign, although it is nonsignificant (β = 
-0.241; p-value = 0.448). Therefore, we cannot affirm that CSiR has a positive impact on the 
number of announced M&As in developing countries. 








Lobbying expenditures 0.047*** 
 (0.008) 








Tobin’s q 0.087 
 (0.315) 












Product safety 0.096 
 (0.898) 


















Industry and year dummies Included 
  
Wald 𝜒2 255.96*** 
 (0.000) 
Observations 2,592 
Number of firms 304 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.7 Robustness Checks and Additional Tests 
We ran several additional regressions to both assess the robustness of our findings and shed 
more light on the central research topic of this chapter. First, we checked whether our estimates 
could be affected by reverse causality issues by lagging our independent, moderating and control 
variables two periods instead of one. As shown in Tables 4.5. and 4.6., our results held, which 
suggests reverse causality does not seem to be an issue in our study. 
Table 4.5. GEE negative binomial regressions predicting the count of announced M&As (2 
lags). 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 
      
CSiR  -0.243* 0.314 -0.316** 0.151 
  (0.077) (0.296) (0.016) (0.590) 
Lobbying expenditures  0.048*** 0.052*** 0.048*** 0.052*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Corporate reputation  0.566*** 0.571*** 0.560*** 0.554*** 
  (0.003) (0.003) (0.004) (0.004) 
CSiR*Lobbying expenditures   -0.036***  -0.044*** 
   (0.007)  (0.001) 
CSiR*Corporate reputation    0.111 0.346** 




Size 0.002*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) (0.004) 
Leverage -1.238*** -0.748*** -0.714** -0.748*** -0.707** 
 (0.000) (0.007) (0.011) (0.007) (0.011) 
ROA 0.009 0.008 0.008* 0.008 0.008* 
 (0.129) (0.105) (0.092) (0.103) (0.084) 
Tobin’s q 0.109 0.075 0.075 0.075 0.076 
 (0.100) (0.206) (0.197) (0.205) (0.195) 
Party ruling the state 0.353*** 0.335*** 0.333*** 0.335*** 0.331*** 
 (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fraud 0.533** 0.750** 0.247 0.785*** 0.308 
 (0.042) (0.019) (0.514) (0.010) (0.391) 
Bribery and corruption 0.315 0.680** 0.183 0.740*** 0.314 
 (0.191) (0.016) (0.617) (0.008) (0.367) 
Competition 0.336 0.506* -0.024 0.535* 0.011 
 (0.141) (0.077) (0.948) (0.052) (0.976) 
Environment 0.001 0.284 -0.202 0.344 -0.070 
 (0.997) (0.398) (0.614) (0.292) (0.854) 
Discrimination -0.410 -0.047 -0.638 0.002 -0.564 
 (0.331) (0.903) (0.155) (0.995) (0.189) 
Product safety 0.112 0.430 -0.081 0.489 0.042 
 (0.674) (0.162) (0.824) (0.111) (0.907) 
Human rights 0.573 0.641* 0.134 0.634* 0.056 
 (0.142) (0.091) (0.765) (0.083) (0.895) 
Fined -0.456* -0.574* -0.503 -0.583* -0.514 
 (0.088) (0.088) (0.108) (0.088) (0.108) 
Boycott 0.087 0.090 -0.017 0.093 -0.031 
 (0.777) (0.764) (0.959) (0.763) (0.928) 
Outstanding -0.089 -0.118 -0.124 -0.139 -0.192 
 (0.741) (0.649) (0.628) (0.582) (0.429) 
Reach -0.107 -0.109 -0.094 -0.107 -0.083 
 (0.323) (0.387) (0.427) (0.404) (0.503) 
Severity 0.128 0.069 0.059 0.069 0.057 
 (0.223) (0.544) (0.578) (0.552) (0.600) 
Constant -0.125 -0.028 0.007 -0.032 -0.001 
 (0.546) (0.889) (0.972) (0.875) (0.995) 
      
Industry and year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Wald 𝜒2 320.13*** 468.91*** 413.53*** 647.64*** 507.89*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,319 2,270 2,270 2,270 2,270 
Number of firms 302 297 297 297 297 
pval in parentheses 








Table 4.6. GEE negative binomial regression predicting the count of announced M&As in 







Lobbying expenditures 0.048*** 
 (0.004) 








Tobin’s q 0.113 
 (0.196) 












Product safety 0.010 
 (0.991) 




















Wald 𝜒2 225.62*** 
 (0.000) 
Observations 2,270 
Number of firms 297 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Second, we used an alternative definition of our dependent variable. Instead of the count 
of announced M&As, we introduced the count of effective M&As. Tables 4.7. and 4.8. contain the 
results of our regressions, which are consistent with the ones found in our core analysis.  
Table 4.7. GEE negative binomial regressions predicting the count of effective M&As. 
 
Model I Model II Model III Model IV Model V 
 
      
CSiR  -0.164 0.021 -0.451** -0.279 
  (0.428) (0.925) (0.022) (0.157) 
Lobbying expenditures  0.048*** 0.050*** 0.047*** 0.050*** 
  (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Corporate reputation  0.579*** 0.582*** 0.560*** 0.556*** 
  (0.005) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007) 
CSiR*Lobbying expenditures   -0.018  -0.030** 
   (0.126)  (0.015) 
CSiR*Corporate reputation    0.310** 0.455*** 
    (0.021) (0.001) 
Size 0.003*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.002) 
Leverage -1.121*** -0.753** -0.738** -0.750** -0.723** 
 (0.000) (0.011) (0.014) (0.011) (0.015) 
ROA 0.014** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 0.014*** 
 (0.021) (0.010) (0.009) (0.008) (0.006) 
Tobin’s q 0.086 0.048 0.049 0.047 0.047 
 (0.229) (0.462) (0.455) (0.469) (0.462) 
Party ruling the state 0.398*** 0.367*** 0.364*** 0.368*** 0.364*** 
 (0.000) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) (0.001) 
Fraud 0.407 0.562 0.405 0.746** 0.579* 
 (0.101) (0.104) (0.238) (0.027) (0.077) 
Bribery and corruption 0.240 0.448 0.301 0.686** 0.558* 
 (0.255) (0.124) (0.306) (0.023) (0.062) 
Competition 0.447* 0.566* 0.406 0.754** 0.584* 
 (0.051) (0.087) (0.221) (0.018) (0.069) 
Environment 0.071 0.233 0.106 0.471 0.375 




Discrimination 0.664 0.972** 0.820* 1.224*** 1.082** 
 (0.153) (0.028) (0.068) (0.006) (0.017) 
Product safety 0.322 0.452 0.304 0.673 0.535 
 (0.382) (0.321) (0.492) (0.148) (0.226) 
Human rights 0.233 0.476 0.275 0.644 0.397 
 (0.481) (0.267) (0.517) (0.135) (0.356) 
Fined -0.004 -0.006 0.011 -0.026 -0.016 
 (0.991) (0.989) (0.979) (0.955) (0.970) 
Boycott -0.573 -0.590 -0.623 -0.638* -0.721* 
 (0.267) (0.159) (0.152) (0.085) (0.054) 
Outstanding 0.119 -0.031 -0.006 -0.139 -0.156 
 (0.585) (0.882) (0.978) (0.461) (0.385) 
Reach -0.040 -0.046 -0.044 -0.032 -0.025 
 (0.638) (0.580) (0.588) (0.702) (0.764) 
Severity 0.022 -0.046 -0.047 -0.059 -0.066 
 (0.783) (0.556) (0.534) (0.446) (0.392) 
Constant -0.045 0.078 0.086 0.060 0.064 
 (0.850) (0.744) (0.719) (0.802) (0.788) 
      
Industry and year dummies Included Included Included Included Included 
      
Wald 𝜒2 376.66*** 480.84*** 470.74*** 598.33*** 622.17*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,592 
Number of firms 304 304 304 304 304 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 








Lobbying expenditures 0.040** 
 (0.023) 

























Product safety -0.361 
 (0.687) 















Industry and year dummies Included 
  




Number of firms 304 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Third, we aimed to unpack the nonsignificant effect of the lobbying expenditures 
interaction in Model III of Tables 4.3. and 4.4. To test whether said lobbying expenditures are 
more effective within the US than in foreign locations, we used an alternative definition of our 
dependent variable based on the count of announced and effective M&As in the US (Table 4.9.). 




effect on the count of announced M&As (β = -0.018; p-value = 0.110), it does on the count of 
effective M&As (β = -0.023; p-value = 0.074). This suggests that lobbying expenditures combined 
with CSiR have a more punitive effect on effective M&As than on announced ones. 
Table 4.9. GEE negative binomial regressions predicting the count of announced/effective 







   
CSiR -0.014 0.145 
 (0.943) (0.481) 
Lobbying expenditures 0.055*** 0.057*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Corporate reputation 0.473*** 0.554*** 
 (0.004) (0.003) 
CSiR*Lobbying expenditures -0.018 -0.023* 
 (0.110) (0.074) 
Size 0.001 0.001** 
 (0.106) (0.014) 
Leverage -0.664** -0.559* 
 (0.012) (0.055) 
ROA 0.010** 0.010* 
 (0.046) (0.088) 
Tobin’s q 0.023 0.017 
 (0.715) (0.809) 
Party ruling the state 0.330*** 0.371*** 
 (0.002) (0.002) 
Fraud 0.320 0.147 
 (0.318) (0.680) 
Bribery and corruption 0.321 0.135 
 (0.260) (0.670) 
Competition 0.400 0.231 
 (0.237) (0.518) 
Environment 0.163 0.127 
 (0.609) (0.722) 
Discrimination 0.191 0.437 
 (0.597) (0.248) 
Product safety 0.484 0.360 
 (0.217) (0.468) 
Human rights -0.048 -0.029 
 (0.909) (0.957) 
Fined -0.021 -0.369 




Boycott -0.621 -1.657** 
 (0.255) (0.046) 
Outstanding -0.012 0.057 
 (0.955) (0.804) 
Reach -0.031 -0.019 
 (0.732) (0.849) 
Severity -0.025 -0.035 
 (0.747) (0.691) 
Constant -0.109 -0.368 
 (0.602) (0.118) 
   
Industry and year dummies Included Included 
   
Wald 𝜒2 312.65*** 314.66*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,592 2,592 
Number of firms 304 304 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
Finally, we examined whether there are any differences in the impact of CSiR on M&A 
activity if we include the CSiR track record—accumulated number of CSiR events until year t—
instead of CSiR in year t and 2) and the firm’s M&A experience as the dependent variable; that is, 
the accumulated number of announced and effective M&As of firm i until year t. The findings 
reported in Table 4.10. imply that the expected positive relationship between CSiR and the number 
of announced M&As established in H1 only appears when the firm has a poor CSiR track record 
(β = 0.084; p-value = 0.098). As for the impact of this independent variable on the count of 
effective M&As, it is interesting to note the positive and significant coefficient of the CSiR track 
record variable in Model IV (β = 0.119; p-value = 0.025). This result reveals that those firms 
involved in a higher number of CSiR events within the period of our study also have a higher 






Table 4.10. GEE negative binomial regressions predicting the count of announced/effective 
M&As (CSiR track record as independent variable). 











     
CSiR track record 0.084* 0.134 0.086 0.119** 
 (0.098) (0.157) (0.122) (0.025) 
Lobbying expenditures 0.047*** 0.027 0.046*** 0.044*** 
 (0.000) (0.116) (0.000) (0.002) 
Corporate reputation 0.531*** 0.405** 0.550*** 0.608*** 
 (0.004) (0.027) (0.005) (0.005) 
Size 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.001*** 0.002*** 
 (0.001) (0.002) (0.001) (0.000) 
Leverage -0.873*** -0.702** -0.747** -0.554* 
 (0.001) (0.038) (0.013) (0.065) 
ROA 0.013*** 0.005* 0.014*** 0.005** 
 (0.007) (0.094) (0.008) (0.037) 
Tobin’s q 0.060 0.076 0.050 0.032 
 (0.308) (0.198) (0.439) (0.604) 
Party ruling the state 0.338*** 0.393*** 0.368*** 0.453*** 
 (0.000) (0.004) (0.001) (0.000) 
Fraud 0.332 -0.260 0.298 0.378** 
 (0.138) (0.525) (0.237) (0.036) 
Bribery and corruption 0.092 -0.489 0.182 0.179 
 (0.647) (0.161) (0.388) (0.310) 
Competition 0.348* -0.052 0.309 0.136 
 (0.098) (0.894) (0.189) (0.473) 
Environment 0.090 -0.595 -0.025 -0.149 
 (0.759) (0.179) (0.927) (0.528) 
Discrimination 0.541 -0.125 0.784* 0.188 
 (0.180) (0.790) (0.096) (0.596) 
Product safety 0.179 -0.530 0.171 -0.210 
 (0.542) (0.289) (0.659) (0.433) 
Human rights 0.115 -0.509 0.276 0.021 
 (0.694) (0.240) (0.439) (0.936) 
Fined -0.034 0.174 0.007 0.015 
 (0.927) (0.649) (0.987) (0.964) 
Boycott -0.284 -0.215 -0.536 -0.281 
 (0.405) (0.551) (0.223) (0.388) 
Outstanding -0.057 0.018 -0.060 -0.104 
 (0.760) (0.938) (0.770) (0.644) 
Reach -0.025 0.111 -0.044 -0.104* 
 (0.791) (0.308) (0.604) (0.086) 
Severity -0.077 -0.025 -0.054 0.045 




Constant 0.309 0.142 -0.034 0.777*** 
 (0.116) (0.517) (0.885) (0.002) 
     
Industry and year dummies Included Included Included Included 
     
Wald 𝜒2 500.05*** 374.71*** 502.61*** 2180.30*** 
 (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) 
Observations 2,592 2,592 2,592 2,592 
Number of firms 304 304 304 304 
pval in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
4.8 Discussion  
 In this chapter we set out to examine the impact of CSiR on M&A announcements and 
explore the following: (1) the effect of CSiR on external growth decisions, specifically the 
motivations of firms engaging in domestic and/or cross-border M&As, and (2) the moderating 
effects of lobbying expenditures and corporate reputation. We also performed additional tests to 
prove the robustness of our core results and complement them. We ran our analysis on the same 
sample of S&P 500 firms that we used in Chapter 3, adding information detailing M&A activity 
from the Thomson Financial SDC database.  
 Broadly speaking, our findings suggest that there is a partially significant negative 
relationship between CSiR in a certain year and the number of announced M&As (both domestic 
and cross-border). When focusing on M&A announcements in developing countries, the relation 
between both variables turns non-significant. Interestingly, our findings suggest that where firms 
are involved in a single or ‘one-off’ CSiR event, they will tend to decrease M&A announcements, 
potentially avoiding unnecessary attention to their actions. Nonetheless, our results change when 
we introduce an alternative independent variable that reckons the firm’s CSiR record. Here we 




announcements, possibly because firms will increase their M&A activity to lessen backlash from 
primary and secondary stakeholders. Our results are in line with previous studies by Surroca et al. 
(2013) and Witt and Lewin (2007), which investigated how firms take strategic action to evade 
scrutiny. Adding to this, evidence from our analysis also supports our findings in the previous 
chapter, in which we noted how CPA exacerbates the negative outcomes of CSiR. Furthermore, 
as expected, we find that those firms with a good corporate reputation will announce a higher 
number of M&As than those that do not possess the same recognition in the markets. 
We introduce a nonmarket approach to the M&A literature that is so far noticeably absent. 
Our aim is to extend M&A theory beyond just financial motivation of increasing shareholder 
wealth that has dominated the literature to date. Even though a growing number of scholars is 
trying to unpack the relationship between nonmarket initiatives and M&A activity, there is still a 
lack of research in this area. A changing business environment and a shift towards a more 
stakeholder-based model have important implications for the development of the M&A literature. 
Emerging research shows that a high CSR involvement in acquiring firms helps reduce 
uncertainty, which leads to faster completion times of the M&A process (Arouri et al., 2019). 
Additionally, CSR engagement also increases stronger commitment to stakeholders, reducing the 
likelihood of breaching contracts (Deng et al., 2013). These contributions are important starting 
points linking NMS to the M&A process, yet this needs further investigation. In the previous 
chapter, we discussed how investors and stock analysts are paying more attention to strategic CSR 
to improve financial performance (e.g. Ioannou and Serafeim, 2012). Applying the same logic to 
M&A literature, accounting for social and political activities could offer opportunities for better 




approach, exploring how firms also use the different strands of nonmarket strategy as a form of 
insurance against CSiR behavior.  
Our results support existing studies that associate increased investment in CSR and CPA 
to build reputation insurance. Using Fortune’s WMAC survey to measure corporate reputation, our 
results seem to indicate that high reputation firms will engage in actions aimed at maintaining or 
increasing this high reputation status, thus lending support to the findings by Haleblian et al. (2017) 
and Luo et al. (2018). This once again suggests that highly reputable firms may be engaged in 
actions aimed at deflecting attention from certain behavior, without necessarily addressing the 
actual problem. In this regard, we associate firm visibility and size with high reputation and 
increased levels of stakeholder attention. Highly visible firms are more vulnerable to stakeholder 
sanctions, which means that they will try to control the message regarding their actions, 
specifically where CSiR occurs (Brammer and Millington, 2006).  
The debate in business and society literature is heavily focused on proving the financial 
benefits of socially responsible investments. However, research is turning towards how firms use 
CSR and reputation as a risk management strategy, aimed at ‘insuring’ against negative events 
(Godfrey, 2005; Minor and Morgan, 2011). Indeed, Pfeffer (2016) remarks that certain firms 
involved in high profile CSiR incidents are still consistently ranked as prestigious and high 
performing firms.  The BP Deepwater Horizon environmental disaster that took place in 2010 is 
an illustrative example. Despite its serious financial repercussions and reputational damage, within 
five years of the incident, the company was listed once again as the fifth most profitable oil and 
gas company worldwide17.   
 
17 https://www.forbes.com/sites/rrapier/2016/03/30/the-worlds-largest-public-oil-and-gas-companies/#698f53bd3173 




Theoretically, we also extend signaling theory into the nonmarket domain by highlighting 
how CSiR may distort the message firms wish to convey. By increasing M&A announcements, 
firms will look to divert attention away from CSiR behavior. Pursuing strategies to expand and 
grow operations, these tactics aim to signal to shareholders that the firm has strong financial 
resources, despite the potentially severe consequences from CSiR. While this behavior may ensure 
good relations with some primary stakeholders, this may not be the case with nonmarket 
stakeholders.  
In addition, this chapter extends work by Barnett (2014), who claimed stakeholder attention 
plays a significant role in whether firms are punished for their irresponsible actions. When firms 
look to divert attention from CSiR by engaging in other activities, they are avoiding finding 
solutions to the actual problem and are further damaging stakeholder relations (Kotchen and Moon, 
2012). Therefore, we see that taking an instrumental approach to stakeholder management, being 
open and transparent, communicating a firm’s intentions could possibly offer a longer-term 
solution. All in all, working towards reducing information asymmetry between a firm and its 
stakeholders signals that firms will accept accountability for their actions and be more open when 
dealing with nonmarket stakeholders (Brammer and Millington, 2006; Flammer and Luo, 2017; 
Groening and Kanuri, 2018; Luo et al., 2018).  
4.9 Limitations and Future Research Directions 
 The study presented in this chapter is not without limitations. As mentioned in the previous 
chapter, our sample is restricted to S&P 500 firms, which means that we focus on large US-based 
corporations. Future research could once again examine whether our results hold in other research 




We also see great potential for future research in the intersection of the M&A and 
nonmarket literatures. We have identified an emergent strand of M&A research in a nonmarket 
context that opens up many avenues to explore. One area to consider would be the use of CSR to 
reduce cultural barriers, specifically the liabilities of foreignness and outsidership in cross-border 
M&As. Scholars could investigate how firms can use CSR to reduce barriers in this process. For 
example, by engaging local stakeholders through CSR initiatives prior to or during an M&A 
process. Taking an instrumental stakeholder approach, they could examine potential collaborations 
between acquirer and target firm stakeholders to reduce potential conflicts and enhance synergies, 
both at home and in foreign countries.  
Furthermore, in this chapter we focus on the CSiR behavior of the bidder firm. Future 
studies may also examine the target’s responsible/irresponsible behaviors and political activity 
when unpacking how nonmarket factors impact the M&A process. Although we concentrate on 
the announcement phase, subsequent studies could also examine other stages of the M&A, such 
as integration and post-integration. It would also be interesting to analyze whether CSiR results in 
abandoned deals or divestments.        
Finally, we would encourage researchers to analyze the impact of CSiR and nonmarket 
factors on other methods of growth, such as joint ventures. This could shed more light on the 
aftermath of CSiR by revealing whether and how firms respond to it.  
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5.1 Concluding Remarks  
This thesis has set out to explore the outcomes of corporate social irresponsibility (CSiR). 
We have conducted an extensive empirical analysis to examine the effect of CSiR on 1) financial 
performance; 2) non-financial performance; and 3) external growth decisions. Primarily drawing 
on instrumental stakeholder theory (IST) and signaling theory, we analyzed how firms engage with 
their stakeholders (both primary and secondary) to develop social and political capital to try to 
avoid stakeholder sanctions for CSiR behavior. Additionally, we sought to understand how firms’ 
nonmarket strategies (NMS) and corporate reputation either intensify or buffer the positive and/or 
negative outcomes of CSiR. 
We emphasize across the different chapters the importance of firms incorporating 
nonmarket factors into core strategic decisions. There is no doubt that CSR is an important 
intangible asset for firms to utilize to their advantage, with benefits ranging from increased 
reputation and the achievement of a competitive advantage to improved employee morale (Barnett 
and Salomon, 2012; McWilliams and Siegel, 2011). Furthermore, CPA is associated with 
improving the firms’ competitive environment by influencing government policy in their favor 
(Hillman and Hitt, 1999). However, despite a few notable exceptions, the existing literature has so 
far overlooked the central role of nonmarket aspects when examining CSiR. 
We acknowledge throughout this thesis the evolution of firms as social and political actors, 
undertaking the role once solely assigned to governments. On top of this is the increased 
complexity that comes with operating in a globalized business environment. Broadly speaking, our 
research revolves around the way in which firms are adapting to this changing business 
environment and are by necessity adapting their strategic goals and objectives to incorporate a 




effectively if socially irresponsible behavior is uncovered. Indeed, the overarching question in this 
thesis is the following: Does CSiR adversely affect performance and strategic growth or can firms 
act with impunity?  The core structure of this thesis is comprised of three main chapters, which we 
briefly review below before we discuss the contribution to research, implications for practice and 
finally offer some concluding remarks. 
In Chapter 2 we aimed to systematically review the instrumental stakeholder theory 
literature (IST) to understand its trajectory since Donaldson and Preston’s seminal paper (1995) 
and offer some avenues for future research. The central premise of IST is that firms can build 
relationships with their stakeholders to create long-term value (Jones, 1995). Though early 
research in stakeholder theory favored a normative approach, thus neglecting IST, we detected a 
renewed interest in applying IST (Bridoux and Stoelhorst, 2014). Our review identified 109 papers 
spanning from 1995-2019. Based on Laplume, Sonpar and Litz’s classification of stakeholder 
themes (2008), we established the following categories capturing the research trajectory of IST: 1) 
Identification and salience; 2) Firm performance; 3) Corporate social responsibility (CSR); and 
4) Theory debates. We extended Laplume et al.’s classification (2008) by adding a fifth category: 
Corporate social irresponsibility. As firms operate in an increasingly challenging business 
environment, we see advantages of applying an instrumental approach to the firm-performance 
debate.    
Firms face new challenges as social and political factors influence their performance goals. 
Our research sets out to determine if developing relationships with both primary and secondary 
stakeholder groups can offer a response to these challenges. Firms are continually seeking new 
ways to improve their financial and operational capabilities, in some cases at the expense of the 




centers on investigating how socially responsible behavior can improve financial performance, 
emphasizing the interactions between firms and their primary stakeholder groups. However, while 
research has advanced in this area, we observed that it had taken a mostly one-sided approach. 
Research has mainly investigated the ‘good actions’ of the firm, yet mostly ignored how firms’ 
irresponsible acts have the potential to negatively affect firm performance (Brammer and 
Millington, 2008; Price and Sun, 2017).  
By applying IST as our main theoretical approach, our research intended to investigate 
secondary or ‘nonmarket’ stakeholders and their changing relationships with firms and how this 
can impact performance. IST pushes the narrative that firms can improve overall performance by 
building stakeholder relationships. Yet IST does not account for any firms’ irresponsible actions 
that can cause those same stakeholders to retaliate against said firms regarding their negative 
actions. In this respect, our research aligns with Price and Sun (2017) as we expand the boundaries 
of IST to investigate how CSiR can negatively impact the ability of firms to successfully achieve 
their strategic goals.  
Our next chapter (Chapter 3) is built on the premise that CSiR shapes the financial and 
non-financial performance of firms. To explore this premise, we undertook an empirical 
investigation using a sample of firms listed on Standard and Poor’s (S&P) 500 covering an 11-
year timeframe, using a series of random effect regressions. We carried out an extensive data 
collection and codification of media publications that resulted in a unique dataset of 420 CSiR 
events in which the firms from our sample had been involved during the analyzed timeframe. We 
used this database to create our independent variable of CSiR as well as some of the control 
variables of the study, in which we introduced Tobin’s q and corporate social performance (CSP) 




Our results indicated that there is no significant relationship between CSiR and Tobin’s q. 
In contrast, they showed that CSiR has a negative impact on CSP. By separately analyzing 
financial and non-financial performance measures, we gain a more comprehensive understanding 
of the outcomes of CSiR. In addition, distinguishing between primary and secondary stakeholder 
groups in our non-financial performance measure allowed us to provide more fine-grained 
evidence on the impact of CSiR on each of these groups. Moreover, we obtain interesting insights 
from our two moderating variables in this chapter: financial CPA (i.e. lobbying expenditures) and 
relational CPA (i.e. distance from the firm’s headquarters to the political capital of the country; 
namely, Washington DC, as they are all US-based). We find that financial CPA deepens the impact 
of the negative relationship between CSiR and non-financial performance. The same occurs with 
relational CPA, but only if this is proxied by the number of revolvers1 hired by a certain firm.  
Nonmarket scholars have put forward the notion that firms can align both strands on NMS 
(i.e. CSR and CPA) to improve firm performance (e.g. den Hond, Rehbein, de Bakker and 
Lankveld, 2014; Lawton, Doh and Rajwani, 2014). However, this research overlooks how CSiR 
shapes performance outcomes and that firms must adapt their social and political activities 
accordingly. As firms attempt to build a form of social and political capital, the tactics used can be 
viewed by some stakeholders as damaging to their interests. In this regard, CSiR can erode the 
gains of social and political investments made by firms since it is difficult to pursue an instrumental 
approach to stakeholder engagement when some stakeholders view a firm’s actions with suspicion.  
 
1 As previously defined, revolvers are “government regulators, Congressional staff and even members of Congress 
who take new jobs with lobbying firms and private sector organizations that they often used to supervise”. We 




In the final chapter (Chapter 4), we explore how CSiR impacts on a firm’s core strategic 
decision processes. Specifically, its external growth decisions via M&As (both domestic and cross-
border). We took the decision to focus on M&A activity as literature and practice describes this 
corporate strategy as the most popular form of external growth open to firms (Bauer, Dao, Matzler 
and Tarba, 2017). Prior research cites factors such as established production facilities, distribution 
networks and flexible payments in the form of stock options as motivations for pursuing M&As 
over other methods of growth (Huyghebaert and Luypaert, 2010; Reddy, 2014; Shimizu, Hitt, 
Vaidyanath and Pisano, 2004). 
Using our sample of S&P 500 firms used in Chapter 3, we added information detailing 
firms’ M&A activity from the Thomson Financial SDC database. We sought to examine the impact 
of CSiR on domestic and cross-border M&A announcements and whether this is used as a means 
of deflecting attention from the firms’ “bad deeds”. Our results provide partial evidence that when 
firms are involved in a single or ‘one-off’ CSiR event, they will decrease their M&A 
announcements. However, when considering a firm’s CSiR track record, we find a significant 
positive relationship between accumulated CSiR and the number of M&As announced. This 
finding could be interpreted as firms attempting to avoid potential retaliation from primary and 
secondary stakeholders where CSiR has occurred.  
In this chapter, we also added two moderating variables to our analysis; namely, lobbying 
expenditures and corporate reputation. By doing so, we address one of the research gaps in the 
current M&A literature, where nonmarket elements have been largely unexplored. Our results are 
in line with those in Chapter 3, as our analysis reveals that CPA further intensifies the negative 
outcomes of CSiR. Adding to this, we explore how firms involved in CSiR try to use reputation as 




effect of a corporate reputation given that highly regarded firms announce a higher number of 
M&As in the event of CSiR.  
 Overall, this thesis seeks to answer the question of whether firms are punished for their 
irresponsible behavior. Instinctively, the answer to this question would be yes, all firms are 
punished for behavior that is deemed unethical, immoral and/or illegal. However, the concept of 
CSiR is not so straightforward, and there are many factors affecting this outcome. The present 
research has addressed some of these factors, more specifically, the nonmarket issues. It is these 
issues that the present research has sought to address, using empirical analysis to investigate how 
firms use social and political capital, built using a series of nonmarket tactics to avoid stakeholder 
retaliation. Overall, our research shows that only in certain instances do firms face repercussions 
for their CSiR actions. For instance, the analysis in Chapter 3 shows that financial performance 
(i.e., Tobin’s q) is not affected by CSiR, which might mean that shareholders tend to overlook the 
irresponsible actions that firms commit. Meanwhile, stakeholders as a whole are more likely to 
hold firms accountable for their CSiR behavior, especially when these firms increase political 
activity through financial CPA.  
 As we have discussed in the thesis, CSiR is a multifaceted concept identified through 
accidental or intentional behavior by the firm. However, identifying which CSiR act falls into these 
two categories can be subjective and in some cases context specific. We note early in this research 
the different factors affecting CSiR, such as how the location of the act can determine the 
difference between illegal and immoral CSiR. This suggests that stakeholder perception of these 
actions will determine if the firm faces some form of punishment. Our results in Chapter 4, 
specifically the analysis of the control variables identifying each CSiR category, suggest that not 




stakeholders recognize CSiR acts. As previously discussed, stakeholders’ attention is often split, 
and firms rely on this to potentially deflect attention from irresponsible behavior. By answering 
the overarching research question, this thesis shows that CSiR activity can negatively affect a 
firm’s performance. Nonetheless, there may be extenuating circumstances that will determine if 
there are any consequences and how severe these consequences are.  
5.2 Contribution to Research  
This research makes four important contributions to NMS, IST and M&A literatures. First, 
we extend IST into the nonmarket domain by drawing attention to the ability of stakeholders to 
sanction firms due to irresponsible behavior. In their original contribution, Donaldson and Preston 
(1995) endorse the normative approach to stakeholder theory as the dominant perspective, with 
the instrumental approach taking a more subservient role. However, it is clear that the instrumental 
approach to stakeholder theory is more suited to a complex business environment like the current 
one we live in. Stakeholder theory is originally rooted in strategic management, and in challenging 
and uncertain business environments, collaborating with stakeholders is vital to safeguarding and 
often improving firm performance. An ethical/normative approach to the strategy-performance 
debate has merit, but firms are ultimately focused on value creation. Taking an instrumental 
approach to stakeholder relationships provides opportunities for collaboration and reduces the 
potential for conflict. The core ethos of IST is to create long-term stakeholder relations by building 
trust, leading to a sustained competitive advantage. We note with interest that Jones (1995) discuss 
how firms can sanction certain stakeholders where opportunistic behavior occurs. However, our 
research challenges this assumption and we examine if stakeholders can sanction firms through 




   Our next contribution is in the nonmarket domain, where we address a call from scholars 
in both strategy and international business that seek to align the parallel strands of nonmarket 
strategy; namely, CSR and CPA. Aligning these two concepts is bound to make firms enjoy the 
perceived benefits of both to improve firm performance (den Hond et al., 2014). However, our 
research takes a different approach to this and considers the role of CSiR and how this type of 
behavior (either intentional or accidental) can influence firm performance. Firms can reap many 
benefits from CSR, including improved financial performance (Barnett and Salomon, 2012); 
enhanced corporate reputation (Brammer and Pavelin, 2005); and sustained competitive advantage 
(Saeidi, Sofian, Saeidi, Saeidi, and Saaeidi, 2015). And while these benefits can extend to both 
primary and secondary stakeholder groups, the benefits of firms engaging in CPA mostly extends 
to the firm (Lux, Crook and Woehr, 2011). Our research explores the effect that relational and 
financial lobbying have on the relationship between CSiR and firm performance, finding that it 
either has no effect or a negative effect that further erodes financial and non-financial gains. As 
such, aligning the two strands of nonmarket strategy in the aftermath of a CSiR event is a complex 
task. To the best of our knowledge, this thesis is the first study to extend IST into the CPA domain. 
Our research refocuses IST from the firm as the dominant partner and brings attention to other 
important nonmarket stakeholder groups who can retaliate against the firm and affect its 
performance objectives. 
 We also contribute overall to nonmarket strategy literature by analyzing CSR and CSiR as 
two separate variables. CSR is a multidimensional construct and extends to business ethics, 
strategy, corporate reputation and organizational behavior. And through all this, research extends 
the virtues of firms engaging in CSR and the benefits to firm and stakeholders alike. However, 




“doing good, it is avoiding bad” (Murphy and Schlegelmilch, 2013; Price and Sun, 2017). Chapters 
3 and 4 in this thesis analyze CSiR separately from CSR to provide a better understanding of the 
performance impact of CSiR. We found that separating the “good” and “bad” can help firms better 
address issues that are harmful not just to firm performance, but also stakeholder engagement. We 
believe that nonmarket strategy is firm and industry specific, and therefore it is necessary to 
separately account for all factors in this process and move firms away from a ‘one-size fits all’ 
mentality.    
 Our final contribution is to the mergers and acquisitions (M&A) literature. We extend 
nonmarket strategy and IST into this research domain. M&As are complex and require extensive 
negotiations with multiple stakeholders across economic, political, social, governance, and 
environmental spheres. Yet so far, the M&A literature has largely ignored nonmarket concepts by 
concentrating on the financial and strategic factors that affect this process. Our research introduces 
the nonmarket element and takes a stakeholder perspective rather than a shareholder-centric 
approach that marks most of this literature. We investigate how to avoid or mitigate stakeholder 
retaliation by using reputational and political capital where CSiR poses a risk. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study to take such an approach.  
5.3 Reflection of the Research Journey  
 Over the course of completing this thesis I2 encountered some challenges that ultimately 
determined the methodological approach. The following is an account of said challenges, and how 
they eventually contributed to the creation of the unique and novel dataset and successful 
completion of the thesis. These challenges are directly related to the nature of the core research 
 
2 Please note the use of “I” instead of “we” in this subsection, in which I reflect on the process that led me to 




topics addressed, and the practical challenges that researchers face when designing a successful 
research strategy.   
In the early stages of the PhD program, developing a rigorous research strategy was crucial 
to successfully complete the doctoral thesis. In order to do this, the nature of the research question 
itself would in some ways determine how the research methodology would develop, and by 
extension the data collection process. Initially, I designed an inductive qualitative study with the 
express aim of targeting aerospace companies. The idea here was to pursue firms operating in 
industries deemed to be strongly active in the nonmarket arena. The original direction of the thesis 
set out to explore how firms develop sociopolitical strategies to overcome potential issues that may 
arise as firms expand operations across national borders. One area of interest focused particularly 
on issues related to liabilities of foreignness during the internationalization process, investigating 
how firms could use their socio-political activity to overcome such issues. Drawing on IST as the 
main theoretical framework, one of the central aims of the thesis set out to explore the different 
stakeholder networks these firms engage with to successfully implement market and nonmarket 
strategies. Therefore, I developed (together with my supervisors) a research strategy aimed at 
gaining an in-depth understanding of how these networks unfold to achieve the firm’s strategic 
objectives.  
Using this perspective, my supervisors and I agreed that trade associations would be the 
most appropriate group of stakeholders to approach, as these are active in both social and political 
activities. Having identified these groups, we approached the UK, USA and European aerospace 
trade associations to conduct a series of interviews with these specific partners. This process met 
with some success in the early phase. I made initial contact with the UK and US associations using 




From here a series of informal interviews were arranged to introduce the intended work connected 
to the thesis and lay out the research aims and objectives. 
 It was during this process that my supervisors and I were informed that the UK TA held 
every two years the Farnborough Air and Trade Show, where more than 1500 of its members 
attended a weeklong trade show and exhibition. In 2018, I applied to attend the exhibition and 
created a “research information pack” to approach a specific set of global aerospace firms. I 
identified the top 100 aerospace firms and cross-checked that each one was a member of the trade 
association and would be attending the air show as exhibitors.  
 I conducted the initial research strategy over three stages to gain access and secure the 
agreement of individuals at each organization to take part in a series of interviews. First, I planned 
to approach the identified trade associations to explore the stakeholder-firm relationship. Next, I 
intended to email a specific set of aerospace companies; and, finally, I made the necessary 
arrangements to attend the trade show to conduct face-to-face research pitches to make contacts 
and follow up communication in the next phase, once agreement had been confirmed. However, 
this ambitious strategy met with serious challenges regarding access to these firms. In one respect, 
we had successfully engaged with the trade associations, but only to a certain point. While the UK 
trade association showed interest in partaking in the research process, the US trade association, 
after the initial contact and informal interviews (conducted over Skype), were unable to continue 
to engage in the research project further. Reasons given centred around issues such as conflicts of 
interest and confidentiality. One central point made was the nature of the contract process with the 
US trade association and its clients, the premise being that the US government (as the main client 




 Beyond this, the months spent engaging with firms via emails also met with limited 
success. Some firms showed initial interest in engaging in the process. They were particularly 
eager to discuss their social responsibility initiatives. However, when discussions touched upon 
their political activity, this was met with reluctance and in most cases a refusal to progress further 
in the research project. Moreover, where some firms cited conflicts of interest and confidentiality, 
other firms cited a lack of time and resources to engage in a research project of this size. Mostly 
though, firms ceased contact altogether.  
 The end result of this unsuccessful research strategy prompted discussions with my 
supervisory team on the most appropriate next steps for the thesis. Ultimately, it was decided that 
a quantitative approach should be explored, more specifically looking at secondary archival data 
to avoid further issues with access. As described in earlier sections of this thesis, an extensive data 
collection process was devised, following previous studies in the nonmarket strategy and social 
movement literatures (e.g., McDonnell and Werner, 2016: Price and Sun, 2017). This decision 
resulted in the successful completion of the thesis in its current form. On a final note, although I 
met serious challenges in the early stages of completing the thesis, this was a valuable learning 
experience for an early career researcher, which I will be able to build on for future research 
projects.    
5.4 Implications for Future Research and Practice  
 Based on the results from the extensive analysis conducted in the thesis, this section serves 
to discuss some areas that may be of importance to practitioners. Using IST as the main theoretical 
lens, we highlight the necessity of firms to increase stakeholder engagement to improve overall 
performance while noting the ability of stakeholders to influence the strategic direction of firms. 




stakeholder engagement. Prior research has focused on the most powerful stakeholder groups (e.g., 
employees and suppliers), who are perceived to have the ability to disrupt firm performance. By 
contrast, nonmarket or “secondary” stakeholders, who can also significantly influence firm 
performance, have received scant attention. Nonetheless, our research shows that not all 
stakeholder engagement improves performance. As an example, it seems that engaging with 
nonmarket stakeholders via lobbying can negatively impact on non-financial performance. 
Therefore, it is essential to continually assess the needs of all stakeholder groups (both primary 
and secondary) to understand and anticipate their influence. We would suggest that implementing 
an audit process similar to how firms assess the impact of CSR programs is one such measure 
practitioners could take. Stakeholders may have competing needs and taking a long-term approach 
to manage those needs by addressing and evaluating each relationship can potentially identify 
problematic issues and reduce conflicts.   
We identify early in the thesis serious challenges in the business environment concerning 
social and environmental issues that impact on firm performance. Facing increased pressure from 
stakeholders concerning the responsibility of firms to provide solutions to these issues is pushing 
firms to engage more strategically with their CSR policies and programs. Firms now seek 
opportunities to align these factors with firms financial and operational goals. Effectively aligning 
social and financial objectives has enabled some firms to reduce operational costs, increase 
efficiency and improve reputation. The successful implementation of these policies has caught the 
attention of shareholders and investors, placing further pressure on firms to align market and 
nonmarket strategies. This has implications for the wider area of strategy and practitioners alike, 
as we now see firms pushed to divest from socially irresponsible practices and increase their 




if firms have a history of irresponsible behavior, as these efforts could be viewed with skepticism 
concerning firm motivation. As this type of pressure increases, activist shareholders will continue 
to urge firms to incorporate more strategic CSR into their financial and operational activities. In 
past research where the unnecessary cost of CSR programs has been used to cut funding for these 
projects, we now see opportunity for CSR to boost financial performance and attract future 
investors. We anticipate fruitful opportunities for practitioners to invest in innovative programs to 
boost CSR initiatives, particularly in terms of clean/green technology.     
Finally, our research highlights the implications of continued investment in political 
activity, using both financial and relational CPA tactics. Our analysis shows the negative effect of 
financial CPA on non-financial performance. Stakeholder attention on firm activity is increasing, 
specifically in areas that can be misconstrued as forms of bribery. Increasing lobbying 
expenditures can negatively impact relations with certain stakeholders, particularly if the issues 
that firms lobby for have the potential to harm them (e.g., lobbying efforts against the increase of 
the minimum wage). This can be particularly damaging for firm performance and growth if the 
firm is also involved in CSiR. It is therefore essential that firms engaging in these practices assess 
each one on a case-by-case basis, as certain CPA tactics can contradict other strategic intentions 
of firms. This can undermine confidence in the firm’s ability to meet its strategic obligations and 
may have long-term consequences.  
************************************ 
All in all, our findings offer some interesting perspectives on the stakeholder-performance 
debate. Firms are under increasing pressure to find innovative solutions to improve performance 
and create a sustainable competitive advantage. Our aim of extending the stakeholder-performance 




assumption that irresponsible behavior will negatively impact firm performance. Drawing on IST 
and signaling theory, we have explored how firms engage in nonmarket activities to try to build 
social and political capital as a form of insurance. While these tactics may work, we find that only 
a good corporate reputation has an insurance-like effect when CSiR takes place. This supports risk 
management as a successful strategy for certain firms (Pfeffer, 2016). As Groening and Kanuri 
(2013) point out “it pays to be good, but not too good”. Nonetheless, being involved in CPA 
worsens the negative effects of CSiR. We suggest that when firms see the potential of taking an 
instrumental approach to stakeholder engagement, they will need to readdress their CPA activity. 
If they continue investing in financial and relational CPA, our results indicate that stakeholders 
will eventually sanction them, probably because of how these nonmarket activities are often 
associated with shady operations. 
Firms must now pay attention to this as stakeholders are more than ever able to hold firms 
accountable for their actions. Stakeholders have become increasingly vocal on social media 
platforms, ensuring firms will need to devote greater resources to manage their stakeholder 
engagement. Consumer preferences are changing and awareness of certain CSiR behaviors can 
push them to switch brands to more socially responsible firms. For instance, we note the rise of 
firms attempting to achieve a B-Corporation certificate to incorporate more sustainable practices 
into their core business models.3 Other examples are the Pandora Group, which is committing to 
using only recycled materials in its jewelry;4 or the Brewdog Brewery Company, which has 
recently announced its carbon neutral status.5 Both firms aim to become market leaders in their 
 
3 “Certified B Corporations are businesses that meet the highest standards of verified social and environmental 
performance, public transparency, and legal accountability to balance profit and purpose” (B Corps, n.d.). For more 
information, please visit: https://bcorporation.net/ (Last accessed August 25, 2020). 
4 https://www.ft.com/content/d82002c9-26ef-41bc-80b7-96025f52dbdd (Last accessed August 25, 2020).  
5 https://www.forbes.com/sites/emanuelabarbiroglio/2020/08/25/brewdog-is-officially-the-first-carbon-negative-




industries, implementing innovative policies and practices and seeking to secure brand and product 
loyalty.         
We expect that full transparency is key to firms responding to the increased pressure to 
align their stakeholder strategy with their performance goals. Whether CSiR acts are intentional or 
accidental, keeping stakeholders engaged and informed throughout the process is crucial. In fact, 
collaborating with stakeholders to find solutions to prevent CSiR from reoccurring could be 
beneficial for firms to secure long-term value creation. Stakeholder engagement is still relatively 
ill defined, and so are the motivations of investing in stakeholder activities.  
But what are the costs of not engaging with nonmarket stakeholders? In the current 
business climate, this seems to be the most significant question. At a time of unprecedented change, 
firms are by necessity changing their strategic approach. In many cases, stakeholders who were 
once side-lined or dismissed as unimportant are now considered crucial and regarded as key 
workers, for instance. In the era of COVID-19, many of our assumptions regarding firm behavior 
may no longer seem relevant. Yet what stands out now is that more than ever, this crisis has 
accelerated the shift towards a more stakeholder-centric approach to business management. The 
World Economic Forum has labelled this the great reset6, stating that cooperation and partnerships 
across political, economic, and social arenas is vital to renewed growth and opportunity. Our 
research seeks to emphasize this point, that stakeholder engagement is key to creating shared value, 
as we seek to move the business and society debate beyond a purely shareholder-centric approach.  
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